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Resumen 
          Este conjunto de ensayos tiene como principal objetivo proporcionar una base 
epistemológica a las ciencias sociales y en especial, a la economía. Nuestro punto de 
partida y principal premisa es la Teoría Evolucionista Popperiana del Conocimiento y del 
Aprendizaje (PTKL). No obstante, existe una segunda rama en la obra de Popper que está 
directamente relacionada con la metodología de las ciencias sociales: el Análisis 
Situacional (SA) y el Principio de Racionalidad (RP). De estas dos ramas se derivan dos 
nociones distintas de "racionalidad" en la obra de Popper. El objetivo del presente estudio, 
por tanto, es doble: (i) estudiar la relación entre PTKL y SA y (ii) estudiar los 
fundamentos epistemológicos de dos enfoques macroeconómicos rivales a la luz de la 
PTKL y el RP, a saber, la teoría keynesiana y la llamada "Nueva Síntesis Neoclásica". 
          El primer ensayo es un análisis crítico de la relación entre PTKL y el SA y las 
implicaciones que se derivan para las ciencias sociales. Nuestra primera hipótesis es que 
existe cierta tensión entre el PTKL y el SA cuando su relación se analiza desde el punto 
de vista de la “racionalidad de los agentes” cuyo comportamiento es recogido en el 
modelo, aunque la tensión desaparece en gran medida cuando dicha relación se analiza 
desde el punto de vista de la “racionalidad del modelizador”. Nuestra segunda hipótesis 
es que el tipo de tensión entre el PTKL y el SA depende de si el modelizador adopta la 
versión “objetivista” (RPo) o “subjetivista” (RPs) del RP. Nuestra tercera hipótesis se 
apoya en las ideas de Hayek (1943) sobre los “hechos” de las ciencias sociales, y 
argumentamos que tal y como Popper y otros autores definen el RPo, éste representa un 
caso extremo pues presupone que el P-S es completamente independiente de las 
expectativas de los agentes. Nuestra cuarta y última hipótesis está estrechamente  
relacionada con la anterior, y consiste en la idea de que, si aceptamos las ideas de Hayek 
sobre la naturaleza de los hechos en las ciencias sociales, la estrategia natural para los 
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científicos sociales es la reconstrucción del P-S tal y como los agentes la perciben, más 
que la reconstrucción de acuerdo a cómo el científico la percibe. Por último, y a diferencia 
de lo que Popper y otros autores sugieren, la diferencia entre el RPo y el RPs no consiste 
en que en el primero el modelizador reconstruye el P-S como realmente es y, que en el 
segundo, se reconstruye como los agentes lo ven, sino que en el primero el modelizador 
reconstruye el P-S como él percibe que el P-S es mientras que en el segundo lo 
reconstruye como él cree que los agentes creen que P-S es. 
              En el primero de los ensayos apuntamos que Hume era escéptico acerca de la 
racionalidad del comportamiento humano porque pensaba que éste estaba basado en la 
“costumbre y el hábito”, es decir, en el supuesto de que el “futuro será como el pasado” 
a pesar de no existir una “lógica inductiva”. Igualmente, en sus escritos tardíos, Keynes 
presupone que tomamos decisiones utilizando procedimientos inductivos que consisten 
en adoptar reglas sociales y convenciones en las que confiamos debido a los buenos 
resultados generados en el pasado. Las reglas y convenciones que Keynes identifica en 
sus escritos tardíos son, a todos los efectos, equivalentes a la vieja idea de Hume acerca 
del comportamiento basado en “costumbres y hábitos”. Concretamente, la convención 
más importante es el supuesto de que “el estado presente de las cosas continuará de forma 
indefinida a no ser que haya razones específicas para esperar un cambio” (Keynes, 1936, 
p. 152). La tesis principal del ensayo es que la teoría de Keynes es compatible con la 
PKTL. Además, mostramos que el tipo de metodología implícita en la teoría keynesiana 
es un caso particular de RPs. Respecto al punto anterior, mostramos que la formación 
convencional de expectativas en la teoría macroeconómica keynesiana puede ser 
interpretada como el resultado último de un complejo proceso caracterizado por el método 
de prueba y error donde aquellas convenciones que son percibidas por los agentes como 
erróneas son reemplazadas en el tiempo por nuevas convenciones que emergen 
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espontáneamente. Proponemos el concepto de “Convenciones Hegemónicas” (HC) para 
denotar estas convenciones que son utilizadas por los agentes económicos porque creen 
que representan una guía válida para la toma de decisiones. En la medida que el proceso 
por el que las HC emergen y desaparecen es un proceso de prueba y error, establecemos 
una analogía entre el crecimiento del conocimiento convencional en la teoría keynesiana 
y el proceso de expansión del conocimiento derivado del PTKL. A continuación, 
argumentamos que la convención “el presente estado de las cosas continuará de forma 
indefinida a no ser que haya razones específicas para esperar un cambio” está en el núcleo 
de la teoría keynesiana y es responsable de dos de las críticas más habituales que ha 
recibido: (i) el supuesto comportamiento irracional de los agentes y (ii) su aparente 
nihilismo. En el ensayo mostramos que estas críticas son una consecuencia directa de la 
adopción por parte de los economistas ortodoxos del RPo y que pueden ser debidamente 
contestadas cuando se demuestra que la teoría keynesiana es, contrariamente a la teoría 
neoclásica, una versión particular del RPs.  
            El último ensayo analiza la “Hipótesis de Expectativas Racionales” (REH) a la 
luz de la PTKL. En el ensayo se defiende que la adopción de la REH sesga la teoría 
macroeconómica y reduce su relevancia práctica al restringir su aplicabilidad a 
situaciones de “riesgo” (Knight 1971[1921]) o “mundos pequeños” (Savage, 1954). En 
dichos contextos, la única fuente de falibilidad es la incapacidad de los agentes 
económicos para anticipar shocks aleatorios “exógenos”. Por el contrario, en el ensayo se 
señala que la PKTL proporciona a la teoría macroeconómica una sólida fundamentación 
epistemológica que permite incorporar plenamente la falibilidad humana.  
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Abstract 
        These essays represent an attempt to provide an epistemological basis for the social 
sciences and, especially, for economics. Our departure point is Popper’s Evolutionary 
Theory of Knowledge and Learning (PTKL). However, there is a second strand in 
Popper´s philosophy that is directly related to the methodology of the social sciences: 
Popper´s Situational Analysis (SA) and the ` Rationality Principle´ (RP) that lies at its core. 
It follows that there are two notions of rationality in Popper´s work: (i) the notion that 
stems from (PTKL) according to which human behaviour is `rational´ if it exhibits 
`corrigibility´ (i.e., if individuals are willing to eliminate their errors), and (ii) the notion 
that stems from Popper´s RP according to which human behaviour is `rational´ if it is 
appropriate or adequate the Problem-Situation (P-S) in which actors find themselves. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is two-fold: (i) to analyze the relation between PTKL 
and RP, and (ii) to analyze the epistemological foundations of two different (and rival) 
macro-theories (the so-called New Neoclassical Synthesis and Keynes´s macro-theory) 
in the light of both PTKL and SA.       
The first essay provides a critical analysis of the relationship between PTKL and 
SA and its implications for the social sciences. Our first claim is that there is a certain 
tension between PTKL and SA when their relation is analyzed from the standpoint of the 
`rationality of the agents´ whose behaviour the theoretical model seeks to capture albeit 
the tension disappears when the relation is analyzed from the standpoint of the ` rationality 
of the theoretician´. Our second claim is that the nature of the tension between PTKL and 
SA depends upon whether the theoretician adopts the `objectivist´ (RPo) or the 
`subjectivist´ (RPs) version of RP. Our third claim builds upon the ideas of Hayek (1943) 
about the `facts´ of the social sciences and is that, as presented by Popper and his 
commentators, RPo represents an extreme case based on the presupposition that P-S is 
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(fully) independent of agents´ beliefs. Our fourth claim is closely related to the previous 
one and consists of the idea that, if Hayek´s ideas are taken on board, it follows that the 
natural strategy for social scientists is to seek to reconstruct P-S as agents´ see it rather 
than to reconstruct it as the scientist sees it. Our last claim is that, unlike what Popper 
suggests, the difference between RPo and RPs is not that in the former the theoretician 
reconstructs P-S as it actually is whereas in the latter she does it as agents see it but, 
rather, that in the former she reconstructs P-S as she sees it herself whereas in the latter 
she does it as she believes that agents actually see it. 
In our second essay we note that Hume was sceptical about the rationality of 
human behaviour because he believed that the latter was grounded upon `custom and 
habit´, that is, on the assumption that the `future will resemble the past´ in spite of the 
inexistence of an `inductive logic´. Now, the view Keynes adopts in his later economic 
writings consists of the notion that we make decisions by using inductive procedures 
which essentially amount to adopting the social rules and conventions which are widely 
believed to have yielded good results in the past. The former are, for our purposes, 
equivalent to Hume´s old idea that individual behaviour is grounded upon `custom and 
habit´. In particular, the chief convention of all, according to Keynes, is the assumption 
that `the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely, except in so far as we have 
specific reasons to expect a change´. This assumption plays an essential role in Keynesian 
macro-theory in that it enables the theoretician to construct models in which: (i) economic 
agents behave in a `rational´ way in a context of genuine uncertainty, and (ii) testable 
predictions can a priori be generated. The main thesis of this essay is that Keynes´s theory 
is compatible with PTKL. Further, we also argue that the methodology underlying 
Keynes´s macro-theory is an instance of the `subjectivist´ version of Popper´s 
`Rationality Principle´ (RPs). Finally, we argue that the convention that ` the existing state 
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of affairs will continue indefinitely, except in so far as we have specific reasons to expect 
a change´ is at the core of Keynesian macro-theory and is directly responsible for two 
criticisms the latter has been subject to: (i) the alleged `irrational´ behaviour of Keynesian 
economic agents, and (ii) the nihilism of Keynesian theory. Notwithstanding it, we argue 
that these criticisms stem from the adoption by mainstream economists of the ` objectivist´ 
version of Popper´s `Rationality Principle´ (RPo) and that they can be duly answered by 
showing that Keynes´s theory is instead an instance of RPs.  
 The third and last essay analyses the `Rational Expectations Hypothesis´ (REH) 
in the light of PTKL. We argue that the adoption of REH biases macroeconomics and 
reduces its practical relevance by restricting its applicability to situations of ‘risk’ or 
‘small worlds’. In such contexts, the only source of fallibility is the inability of economic 
agents to anticipate ‘exogenous’ random shocks. By contrast, we argue that PTKL 
provides macro-theory with solid epistemological and ontological foundations in that it 
enables it to take full account of human fallibility. We also argue that, in an economy, 
change and evolution can be viewed as generated endogenously by the interaction of two 
feedback mechanisms: (i) a negative feedback mechanism whereby market participants 
revise their previous expectations in the light of observed systematic discrepancies 
between expected and realized outcomes, and (ii) a feedback mechanism of ambiguous 
sign whereby market participants´ decisions and actions may alter the surrounding 
environment in an unpredictable way. The endogeneity of change in a market economy 
generates two main predictions: (i) macroeconomic equilibrium is fragile and short-lived 
thereby making it difficult for theorists and policy-makers to exploit it, and (ii) market 
economies exhibit boom-bust cycles of varying amplitude and duration so that there is 
never a repetition of the same cycle.  
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I. SOME REFLECTIONS ON POPPER´S APPROACH 
TO RATIONALITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES  
 
 
`The physicist who is only a physicist can still be a first-class physicist and a most valuable 
member of society. But nobody can be a great economist who is only an economist ― and I am 
even tempted to add that the economist who is only an economist is likely to become a nuisance 
if not a positive danger´ (F. A. Hayek, `The Dilemma of Specialization´, p. 123, in Studies in 
Philosophy, Politics, & Economics, 1967).  
 
1. Introduction  
Discussions by both philosophers of science and social science methodologists on 
Popper´s methodological proposal for the social sciences known as `Situational Analysis´ 
(SA) have focused either on its (in)compatibility with falsification (Hands, 1985, 1991, 
1992; Notturno, 1998; Hedström et al., 1998) or on its interpretation.1 In the former case, 
the debate has revolved around Popper´s confession (Popper, 1994, ch. 8) that his 
`rationality principle´ (RP), i.e., the notion that in the construction of models in the social 
sciences we must assume that actors´ behaviour is adequate or appropriate to their 
problem-situation (P-S), is false but nevertheless a good enough approximation to the 
truth (Popper, 1985).2 This surprising confession by a philosopher of science whose 
academic reputation grew out of the formulation of a demarcation criterion for scientific 
hypotheses based on the requirement that the latter be potentially falsified has led some 
commentators to argue that Popper´s methodological proposal for the social sciences and, 
specifically, his RP is incompatible with the criterion of refutability as prescribed for the 
13 
 
natural sciences.3 Some critics even argue that such incompatibility severely undermines 
Popper´s claim to methodological monism in the natural and the social sciences. Other 
critics have accused him of reintroducing a pure instrumentalism à la Friedman (1953) 
due to his methodological advice to immunize RP from potential refutation and of 
`contradicting his own explicit rejection of instrumentalist pretences to knowledge´ 
(Oakley, 1999, p. 32).  
As for the interpretation of RP, the debate has centred on its role and status. For 
instance, Latsis (1983, p. 132) argues that `Popper´s account of the role and status of the 
rationality principle is obscure and unsatisfactory´. He shows that, in different parts of his 
work, Popper notes that RP is `almost empty´, `not a priori valid´, `clearly false´, `a good 
approximation to the truth´, and `the consequence of a methodological postulate´ (op. cit., 
p. 133). According to him, the role of RP is to function as a `plastic interface´ between 
mental states and behaviour and this is the reason why it is declared by Popper to be false 
but close to the truth (op. cit., p. 140). Specifically, RP is false if interpreted in a literal 
way because it does not determine behaviour in a `cast-iron´ fashion but is close to the 
truth because it captures the tendency of human behaviour to follow the logic dictated by 
P-S.4 Crucially, he distinguishes between an `objectivist´ (RPo) and a `subjectivist´ 
version (RPs), and associates the former with Pareto (1917, section 150) and Parsons 
(1937, p. 58), and the latter with Popper himself. If RPo is adopted, the theoretician 
reconstructs the `objective´ P-S in an oversimplified way whereas, if RPs is adopted, P-S 
is reconstructed as it is seen by the actors.  
Building on Latsis´ distinction between RPo and RPs, Nadeau (1993) discusses 
the role of RP in Popper (1985) and maintains that RPo is clearly false because actors´ 
behaviour is not always adequate to the `objective´ P-S whereas RPs is irrefutable and, 
hence, it can only be interpreted as a metaphysical statement (op. cit., p. 459). He then 
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states that RPs is the correct interpretation since `the rationality principle that Popper puts 
at the theoretical core of all social sciences looks more like a “synthetic a priori truth or 
pure reason” in the domain of social reality than like an empirical law of nature´. 
Nevertheless, when asked to clarify whether RP is a `methodological principle´ or an 
`empirical conjecture´, Popper explains that `[t]his second case is precisely the one that 
corresponds to my own view of the status of the rationality principle: I regard the principle 
of adequacy of action (that is the rationality principle) as an integral part of every, or 
nearly every, testable social theory´ (Popper, 1994, p. 177). In other words, he views RP 
as an integral part of any empirical theory in the social sciences and, more specifically, 
as the animating part, just as the laws of motion of planets are an integral part of Newton´s 
gravitational theory. In an attempt to make sense of all this, Lagueux (2006, p. 203) argues 
that a methodological principle cannot be a part of a scientific theory whose constituent 
parts must be empirical rather than a priori. Yet, according to him, if RP cannot be a 
methodological principle, `the decision to immunize it can nonetheless be considered as 
based on a methodological principle´ (see Notturno, 1998, pp. 405-408). Although he 
uses a different terminology — methodological `rule´ instead of methodological 
`principle´ — de Bruin (2006, p. 213) also explains that the decision to adopt RP is a 
methodological rule according to which `one should always try to explain human 
behaviour in terms of reasons´. However, he adds that `there are good reasons to doubt 
whether the kind of principle of rationality that Popper discusses is really empirical at 
all… one could as well phrase it as a metaphysical principle that all actions have reasons´ 
(de Bruin, 2006, p. 216, emphasis added).  
 Despite the fact that some commentators have noted that there are two different 
notions of rationality in Popper´s philosophy, there has been very little discussion about 
the relation of RP and Popper´s evolutionary theory of knowledge and learning (PTKL). 
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The essence of Popper´s theory of knowledge is that all knowledge is conjectural and that 
we can never prove that a hypothesis is true albeit sometimes it is possible to prove that 
it is wrong. Likewise, the essence of Popper´s evolutionary theory of learning is that all 
living organisms (including human beings) learn by virtue of an imperfect and unending 
process that consists of subjecting their conjectures or hypotheses to trial and eliminating 
those ones which turn out to be erroneous while keeping provisionally those ones that are 
not falsified (Popper, 1963, p. 312).5 In other words, our knowledge grows in a `negative´ 
sense by discarding erroneous conjectures through a process of trial and error-elimination. 
As a result of it, an implication of PTKL is that the most important feature of knowledge 
is its fallibility. A second element of Popper´s theory of learning is that the learning 
process is always imperfect insofar as it never reaches an optimum adaptation to the 
surrounding environment.  
Now, a number of critics have referred to the apparent duality in Popper´s notion 
of rationality. To be sure, Popper (1985, p. 365; 1994, p. 181) distinguishes between 
rationality as a personal attitude — which he defines as the attitude of readiness to correct 
one´s beliefs when they turn out to be wrong — and his RP which, according to him, has 
nothing to do with the assumption that men are rational in this sense. Further, when he 
presents SA as his methodological proposal for the social sciences he writes that `when 
we speak of “rational behaviour” or of “irrational behaviour” then we mean behaviour 
which is, or is not, in accordance with the logic of the situation´ (Popper, (1966[1943a]), 
p. 97; 1944-45, sections 31 & 32). Be that as it may, Kerstenetzky (2009, p. 202) argues 
that the demarcation line between rationality and irrationality in Popper is the 
incorrigibility of one´s beliefs. That is, human behaviour is `rational´ if we are willing to 
correct our wrong beliefs and `irrational´ if otherwise. Similarly, Lagueux (2006, p. 202) 
points out that it is the `tendency to correct oneself by criticism´ that represents true 
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rationality in Popper whereas Vanberg (2002, p. 19) remarks that, on the one hand, Popper 
presents RP as the methodological foundation for the social sciences but, in other parts of 
his work, he sketches out a framework for the analysis of human behaviour that relies on 
a different approach at purposeful behaviour that he defines as `conjecture-based 
problem-solving behaviour´. Finally, the conflict between the view of human agency 
depicted in PTKL and SA is also noted by Oakley (1999, p. 25; 2002, p. 468).  
 The main purpose of this essay is to analyse the compatibility or otherwise of these 
two seemingly different notions of rationality in Popper´s work. In the process, we will 
make five claims. Our first claim is that there is a certain tension between PTKL and SA 
when their relation is analysed from the standpoint of the ` rationality of the agents´ whose 
behaviour the theoretician seeks to capture in a situational model albeit the tension 
disappears when the relation is treated from the standpoint of the `rationality of the 
theoretician´. Our second claim is that the nature of the tension between PTKL and SA 
depends on whether the theoretician adopts the `objectivist´ or the `subjectivist´ version 
of SA. In particular, we will argue below that the tension between PTKL and the 
`subjectivist´ version stems from the fact that, in the latter, it is implicitly assumed that 
agents´ view of P-S is, at least partially, wrong which implies that agents do not tend to 
eliminate their mistakes as PTKL posits. By contrast, we will argue that the tension 
between PTKL and the `objectivist´ version of SA stems from the fact that: (i) if agents 
behave according to PTKL it is not necessarily the case that their decisions will be 
adequate or appropriate to the `logic of the situation´ because the former only implies that 
agents tend to eliminate their (past) mistakes and, hence, in the wake of changes in the 
surrounding environment agents´ decisions may be inadequate to the `logic of the (new) 
situation´, and (ii) adoption of the `objectivist´ SA implies de facto the imposition of the 
theoretician´s view of P-S on agents´ but it is unlikely that if agents behave according to 
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PTKL their view of P-S will converge to the theoreticians´. Our third claim builds on the 
ideas of Hayek (1943) about the nature of the `facts´ of the social sciences and is that, in 
the way it is presented by Popper and his commentators, the `objectivist´ version of SA 
represents a limit case which presupposes that P-S is (fully) independent of agents´ 
beliefs. Our fourth claim is closely related to the previous one and consists of the idea 
that, if Hayek´s ideas are accepted, it follows that the natural strategy for social scientists 
is to seek to reconstruct P-S as agents´ see it. Our fifth and last claim is that, unlike what 
Popper and some of his commentators suggest, the difference between the `objectivist´ 
and the `subjectivist´ version of SA is not that in the former the theoretician reconstructs 
P-S as it actually is whereas in the latter she does it as agents see it but, rather that in the 
former the theoretician seeks to reconstruct P-S as she sees it whereas in the latter she 
does it as she believes agents see it. The content of the essay is as follows. The following 
section introduces PTKL. In section 3, we expound Popper´s SA. In section 4, we discuss 
the duality in Popper´s notion of rationality by addressing: (i) the implications of adopting 
either the `objectivist´ or the `subjectivist´ version of SA, (ii) Hayek´s ideas about the 
`facts´ of the social sciences, (iii) a reformulation of the `objectivist´ and `subjectivist´ 
version of SA that takes on board Hayek´s ideas on the methodology of the social sciences, 
and (iv) the division line between `rational´ and `irrational´ behaviour in PTKL and SA. 
Finally, section 5 summarizes and concludes.     
 
2. Popper’s evolutionary theory of knowledge and learning 
Inductive inference is reasoning from the past observed behaviour of objects to 
their future behaviour. The ‘problem of induction’ was originally raised by David Hume 
(2006[1748]) who pondered whether inductive evidence can go beyond the available 
evidence in order to predict future events. He argued that past evidence can tell us only 
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about past experience. Hume's main argument was that we cannot rationally justify the 
claim that nature will continue to be uniform merely because it has been in the past, as 
this is using the sort of reasoning (i.e., induction) that is under question, that is, it would 
be circular reasoning. Hume (op. cit.) also noticed that we tend to believe that phenomena 
behave in a regular fashion, that is, that certain patterns in the behaviour of objects persist 
into the future.  
Now, Popper defines the philosophical ‘problem of induction’ as the problem of 
providing a rational justification for the common belief that the future will be (largely) 
like the past (Popper, 1972, p. 2). He identifies two problems in Hume´s criticism of 
induction: (i) a logical problem (HL), and (ii) a psychological problem (HP). First, 
Hume´s HL is whether we are justified in reasoning from repeated instances of which we 
have some experience to other instances of which we have no experience. Hume´s answer 
to HL is negative no matter how many repetitions of the instances there are. Second, 
Hume´s HP is why, notwithstanding it, reasonable people believe that instances of which 
they have no experience at all will tend to conform to those of which they have 
experience. Hume´s answer to HP is that ‘the psychological mechanism of association 
forces them to believe, by custom or habit, that what happened in the past will happen in 
the future’ (op. cit., p. 90). According to Popper, this explains why Hume abandoned 
rationalism and viewed man as a product of blind habit. Specifically, Hume (1875, pp. 
41-46) argues that custom is the means by which nature induces reasonable people to 
accept the existence of ` constant conjunctions´ of events.6 By contrast, Popper argues that 
there is no such thing as induction by repetition either in psychology or science: 
 
‘We do not act upon repetition or “habit”, but upon the best tested of our theories 
which… are the ones for which we have good rational reasons; not of course good reasons 
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for believing them to be true, but for believing them to be the best available from the point 
of view of a search for truth or verisimilitude… The central question for Hume was: do 
we act according to reason or not? And my answer is: Yes.’ (op. cit., p. 95) 
 
Popper restates Hume´s problem of induction as follows. First, he denies that a 
theory can be simply justified by assuming the truth of certain observation statements. 
Rather, he insists that all theories are hypotheses and, hence, they can be overthrown (op. 
cit., p. 13). Further, he states that paradoxically induction is inductively invalid, that is, 
the claim that induction is a legitimate way to acquire (true) knowledge needs to be 
supported by a ‘higher’ principle that has, in its turn, been established inductively. But 
this strategy ultimately leads us into an infinite regress insofar as we will endlessly need 
to resort to a superior principle that has been discovered through induction. Second, he 
puts forward the proposition that the claim that an explanatory universal theory is false 
can be justified by the truth of certain observation statements (op. cit., p. 7). As the typical 
example goes, no matter how many white swans we come across, the finding of just one 
black swan will lead to the rejection of the universal statement ‘all swans are white’. 
Consequently, he urges scientists to construct severe tests that help detect false theories 
so that, by a method of elimination, they may eventually hit upon a true theory even 
though we can never establish its truth (op. cit., pp. 14-15).7 Thus, he argues that there is 
an asymmetry between verification and falsification; any conjecture may be true or false 
but even if it turns out to be true, there is no way we can ever prove it (op. cit., p. 12). 
According to Popper, the method of science is ‘the method of bold conjectures and 
ingenious and severe attempts to refute them’ (op. cit., p. 81). Since all theories involve 
universal statements, we can only ‘learn’ by proving that our knowledge is false. 
Specifically, learning takes place either when we reject one´s prior theory or when we are 
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forced to adjust one´s theory in a way that recognizes that in its prior version it was false 
(op. cit, p. 81). In short, Popper´s ideas on scientific methodology can be seen as a sub-
product of PTKL:   
 
`Although I shall confine my discussion to the growth of knowledge in science, 
my remarks are applicable without much change, I believe, to the growth of pre-scientific 
knowledge also — that is to say, to the general way in which men, and even animals, 
acquire new factual knowledge about the world. The method of learning by trial and error 
— of learning from our mistakes — seems to be fundamentally the same whether it is 
practised by lower or by higher animals, by chimpanzees or by men of science. My 
interest is not merely in the theory of scientific knowledge, but rather in the theory of 
knowledge in general. Yet the study of the growth of scientific knowledge is, I believe, 
the most fruitful way of studying the growth of knowledge in general. For the growth of 
scientific knowledge may be said to be the growth of ordinary human knowledge writ 
large´ (Popper, 1963, p. 216). 
 
and, elsewhere, he writes:  
 
`Organisms evolve by trial and error, and their erroneous trials ― their erroneous 
mutations ― are eliminated, as a rule, by the elimination of the organism which is the 
“carrier” of the error. It is this part of my epistemology that, in man, through the evolution 
of a descriptive and argumentative language, all this has changed radically. Man has 
achieved the possibility of being critical of his own tentative trials, of his own theories. 
These theories are no longer incorporated in his organism, or in his genetic system: they 
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may be formulated in books, or in journals; and they can be critically discussed, and 
shown to be erroneous, without killing any authors or burning any books: without 
destroying the “carriers”… critical reason is the only alternative to violence so far 
discovered´ (Popper, (1966[1943b]), p. 292).   
 
Third, Popper argues that theories are genetically incorporated into all our sense 
organs and this predisposes us to discriminate a priori between relevant or absorbable 
input and input that can be ignored (Popper, 1972, p.72). For instance, sense organs like 
the eye only react to those selected environmental events which they ‘expect’. However, 
according to him, this prior knowledge cannot be the result of observation; it must be the 
result of adaptation to the surrounding environment by trial and error. He claims that 99 
percent of the knowledge of all living organisms is inborn and incorporated into our 
biochemical constitution (Popper, 1990, p. 46). Furthermore, he argues that there is no 
theory-free language to help us interpret external data because primitive theories emerge 
together with language. Therefore, there is no such thing as pure perception since all 
languages are theory-impregnated (Popper, 1972, p. 145). This leads him to reject any 
epistemology which chooses our ‘direct’ observations and perceptions as the starting 
point; the fact that theories are built into our sense organs implies that ‘the epistemology 
of induction breaks down even before taking its first step’ (op. cit, p. 146).  
Lastly, Popper´s rejection of Hume´s inductive theory of beliefs formation leads 
him to maintain that ‘logical’ considerations may be duly transferred to ‘psychological’ 
considerations. According to him, not only do we reason rationally and thus contrary to 
the principle of induction, but we also behave rationally. He labels this the ‘principle of 
transference’ (op. cit, p. 6). By applying this conjecture to human psychology he then 
arrives at the method of trial and error-elimination in which the trials correspond to the 
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formation of competing hypotheses whereas the elimination of errors corresponds to the 
refutation of (false) hypotheses. In other words, he proposes the theory that individuals 
do not really think in an inductive way but rather form their beliefs by eliminating false 
hypotheses. The theory of knowledge and learning that thus emerges is evolutionary. 
However, such theory implies that adaptation is always ‘imperfect’:  
 
‘Some of the errors that have entered the inheritable constitution of an organism 
are eliminated by eliminating their bearer; that is, the individual organism. But some 
errors escape, and this is one reason why we are all fallible: our adaptation to the 
environment is never optimal, and it is always imperfect’ (Popper, 1990, p. 47). 
 
Further, Popper asserts that no equilibrium state of adaptation is reached by the 
application of the method of trial and error-elimination since (i) no optimal trial solution 
to any specific problem is likely to be offered, and (ii) the emergence of new structures 
and instructions involves a continuous change in the environmental situation (Popper, 
1994, p. 4). More specifically, and crucially, Popper presents the growth of knowledge as 
bringing in its wake changes in the surrounding environment: 
 
‘Our very understanding of the world changes the conditions of the changing 
world; and so do our wishes, our preferences, our motivations, our hopes, our dreams, our 
fantasies, our hypotheses, our theories. Even our erroneous theories change the world, 
although our correct theories may, as a rule, have a more lasting influence. All this 
amounts to the fact that determinism is simply mistaken’ (Popper, 1990, p. 17). 
23 
 
In short, Popper makes it clear that the past affects but does not determine the 
future, i.e., the future is not pre-determined. That is, the future is ‘objectively open’ (op. 
cit., pp. 17-18). As noted in Vanberg (2002, p. 8), Popper´s theory of knowledge and 
learning exhibits a remarkable similarity to the arguments developed by biologist Mayr 
(1988) in the sense that both Popper and Mayr argue that intentional problem-solving 
behaviour can be interpreted as behaviour governed by programs or conjectures which 
are the product of evolutionary learning by trial and error-elimination. As Vanberg (op. 
cit.) explains, this approach implies that ‘there is a continuum from the behaviour of 
primitive organisms, governed entirely by genetically coded programs, to the 
sophisticated, deliberated actions of “rational man” governed by conjectures or mental 
models that are stored in memory’. According to Vanberg (op. cit., p. 27), ‘even the most 
deliberate and conscious instances of problem-solving are no less “program-based” than 
any subconscious or unconscious routine behaviour, in the sense that they, too, have 
nothing else to rely on than conjectures…´. Thus, Vanberg views rationality as a problem-
solving capacity that is stored on a person’s catalogue of conjectures or programs that 
exhibits no more wisdom than that embedded in the knowledge acquired in the past. 
According to this view, rationality ‘cannot guarantee pre-adaptedness, it is instead a 
matter of the backward-looking adaptedness of behavioral programs that allows for a 
tentative, forward-looking response to current problem-situations’ (op. cit., pp. 16-17). 
As we will see, this aspect of the notion of human rationality embedded in both PTKL 
and Mayr´s notion of problem-solving behaviour implies the ability to solve certain 
problems that agents have encountered in the past does not necessarily imply that they 
are endowed with the ability to solve new (and different) problems that they encounter as 
the surrounding environment changes.       
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Let us address Popper´s distinction between subjective and objective knowledge. 
The former consists of certain inborn dispositions of organisms and of their acquired 
modifications to act, whereas the latter consists of the logical content of our theories and, 
as such, it includes the world of language, conjectures, arguments, and scientific theories.8 
As for subjective knowledge, Popper´s diagnosis is that it is part of a complex but accurate 
apparatus of adjustment that, in the main, works like objective conjectural knowledge, 
namely, by the method of trial and error-elimination or ‘auto-correction’ (Popper, 1972, 
p. 77). As for objective knowledge he notes that only a tiny part of it can be given 
sufficient reasons for certain truth. Such tiny part is denoted as demonstrable knowledge 
and comprises the propositions of formal logic, and arithmetic. All else, including 
knowledge associated to the natural and the social sciences, is conjectural or hypothetical 
knowledge and, hence, there are no sufficient reasons for holding it to be true (op. cit., p. 
75). Thus, from the point of view of objective knowledge, all theories are conjectural 
albeit this does not preclude the possibility that some of them are true. 
The method of science, according to Popper, is ‘the method of bold conjectures 
and ingenious and severe attempts to refute them’ (op. cit., p. 81). Since all theories 
involve universal statements, we can `learn´ by proving that our knowledge is false. 
Specifically, learning takes place either when we reject one´s prior theory or when we are 
forced to adjust one´s theory in a way that recognizes that in its prior version it was false 
(Popper, 1972, p. 81). Thus, we can only ‘learn’ by refuting our prior knowledge claim. 
As noted in Boland (2003b, p. 242), an implication of PTKL is that the mere accumulation 
of information does not increase the odds that our theories happen to be true because, as 
Popper insists, all we can ‘learn’ from experience is that some of our theories are false. 
In this respect, Boland (2003b, p. 248) makes a useful distinction between the quantitative 
and qualitative views of knowledge. The former corresponds to the so-called ‘bucket 
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theory of knowledge’ whereas the latter corresponds to Popper´s theory of knowledge. 
He then proposes the metaphor that, in Popper´s Socratic theory of learning, ‘knowledge 
is more like health that one can improve than wealth that one can have more of’. Hence, 
according to Boland (op. cit.), learning consists of improving one´s knowledge rather than 
of increasing it.     
The distinction between objective and subjective knowledge also leads Popper to 
distinguish between three different worlds or ontological domains: (i) the world of 
physical objects or states (World 1), (ii) the world of states of consciousness, or of mental 
states (World 2) and, lastly, (iii) the autonomous Platonic-like world of objective contents 
of thought, especially of scientific thoughts and works of art (World 3).9 His main thesis 
on this respect is that almost all our subjective knowledge (belonging to World 2) depends 
upon World 3, that is, on linguistically formulated theories (Popper, 1972, p. 74). 
However, he argues that our mind may be connected to objects of both World 1 and 3 and 
this allows World 2 to act as a mediator between them. Further, he notes that World 3 
exerts a profound influence upon World 1 through the actions of technologists who 
implement changes in World 1 by applying the predictions of these theories. Finally, he 
argues that we always select our P-S against a World 3 background which consists of, at 
least, a language and that ‘the activity of understanding consists essentially in operating 
with third-world objects’ (op. cit., p. 164). In particular, the development of science and 
art presupposes the prior existence of the human language which leads Popper (1990) to 
argue that the latter is, by far, the most important product of the human mind: 
 
‘Language makes it possible to consider our theories critically: to look at them as 
if they were external objects, as if they belonged to the world outside of ourselves which 
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we share with others. Theories become objects of criticism, like the beaver dam’ (Popper, 
1990, p. 51).    
 
Next, Popper sees science as one of the greatest creations of the human mind, 
comparable only to the emergence of a descriptive and argumentative language, since its 
creation allowed men to replace: (i) the elimination of error in the violent struggle for life 
by non-violent rational criticism, and (ii) killing (World 1) and intimidation (World 2) by 
the impersonal arguments of World 3 (op. cit., p. 84). He defines epistemology as the 
theory of the growth of scientific knowledge, that is, the theory of problem-solving, or of 
the critical discussion, evaluation, and critical testing of competing theories (op. cit., p. 
142). However, as we mentioned above, PTKL is not only applicable to scientific 
knowledge but to any type of knowledge. As such, he sees scientists acting on the basis 
of hunches and guesses concerning what looks promising for future growth in the third 
world of objective knowledge. In so doing, he identifies content and virtual explanatory 
power as the most important criteria for the a priori appraisal of theories where both are 
related to their degree of testability. In turn, the most important criterion for their a 
posteriori appraisal is ‘verisimilitude’ or ‘nearness to truth’ and this, he argues, depends 
upon the way a theory has stood up to severe tests (op. cit., p. 143).10 The evaluation 
process is always critical and aims at error-elimination. Lastly, the exposure of scientific 
hypotheses to severe tests and criticism from the scientific community guarantees their 
increasing accuracy at explaining phenomena:   
 
`What is characteristic of science is that the selective system which weeds out 
among the variety of conjectures involves deliberate contact with the environment 
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through experiment and quantified prediction, designed so that outcomes quite 
independent of the preferences of the investigator are possible. It is pre-eminently this 
feature that gives science its greater objectivity and its claim to a cumulative increase in 
the accuracy with which it describes the world´ (Campbell, 1974, p. 434).   
 
Finally, the growth of World 3 is not a repetitive or cumulative process alike 
Lamarckian instruction but a Darwinian selection process which consists of systematic 
error-elimination (op. cit., p. 149; also Popper, 1994, ch.1). He identifies three different 
levels of adaptation: genetic, behavioural learning, and scientific discovery. Scientific 
discovery is, according to him, a special case of adaptive behavioural learning. Popper 
asserts that, on all levels, the mechanism of adaptation to the surrounding environment is 
essentially the same, i.e., a Darwinian selection process by trial and error-elimination. In 
short, he views science ‘as a means used by the human species to adapt itself to the 
surrounding environment: to invade new environmental niches, and even to invent new 
environmental niches’ (Popper, 1994, p. 2).   
 
3. Popper’s methodological prescription for the social sciences  
We now address Popper´s methodological prescription for the social sciences 
known as SA and the status of RP. Early presentations of the method of SA can be found 
in Popper´s Open Society (Popper, (1966[1943a], ch. 14, especially p. 97), in his Poverty 
of Historicism, originally published in three articles in Economica and, then, as a book 
(Popper, 1944-45, sections 31 & 32), in a French paper (Popper, 1967), and in Objective 
Knowledge (Popper, 1972, p. 179). However, the place where he presents it thoroughly 
is in the article titled “Models, Instruments, and Truth: The Status of the Rationality 
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Principle in the Social Sciences” (Popper, 1994, ch. 8). This book chapter was originally 
written in response to an invitation that Popper received in the early 1960s from the 
Department of Economics at Harvard University and the lecture he delivered there on 26 
February 1963. As noted in de Bruin (2006, footnote 1), in 1963 and 1964 two new 
sections were added and a small extract was then circulated in the London School of 
Economics in 1967 and 1968. This extract was translated into French and published as 
`La rationalitè et le statut du principe de rationalitè´ (Popper, 1967) and, then, a Spanish 
translation of the French translation appeared about a year later. A revised version of the 
English extract was published in 1983 on pages 357-365 of an anthology titled A Pocket 
Popper which is currently available in Popper Selections (Popper, 1985). However, the 
full text of the speech at Harvard University was not made available until 1994 when it 
was published in a collection of Popper´s essays titled The Myth of the Framework.    
 
3.1. The Rationality Principle 
Popper´s thesis in that chapter is that there is no fundamental difference between 
the natural sciences and the social sciences since both of them resort to the construction 
of models or typical P-S to explain and predict events. If anything, models are viewed by 
him as being even more important in the social sciences due to the non-existence of 
universal laws. In any case, he argues that the models of the theoretical social sciences 
are always an over-simplification of reality and, hence, do not represent the facts truly. 
According to him, the fundamental problem of the social sciences is ‘to explain and 
understand events in terms of human actions and social situations’ (Popper, 1994, p. 166). 
In turn, the reconstruction of social situations should include the consideration of the 
relevant ‘social institutions’ which he defines as ‘all those things which set limits or create 
obstacles to our movements and actions’ (op. cit., p. 167). In his autobiography, Popper 
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makes it clear that his methodological proposal for the social sciences stems from an 
‘attempt to generalize the method of economic theory (marginal utility theory) so as to 
become applicable to the other theoretical social sciences’ (Popper (2002[1976a], p. 135).  
Next, Popper makes a distinction between ‘rationality’ as a personal attitude and 
his RP. In particular, he makes it clear that his RP has nothing to do with the assumption 
that men adopt a rational attitude. Rather, he defines it as an a priori methodological 
principle which assumes that our actions are adequate to our problem-situations as we 
see them (Popper, 1994, p. 181). More specifically, he remarks that RP is not true: ‘The 
rationality principle is false. I think there is no way out of this. Consequently, I must deny 
that it is a priori valid’ (Popper, 1985, p. 361).11 Notwithstanding it, he believes it 
represents a good approximation to the truth. Thus, RP ‘does not play the role of an 
empirical explanatory theory, of a testable hypothesis’ (op. cit., p. 360). Rather, he views 
it as an integral part of every testable theory and proposes to avoid blaming it whenever 
our theory breaks down in the wake of empirical tests. His methodological advice to social 
scientists is thus never to abandon RP so that, in the wake of a refutation of their model, 
they should always revise their models of the agent’s P-S.12 
As Koertge (1975) shows, Popper’s views on the RP have evolved over time. As 
time passed by, he tended to weaken his claims about the kinds of actions that agents 
could be expected to perform so that ’where he had earlier spoken of actions as being 
`rational´ or `appropriate´, he now characterized them as `adequate´, or `adapted´, or `in 
accordance with the situation´ (op. cit. p. 441). According to him, the most likely reason 
for this evolution in terminology was his increasing emphasis on the fact that the P-S 
which played a central role in the explanation was not so much the agent’s objective P-S 
but, rather, the agent’s theory of her P-S or the P-S as the agent saw it (Koertge, 1975, p. 
442). She explains that RP really consists of two clauses: the first (RP-1) says that ‘every 
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action (by a person) is a rational response to some problem-situation’ whereas the second 
(RP-2) tells us that ‘every person in a problem-situation responds rationally to it’ (op. cit., 
p. 443). In turn, RP-1 entails: (i) that the response was issued through a methodical 
appraisal of the set of possible solutions available to the actor, (ii) that a description of 
both P-S and the appraisal process could be verbalized by the actor, and (iii) that the 
person acted as she did as a result of the appraisal process so that if a better alternative 
had been available to her she would have taken it. Thus, the complete RP formulated in 
Koertge (1975) emphasizes the close connection between the action and the systematic 
deliberation process from initial conditions that made the agent behave as she did. 
Further, Koertge (1979, p. 90) points out that requirement (i) above implies that ‘some 
systematic non-random decision procedure be used’ albeit she notices that Popper did not 
specify the minimal requirements which acceptable decision rules should satisfy. This 
means that RP can, in principle, be supplemented with different theories of belief 
formation. As Koertge (op. cit., p. 92) explains, for Popper, to explain an action using RP 
does not ‘imply that the agent’s beliefs are reasonable nor even that her way of making 
decisions is the best possible one’ but only presupposes that agents assess the situation in 
a systematic way.  
Next, as we noted above, Popper´s methodological advice to social scientists is 
never to abandon RP so that, in the wake of a refutation of their model, they should always 
revise instead their model of the agent’s P-S. He offers two arguments in favour of this 
strategy: (i) that we learn more if we blame our situational model, and (ii) that the 
adoption of RP ‘reduces considerably the arbitrariness of our models’ (op. cit., p. 362). 
As for the first argument, he explains that: 
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‘The main argument in favour of this policy is that our model is far more 
interesting and informative, and far better testable, than the principle of the adequacy of 
our actions. We do not learn much in learning that this is not strictly true: we know this 
already’ (Popper, 1985, p. 362). 
 
Likewise, Caldwell (1991, p. 25) argues that, although immunizing stratagems 
should be generally avoided ‘at least in the special case of situational analyses, one is able 
to criticize more severely and obtain fruitful criticisms if one blames the model rather 
than RP whenever a falsification occurs’. As for the second argument, Popper explains 
that:  
 
‘The attempt to replace the rationality principle by another one seems to lead to 
complete arbitrariness in our model-building. And we must not forget that we can test a 
theory only as a whole, and that the test consists in finding the better of two competing 
theories which may have much in common; and most of them have the rationality 
principle in common’ (Popper, 1985, p. 362).  
 
As Hands (1985, p. 87) remarks, Popper’s first argument above means that if we 
are consistent with RP ‘the falsification of a specific theory only means that we have 
misspecified the “situation”, i.e., that we have attributed the wrong preferences or 
constraints to the individual’. In turn, Popper’s second argument implies that although RP 
is potentially falsifiable we choose to make a methodological decision that, when faced 
with a falsifying observation, we will stick to it and revise instead our hypotheses about 
the desires, beliefs, and constraints faced by agents (Hands, 1985, p. 88). Notably, Becker 
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(1976) resorts to a similar argument to justify the use of rational choice theory. According 
to him, human behaviour can be viewed from the standpoint of individuals who seek to 
maximize their utility from a stable set of preference and subject to a given constraint. 
Where action appears to deviate from the predictions of neoclassical utility theory, Becker 
claims that little is gained from resorting to explanations in terms of irrationality, changes 
in preferences or cultural values, etc… for such explanations are ad hoc and may even be 
contradictory. Furthermore, he adds that the question is left unanswered of just why 
human behaviour should be sometimes rational but sometimes not.     
According to Caldwell (1991, p. 15), there are two main weaknesses in Popper´s 
presentation of SA: (i) vagueness about how it should be implemented, and (ii) Popper´s 
apparent belief that SA is the only adequate method to adopt in the theoretical social 
sciences. As for the first point, we have presented above a clearer explanation of how to 
apply it suggested in Koertge (1979). As for the second point, Caldwell (1991, p. 16) 
readily admits that SA is a powerful and fruitful method for the social sciences, yet he 
criticizes Popper´s idea that SA is the only legitimate method for the theoretical social 
sciences. Further, he recognizes that there is a tension between falsificationism and SA 
owing to the fact that RP adopts the status of a methodological prescription that plays the 
role of an immunizing stratagem.13 A discussion of this issue is in Hands (1985, p. 89) 
who argues that, by Popperian standards, scientific explanations based on RP ‘are as close 
to metaphysical explanations as they are to scientific explanations’ and, hence, the tension 
between these two methodological principles can hardly be resolved.  Caldwell (1985) 
proposes to solve the conflict between SA and falsificationism by adopting a broader 
conception of acceptable scientific practice based on ‘critical rationalism’ whose goal is 
to subject theories to an optimal amount of criticism. In turn, the latter will depend on 
both the specific problem to be solved and the nature of the problem under investigation 
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(op. cit., p. 25). Such prescription was proposed in Klappholz & Agassi (1959) and, later 
on, it has been promoted by Boland (2003a) who stresses that the only generally 
applicable methodological rule is the exhortation to be always critical and ready to subject 
one’s hypotheses to critical scrutiny. More specifically, he insists we should focus on the 
Socratic-Popper identified in Klappholz & Agassi (1959) and thus discard the Lakatos-
Popper (also known as Popper the ‘falsificationist’) promoted by Latsis (1972) and Blaug 
(1975). According to him, if we put falsificationism aside in favour of ‘critical 
rationalism’ the conflict between SA and falsificationism vanishes.  
 
3.2. The two versions of the Rationality Principle 
Latsis (1983) was probably the first commentator to identify the existence of an 
`objectivist´ version (RPo) and a `subjectivist´ version (RPs) of RP in Popper´s work.14 
In the former, the relevant P-S is that one as seen by the theoretician whereas, in the latter, 
the theoretician is supposed to reconstruct P-S as seen by agents. Latsis (op. cit.) denotes 
the former as the `strong´ version of RP. According to Latsis (op. cit., p. 131), Popper 
both weakens and widens the notion of rationality in human behaviour when adopting 
RPs.15 Building on the distinction between RPo and RPs, Nadeau (1993, p. 463) notes 
that `an attentive reading of the 1967 text shows that although Popper views the RP as an 
explanatory principle throughout the text, he surreptitiously changes his way of 
formulating it during the course of his argument, going from an objectivist formulation at 
the beginning of the text to a subjectivist formulation at the end´. Hands (1991, footnote 
14) recognizes that `Popper is really unclear on this´, and Latsis (1983, p. 133) claims 
that Popper seems either ` confused or deliberately elusive´ on this issue. Be that as it may, 
Hands (op. cit.) points out that in his 1985 text Popper adopts the subjectivist 
interpretation when he openly says that rationality is only `as agents see it´ and SA can 
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thus be applied to apparently irrational behaviour such as the behaviour of a `madman´ 
(Popper, 1985, p. 363).16 However, he adds that Popper also denotes SA `a purely 
objective method´ which `can be developed independently of all subjective and 
psychological ideas (Popper, 2002[1976a], p. 172) and that, elsewhere, Popper says that 
RP is the `general law that sane persons as a rule act more or less rationally´ (Popper, 
1966, p. 265).  
Now, in a passage of his 1967 French paper, Popper (1985, p. 363) proposes his 
famous example of the `flustered driver´ who, by trying to park stubbornly his car in 
evidently too small a space, does not act in a way that is appropriate to the situation in 
which he finds himself and then recognizes that `we employ the rationality principle to 
the limit of what is possible whenever we try to understand the action of a madman´ 
(Popper, 1994, p. 179). It is in the section of the chapter where he notices that cases of 
neurosis have been explained by Freud and other psychologists with the help of their own 
version of the RP that he switches to a subjectivist version of RP. Then, in a key note to 
one of the paragraphs (footnote 19), he acknowledges that he refers successively to two 
versions of his RP and even identifies a third intermediate version according to which P-
S is said to be `as the agent could (within the objective situation) have seen it´ (Popper, 
1994, ch. 8, footnote 19).17 In the aftermath of it, Lagueux (2006, p. 201) concludes that, 
according to Popper, `what the agent sees may or may not be considered a part of the 
objective situation that the model describes´. Summing up, the ` objectivist´ version (RPo) 
supposes that agents possess `true´ knowledge; the `subjectivist´ version (RPs) supposes 
that the alleged knowledge that agents possess is partially wrong; and the third version 
constitutes an intermediate case. However, in all three versions of RP it is assumed that 
the agent acts in a way that is appropriate to the state of his knowledge (Popper, 1994, ch. 
8, footnote 19; Lagueux, 2006, p. 201).  
35 
 
Next, building on the terminology coined in Latsis (1972), Kerstenetzky (2009, p. 
201) denotes RPo the `maximal´ or `single-exit´ interpretation and RPs the `minimal´ or 
`multiple-exit´ interpretation of RP. The `single-exit´ interpretation stems from the fact 
that, if it is supposed that the agent perceives P-S in an objective way, there is thus only 
`one´ possible solution whereas the `multiple-exit´ interpretation captures the idea that, 
in principle, there are as many solutions as subjective perceptions of P-S exist. It is the 
`multiple-exit´ interpretation that is of interest in the context of the `subjectivist´ SA. In 
particular, the issue is whether we can assume for methodological purposes that the 
different subjective perceptions of P-S held by actors actually converge on a `single´ one 
and, if so, how this convergence comes about. Alike Jacobs (1990), Kerstenetzky (op. cit) 
associates the `objectivist´ or `single-exit´ modelling to the influence on Popper of the 
work of Weber. By contrast, Hedström et al. (1998, p. 359) do not think there is textual 
evidence that Popper got the inspiration for the notion of SA from Weber´s work and 
suggest that if there was any influence at all it was probably indirect since Hayek — a 
friend of Popper — admired Weber. However, it could be argued that Popper´s method 
for the theoretical social sciences takes on board Weber´s notion of `interpretive 
understanding´ or `verstehen´ — developed later on by the Austrian economists — and, 
especially, his notions of `ideal type´ and of `instrumental rationality´, i.e., the use of 
rationality to bring about change in the surrounding world in the interest of the actor 
(Weber, 1949).18 Be that as it may, there is some textual evidence that points to Hayek as 
the most important direct source of influence on Popper´s work. Notably, Popper (1994, 
ch. 8, note 1) writes that `I was particularly impressed by Hayek´s formulation that 
economics is the “logic of choice”´ as expressed in his essay titled `Economics and 
Knowledge´ (Hayek, 1948[1937], pp. 33ff). According to Popper, it was this that led him 
to the formulation of the `logic of the situation´ in his Poverty of Historicism.19  
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Finally, there is the issue of the status of RP. We have already mentioned above 
the profound ambiguity of Popper´s explanation about the status of RP. The subsequent 
discussion about the role and status of RP among Popper´s commentators focused on the 
distinction between RPo and RPs. For instance, Lagueux (1993, 2006) argues that, even 
if we adopt the `subjectivist´ interpretation, RP cannot be a priori true because, according 
to him, it is simply not true that people always act appropriately according to the P-S as 
they see it. Notwithstanding it, he thinks that RP occupies an exceptional place in the 
social sciences because it constitutes a condition of intelligibility of any phenomenon that 
derives from human action. More specifically, the latter can only be intelligible, i.e., 
understood by an external observer, when it is motivated by reasons, that is, when it 
represents an appropriate response to P-S as seen by the agent (Lagueux, 2006, p. 205). 
He concludes that maintaining RP after acknowledging that it is not a priori true is, after 
all, to claim that `in spite of the fact that irrational decisions occur, human actions are 
nonetheless normally understandable´ (op. cit.).  
 
4. The notion of rationality in Popper´s philosophy of the social sciences 
In section 2 we showed that PTKL implies that: (i) all knowledge is conjectural, 
(ii) that we learn through an (endless) process whereby we subject our conjectures to trial 
and discard those ones that turn out to be wrong, and (iii) that the learning process is 
imperfect and never converges to an optimum. Consequently, the most important feature 
of knowledge is its fallibility. By contrast, Popper´s methodological proposal for the 
social sciences has been denoted as ‘situational determinism’ (Latsis, 1972; Oakley, 
2002) which suggests that there may be some key epistemological differences between 
PTKL and SA. The first thing we should like to note is that PTKL is a theory about the 
nature of knowledge and its growth over time while SA is a methodological prescription 
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aimed, arguably, at speeding up the rate of progress of the social sciences so that these 
two elements of Popper´s philosophy do correspond to the positive and methodological 
domain respectively. That said, we believe there is also a normative element in PTKL 
since trial and error-elimination can also be said to be the way we should behave when 
seeking to expand our knowledge. In any case, error-elimination can only proceed after 
there is clear-cut evidence that, retrospectively, a decision made in the past was wrong. 
However, this does not provide us with a systematic rule for making decisions in the 
future other than to avoid repeating the same mistakes made in the past. In short, error-
elimination is an incomplete guide to decision-making.  
Next, we may wonder how SA would look like if the agents that are the object of 
the modelling exercise exhibited a theory of knowledge and learning akin to PTKL. To 
be sure, the situational model of the typical P-S consists of three elements: (i) external 
(and observable) elements such as the physical and social constraints agents are subject 
to, (ii) the knowledge and information that agents possess, and (iii) their goals and aims. 
Now, if agents behave according to PTKL, then the situational model of the typical P-S 
should incorporate the knowledge they possess which would include the experience 
accumulated from mistakes they made in the past given the specific circumstances that 
prevailed at that time. Therefore, adequate behaviour would imply, as a minimum, not 
repeating previous mistakes. However, as we noted above, there is no further guidance 
for agents stemming from PTKL as far as future decision-making is concerned in case 
they encounter new (and different) P-S. In short, PTKL appears to be compatible with SA 
provided the situational model includes agents´ learning from previous mistakes. 
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4.1. PTKL versus SA: the `rationality of agents´ 
We noted above that several commentators, as well as Popper (1994, ch. 8, note 
19) himself, identify two different versions of RP: an `objectivist´ version (RPo) and a 
`subjectivist´ version (RPs). According to the former, the relevant P-S is the `objective´ 
P-S, that is, the P-S as it actually is whereas, according to the latter, the theoretician 
should reconstruct P-S as it is actually seen by the agents. As Popper (1972, p. 179) 
recognizes, in both cases P-S is conjectured.20 That said, we will argue below that, if 
Hayek´s ideas on the nature of the `facts of the social sciences´ are taken on board, there 
is no reason a priori to expect that the theoretician´s view of P-S is closer to the `true´ P-
S than agents´ (Hayek, 1943). This is because, as Hayek argues, the theoretician does not 
possess superior relevant knowledge that is not shared by agents. Be that as it may, RPo 
and RPs constitute two different modelling strategies in the social sciences the 
consequences of which, to the best of our knowledge, have not been explored so far. 
Notably, an antecedent is Schumpeter´s distinction between `objective rationality´ and 
`subjective rationality´ (Schumpeter, 1984). He defines the former as consisting of the 
`applicability of a rational schema to the actor´s behaviour´ and he defines the latter as 
the `conformity of the actors´ mental processes to a rational schema´ (op. cit., p. 583). 
Crucially, he states that the former need not imply the latter and criticizes the tendency 
of some social scientists to implicitly identify the rationality of the `observer´ with the 
subjective rationality of the `observed´ (op. cit., p. 583). He uses the example of the 
neoclassical theory of monopoly to illustrate the notion of `objective rationality´:  
 
`The model just described is the product of the analyst´s mind as much as any 
physical theory is, and does not in itself say anything about reality or about anybody´s 
actual behavior or rationality… Even if the model should fit anyone´s behaviour this does 
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not mean that the individual in question consciously aims at the result and still less that 
he arrives at it by processes at all similar to the analytic procedure´ (Schumpeter, op. cit., 
p. 580).  
 
Schumpeter´s notion of `objective rationality´ is closely associated to his notion 
of `rationality of the observer´ whereas the notion of `subjective rationality´ is coupled to 
his notion of the `rationality in the observed´. In the example of monopoly theory, he 
explains that the construction of a model will give us the conditions under which the 
maximization of profits will be attained thereby setting up a standard against which the 
theorist can compare actual behaviour. However, he makes it clear that such model is 
entirely a product of the `rationality of the observer´ and, hence, the usefulness of the 
modelling exercise will depend on the degree to which that hypothesis is justified by facts 
(op. cit., p. 580). According to him, a common source of divergence between the type of 
human behaviour that stems from the `rationality of the observer´ and the `rationality in 
the observed´ is the existence of a multiplicity of ends in actors´ minds. To the extent that 
the goals of actors are also an element of P-S, the adoption of a subjectivist interpretation 
of RP will require that the theoretician understands the goals of actors without this 
necessarily implying that she shares them. Now, the relevance of his notion of `subjective 
rationality´ emerges clearly in those cases where the situational model constructed on the 
basis of the `rationality of the observer´ does not fit the facts. As Schumpeter notes, in 
such cases the task of the theoretician is to explain the reasons for the discrepancy 
between the `rationality of the observer´ and the `rationality in the observed´ (op. cit., p. 
586). In turn, this will require an effort by the former to adopt the point of view of the 
`observed´:  
 
40 
 
`Understanding an end and judging rationality of means often requires that the 
analyst “puts himself” into places very far distant from his time and social location. 
Sometimes he has to transplant himself into another cultural world´ (Schumpeter, 1984, 
p. 583).  
 
These ideas on the methodology of the social sciences were originally written by 
Schumpeter circa 1940 for a Harvard discussion group on rationality which included 
Parsons, Leontief, and Sweezy. The manuscript remained unpublished for more than 40 
years until Professor Loring Allen of the University of Missouri in St. Louis found it 
among the papers of Schumpeter in the Harvard University archives. It was published 
posthumously in 1984 at the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. We 
believe this manuscript contains some intuitions that exhibit a high degree of affinity with 
Popper´s notions of RPo and RPs (Popper, 1994). However, we should like to note that it 
is Hayek´s Economica essay `Economics & Knowledge´ (Hayek, 1948[1937]) where the 
distinction between `objective´ and `subjective´ rationality was first formulated. In that 
essay, Hayek criticises equilibrium economic theory for making an illegitimate use of the 
concept of `data´ possessed by economic agents as well as for the methodological 
confusion thus created:    
 
`But this does not solve the question whether the facts referred to are supposed to 
be given to the observing economist, or to the persons whose actions he wants to explain, 
and if to the latter, whether it is assumed that the same facts are known to all the different 
persons in the system, or whether the “data” for the different persons may be different… 
There seems to be no possible doubt that these two concepts of “data”, on the one hand 
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in the sense of the objective real facts, as the observing economist is supposed to know 
them, and on the other hand in the subjective sense, as things known to the persons whose 
behaviour we try to explain are really fundamentally different and ought to be kept 
carefully apart. And, as we shall see, the question why the data in the subjective sense of 
the term should ever come to correspond to the objective data is one of the main problems 
we have to answer´ (Hayek, 1948[1937], p. 39, emphasis added).  
 
We know that Popper had read Hayek´s 1937 paper in Economica and, indeed, he 
refers to it as the key source of his understanding of the core of economics (Popper, 1994, 
p. 181, footnote 1). According to Popper, it was Hayek´s exposition of the `logic of 
choice´ in that paper that led him to the formulation of the `logic of the situation´ as 
embracing both the `logic of choice´ and the `logic of historical P-S´. Yet, Popper does 
not refer explicitly to Hayek´s distinction between subjective and objective data. That 
said, it is very likely that Popper´s recognition, later on, of a distinction between RPo and 
RPs is related to his acquaintance with Hayek´s Economica essay. In the following 
sections we will explore in some detail the relation between these two concepts as well 
as their relation to PTKL from the point of view of the agents that are the object of the 
modelling exercise performed by the theoretician. 
 
4.1.1. PTKL versus the `subjectivist´ version of SA 
 Let us focus on the relation between RPs and PTKL. To be sure, RPs constitutes 
a minimal requirement for rationality in that agents´ behaviour only has to be adequate or 
appropriate to the P-S as they see it. This implies that, as in the Austrian School of von 
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Mises, Hayek, and Schumpeter, rationality is associated to behaviour that is goal-directed 
or purposive.21 This type of rationality is sometimes denoted as instrumental in the sense 
that reason becomes an instrument to reach a certain goal, e.g. an increase in pleasure.22 
Although there are significant methodological differences among members of the 
Austrian School of economics, they all viewed economics as part of a science of human 
action whose core is `to be found in the unique property possessed by human beings of 
engaging in operations designed to attain a state of affairs that is preferred to that which 
has hitherto prevailed´ (Kirzner, 1976, p. 148). What is crucial in our context is that the 
Austrian School´s conception of rationality is subjective in the sense of being an a priori 
assumption about human behaviour. There are two sources of subjectivity. First, there is 
the subjectivity of actors´ ends or, as von Mises puts it: 
 
 `Nobody else than the individual himself can decide what satisfies him better and 
what less... There is no such thing as an absolute state of satisfaction or happiness 
irrespective of the desires of the individual concerned´ (von Mises, 1944, p. 533).  
 
Second, there is the subjectivity of knowledge itself in the social sciences. As long 
argued in Hayek (1943), it is only in the social sciences that our interpretation of a 
situation no matter whether it is right or wrong becomes an integral part of the situation 
thus affecting subsequent developments. Further, and to the extent that we understand the 
surrounding world via the ‘internal models’ we create, our understanding of the world 
will affect our decisions and, in this way, it may affect the world itself. Hayek (op. cit.) 
illustrates this theme by explaining the purposive nature of human action. As he explains, 
just as we cannot speak of the objective properties of a tool without saying something 
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about the purpose for which the tool is used so we cannot speak of social institutions 
objectively. Laws and economic institutions cannot be known apart from the intentions 
of the individuals who use them. In the field of economics, for instance, the value of 
money depends on the opinions of individuals who use it rather than on any inherent 
property of it. As we argue below, Hayek´s ideas on the methodology of the social 
sciences seem to have been ignored by most commentators of Popper´s work in that field. 
Members of the Austrian School of economics like von Mises or Hayek adopted 
the `praxeological approach´ which consists of a theory of human action based on a set 
of self-evidently true a priori axioms on behaviour which, in turn, yields conclusions 
which are true regardless of time and place. However, the axioms of praxeology are not 
arbitrary like, for instance, those of mathematics. Rather, Austrian economists maintain 
that these axioms are already given to us in our minds and that, through the exercise of 
`introspection´ or `verstehen´, which consists of understanding the functioning of our 
minds, we have the possibility of understanding the behaviour of others. That said, the 
extreme subjectivism of the Austrian School of Economics leads to the conclusion that 
there is no possibility of acquiring knowledge about any social phenomena other than 
through `introspection´. Further, the notion of rationality proposed by von Mises (1944) 
as purposive behaviour may preclude the generation of predictions which can be subject 
to empirical tests. This is because the hypotheses about social phenomena derived from 
self-evident axioms may be close to being true but they may also possess little empirical 
content. This problem is addressed in Popper (1963, pp. 217-19) who makes it clear that 
science characterises as preferable `the theory which tells us more; that is to say, the 
theory which contains the greater amount of empirical information or content´. In other 
words, the empirical content of a theory increases with the increasing improbability of it 
being true or else with its increasing exposure to falsification. He uses the example of 
44 
 
meteorological forecasts; a forecast according to which in some unspecified time in the 
future it will rain has, as he explains, a high probability of being true yet it has virtually 
no empirical content, whereas a forecast which specifies the date and the time it is likely 
to rain has a high degree of empirical content yet it is quite likely to be false. Likewise, 
predictions derived from general or self-evident axioms on human behaviour like the ones 
of praxeology — which amount to stating little more than all human behaviour is 
purposeful — have a high probability of being true yet they have little empirical content 
because they are not falsifiable. By contrast, the subjectivist version of SA proposed by 
Popper (1985) is not subject to the previous criticism since, in addition to incorporating 
all the relevant elements of P-S — including the physical and social constrains and the 
knowledge and information possessed by agents — it also posits that actors´ behaviour is 
`adequate´ to P-S as they see it. The requirement that actors´ behaviour is `adequate´ — 
in addition to being purposeful or goal-oriented — implies, in turn, that the empirical 
content of theories constructed upon RPs exceeds the empirical content of theories about 
human behaviour derived from praxeology.    
Let us distinguish between ‘means-rationality’, ‘beliefs-rationality’, and ‘ends-
rationality’ (Hamlin, 1986). ‘Means-rationality’ implies the correctness of one´s actions 
given one´s desires and beliefs regardless of whether the latter are right. Therefore, as a 
minimum ‘means-rationality’ implies consistency of choice by agents. For instance, in 
standard consumer theory, ‘means-rationality’ is characterized by consistency in the 
preferences of households or transitivity: if an agent prefers a to b and b to c, then a must 
also be preferred to c. 23 The further requirements that are usually imposed, i.e., that 
individuals´ preferences exhibit both ‘completeness’ and ‘continuity’, are not ones of 
‘means-rationality’ but rather of the optimization methods through which economists 
seek to represent individual preferences by a ‘utility function’. Thus, when economists 
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speak of `rational´ agents what they usually have in mind is that their choices have to be, 
at least, consistent with one another.  
Next, following Hamlin (op. cit), ‘beliefs-rationality’ implies that an individual´s 
(subjective) model of the surrounding world represents a good enough approximation to 
reality. Similarly, Bicchieri (1992) defines ‘epistemic’ rationality as a characteristic of 
beliefs that consists in their being correct given the evidence that is available to agents.  
Admittedly, both definitions are imprecise. For instance, in the former case it is unclear 
what a `good enough´ approximation to reality is. Similarly, in the latter case, and to the 
extent that the evidence that is available to every individual is necessarily limited, one 
might argue that agents´ beliefs are always correct given the evidence that is available to 
them. Thus, and for the purposes of this essay, let us characterise `beliefs-rationality´ as 
implying that agents´ subjective view of P-S coincides, with the theoretician´s view of it. 
In turn, `beliefs-rationality´ may be satisfied under any of the following scenarios: (i) 
agents exhibit `perfect foresight´ in which case their view of P-S always coincides with 
the theoretician´s and, hence, they do not make mistakes provided they also exhibit 
`means-rationality´, (ii) agents exhibit `rational expectations´ (Muth, 1961) ― which is 
the stochastic version of the `perfect foresight´ case ― in which case agents´ view of P-
S is such that, provided they also exhibit `means-rationality´, their mistakes will only be 
random, and (iii) agents behave according to Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) theory 
(Savage, 1954) in which case the possibility that agents´ mistakes are systematic cannot 
be ruled out a priori. To be sure, in SEU theory it is assumed that the decision-maker 
knows the set of all possible consequences that will obtain from the adoption of every 
conceivable `course of action´ or `act´ even though she does not know which particular 
`state of the world´ will realize and, hence, which specific consequence will follow if she 
adopts a given `act´. The only source of uncertainty in SEU theory stems from the fact 
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that the numerical probabilities that decision-makers attach to every conceivable `state of 
the world´ are subjective and, hence, liable to error. However, and crucially, there is no 
presumption in the theory that the theoretician knows the `true´ value of the probabilities 
corresponding to each `state of the world´ so that the fulfilment of `belief-rationality´ in 
this case stems from the fact that it is assumed that both decision-makers and the 
theoretician know the precise consequences of adopting every possible `course of action´ 
yet they do not know which `state of the world´ will be realized.24 Of course, if Savage´s 
version of SEU theory is supplemented by the notion that decision-makers´ (subjective) 
probabilities are correct `on average´ then this scenario becomes equivalent to the 
`rational expectations´ case.    
 Finally, ‘ends-rationality’ means that behaviour is purposeful or oriented to the 
achievement of a goal and, hence, not the result of chance (Hamlin, op. cit.). In the context 
of neoclassical economics ‘ends-rationality’ is usually associated to the pursuit of self-
interest. To be sure, this has been the case at least since Edgeworth who, in his 1881 
Mathematical Psychics, stated that ‘the first principle of Economics is that every agent is 
actuated only by self-interest’. The typical statement of mainstream economics 
methodology prior to the emergence of ‘neoclassical’ economics in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, is in Mill (1967[1836]). Be that as it may, Twomey (1998, p. 435) 
claims that the clearest statements of this tradition were already present in the work of 
Bentham and Hobbes. In particular, he argues that Bentham (1907[1789]) first formulated 
the notion that agents seek to maximise pleasure whereas Hobbes (1985[1651]) provided 
a statement of egoism according to which individuals always seek their own greatest 
good. Therefore, we may characterise the `praxeologic´ models of the Austrian school of 
economics as implying `ends-rationality´ and the situational models based upon RPs as 
implying both ‘means-rationality’ and ‘ends-rationality’ but not ‘beliefs-rationality’. As 
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we will argue below, each of these types of models implies a different division line 
between `rational´ and `irrational´ behaviour.   
The absence of ‘beliefs-rationality’ in models based on RPs implies that agents´ 
beliefs may be wrong, i.e., agents are fallible and, crucially, that such mistakes may be 
systematic. Specifically, agents may perceive the physical and social constraints they face 
erroneously or may simply possess wrong information. Therefore, the adoption of RPs 
implies that agents´ beliefs may be (systematically) wrong and understanding their 
behaviour (including their mistakes) will require the construction of a situational model 
of the typical P-S as seen by agents. It follows from this that the adoption of RPs is a 
priori compatible with PTKL since the agents in the typical model can make mistakes 
stemming from their wrong beliefs. Yet, the notion of adequate behaviour according to 
PTKL also implies, as we noted above, the requirement that agents `learn´ from their past 
mistakes, i.e., they do not repeat them. As a result of it, full compatibility of RPs with 
PTKL would require that the theoretician recognizes that agents do not repeat their 
mistakes in the future. As we will see below, this feature of PTKL does create a tension 
with RPs when the purpose of the modelling exercise is to make predictions.25 We may 
also add that, if RPs is adopted, the point of view of the theoretician vis-à-vis the actors 
becomes analogous to the position of participants in the `Beauty Contests´ that were so 
popular in the British tabloids in the 1930s and that were metaphorically captured by 
Keynes in his General Theory to explain the formation of the prices of financial assets 
(Keynes, 1936, p. 156). In `Beauty Contests´, what participants were supposed to do in 
order to win the prize was not so much to identify — among the photos of beautiful ladies 
portrayed in a panel — the lady they believed to be the most beautiful one but to `guess´ 
the photo of the lady they believed other participants would select as the most beautiful 
one. Similarly, we will argue below that, if RPs is adopted, the theoretician will seek to 
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reconstruct P-S not as she sees it herself but the way she thinks agents see it. In a `Beauty 
Contest´, what participants were supposed to do in order to win is not to identify — among 
the photos of beautiful ladies portrayed in a panel — the lady they believe to be the most 
beautiful one but to ` guess´ the photo of the lady they believe other participants will select 
as the most beautiful one. In a similar fashion, we will argue that, if RPs is adopted, the 
theoretician will seek to reconstruct P-S not as she sees it herself but the way she thinks 
agents see it.  
Next, and crucially, to the extent a discrepancy exists between the theoretician´s 
(objective) view of P-S and his conjecture about agents´ view of P-S, the generation of  
predictions will require making the crucial assumption that such a discrepancy and the 
`situational factors´ that warrant it exhibit a high degree of stability over time. In turn, 
the former implies that the `null hypothesis´ in empirical tests applied on a situational 
model which adopts RPs is that agents´ view of P-S is, at least partially, wrong whereas 
the alternative hypothesis is that the theoretician´s (objective) view of P-S is correct. If 
such discrepancy were to disappear over time for some reason (e.g., learning by agents), 
the predictions derived from it would be equivalent to the predictions generated if RPo 
were adopted. Thus, we disagree with Vanberg (2002, p. 12) when he argues that the 
`subjectivist´ RP poses a testability problem vis-à-vis the `objectivist´ RP. Specifically, 
situational models that adopt RPs can generate predictions albeit, as we argued above, 
their generation implicitly implies adopting the assumption that agents´ view of P-S will 
remain constant in the future. Unless the theoretician does so, the models´ testability will 
be seriously weakened. This is because, in the wake of an unfavourable empirical test, 
the theoretician may try to circumvent its refutation by arguing that the adverse result of 
the empirical test was due, for instance, to an (unpredictable) change in agents´ view of 
P-S. Thus, a sine qua non condition for potential refutability in this case, i.e., for the 
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model to possess `empirical content´, is that agents´ view of P-S is assumed to remain 
constant over time or, else, that agents follow a constant pattern of behaviour in spite of 
the mistakes such behaviour may bring about. However, this assumption creates some 
tension with PTKL since, according to the latter, agents tend to purge their wrong beliefs 
over time.    
Now, we have argued above that, if RPs is adopted, it is implicitly assumed that 
(i) there is a discrepancy between the theoretician´s view of P-S and agents´ view of P-S, 
and (ii) that the former persists over time. As we argued above, this implies (under the 
null hypothesis) that the agents whose behaviour the theoretician seeks to capture in the 
situational model do not revise their wrong beliefs which runs counter to PTKL. The 
discrepancy alluded to above is between two different conjectures: (i) the theoretician´s 
(objective) view of P-S, and (ii) her view of agents´ view of P-S. According to Popper 
(1994, p. 178), the latter is always part of the former since the theoretician can only 
understand agents´ view of P-S if she reconstructs a wider view of P-S than their own. 
Specifically, if we adopt Popper´s interpretation of RPs, what the theoretician subjects to 
empirical test is the hypothesis that agents systematically fail to perceive the `true´ P-S 
and, under the null hypothesis, this implies that agents´ view of P-S will likely be 
disappointed if the theoretician´s view of P-S is correct. However, as we have argued 
above, the systematic disappointment of beliefs will come about because it is implicitly 
assumed that agents do not `learn´ from their mistakes, i.e., they tend to repeat mistakes 
all over. However, the above-mentioned tension between PTKL and RPs does not arise 
if the main purpose of constructing a situational model is to explain the past (e.g., 
historical interpretation) rather than to generate predictions. This is because in the former 
case the theoretician need not be concerned about the persistence into the future of a 
discrepancy between agents´ view of P-S and her `objective´ view of P-S. In short, RPs 
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is more problematic than Popper admits if the purpose of constructing a situational model 
is to generate predictions.26  
To finish off this section, a clear example of this tension between PTKL and RPs 
is the Keynesian-type business cycle theory proposed by Minsky (1975) which is based 
on overoptimistic expectations of economic agents about their ability to honour future 
cash commitments which result from their inherited liability structure. According to 
Minsky´s `financial instability hypothesis´ (op. cit.), market economies are intrinsically 
unstable owing to the fact that economic agents become systematically overoptimistic 
during the upswing which makes them take on an excessive amount of debt and this 
eventually triggers off an asset price deflation and a subsequent financial crisis that 
precipitates the economy into a downswing. In other words, Minsky´s theory posits that, 
as memories from the last financial crisis fade out, agents will tend to underestimate the 
risk implied by the increase in the level of real indebtedness so that the upswing ends up 
when an external factor, e.g., an increase in interest rates, leads to an initial decrease in 
the price of real and financial assets which then brings about a reassessment of liability 
structures and, finally, leads to an asset price deflation. In other words, Minsky´s theory 
is a clear example of business cycle theory where (i): there is a discrepancy between the 
theoretician´s view of P-S and her view of agents´ view of P-S, and (ii) it is (implicitly) 
assumed that agents tend to repeat their past mistakes so the same phenomenon (i.e., 
business cycles), occurs recurrently and inevitably.       
 
4.1.2. PTKL versus the `objectivist´ version of SA 
According to Hands (1992, p. 28), `it is easy to see that situational analysis is the 
method of microeconomics (and of any macroeconomics based on micro foundations)´. 
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Indeed, Popper recognizes that his source of inspiration for SA is the methodology of 
neoclassical microeconomics (Popper, 1966[1943a], p. 97; 1944-45, p. 82; (2002[1976a], 
p. 93; 1976b, p. 117f).27 However, on those few occasions when Popper makes it clear 
that he intends to extend the methodology of neoclassical economics to the rest of the 
social sciences he seems to have in mind the `objectivist´ SA.28 That said, some 
commentators have noticed that the rationality requirements are more demanding if RPo 
rather than RPs is adopted (Latsis, 1983; Farmer, 1998; Oakley, 1999; Vanberg, 2002). 
Notably, and in addition to the fulfilment of both ‘means-rationality’ and ‘ends-
rationality’ RPo also implies fulfilment of ‘beliefs-rationality’. In standard consumer 
theory the presence of `perfect foresight´ by agents is pervasive so the fulfilment of 
`beliefs-rationality´ is unambiguous. Similarly, in macro-models which incorporate the 
`Rational Expectations Hypothesis´ (REH), the fulfilment of `beliefs-rationality´ implies 
that agents´ forecast errors are random. However, the presence of `beliefs-rationality´ in 
SEU theory requires some clarification.  
In SEU theory, a `prospect´ is defined as an exhaustive list of `consequences´ 
stemming from different courses of action or `acts´ under different `states of the world´. 
Consequences are mutually exclusive possibilities. The decision-maker is assumed to be 
able to attach a (subjective) numerical probability to each of the consequences such that 
probabilities sum up to unity. The preferences of an individual are defined over the set of 
all conceivable `acts´. In other words, an individual must have a preference ordering that 
is complete over the set of conceivable `acts´ if she is to maximize expected utility. The 
evaluation by an individual of a given `act´ in the face of uncertainty involves both her 
preferences for the set of possible consequences and her (subjective) evaluation of the 
relative likelihood of each `state of the world´ actually being realized. Further, the 
preference structure is depicted axiomatically thereby allowing the theorist to transform, 
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by virtue of a von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, the preference ordering of any 
individual into a numerical value. Savage (1954, p. 30) interprets probability as `degrees 
of conviction´.29 More generally, we can think of probability as an individual´s `degree 
of belief in the likely realization of an event´. Be that as it may, Savage (op. cit., pp. 82-
86) makes it clear that the practical applicability of SEU theory is restricted to `small 
worlds´ in which its axioms do apply.30 Yet, there is by now plenty of evidence in the 
field of both experimental and behavioural economics showing that the axioms of SEU 
theory are often violated even in so-called `small worlds´. In any case, we believe that the 
subjective nature of probability in SEU theory does not preclude it from being part of the 
family of models characterised by RPo, the reason being that an axiomatic structure is 
imposed upon agents´ behaviour by assuming that a complete preference ordering of an 
(exhaustive) list of `acts´ based on subjective probability evaluations can be derived. In 
other words, the joint assumption that agents know the consequences of all possible `acts´ 
under all conceivable `states of the world´ ― even though they do not know which `state 
of the world´ will be realized ― and that they attach numerical probabilities to each `state 
of the world´ confers SEU theory a logical structure that places it within the family of 
models embodying RPo by fulfilling `means-rationality´, `ends-rationality´, and `beliefs-
rationality´.  
The feature that distinguishes SEU theory from the other scenarios identified 
above in which the assumption of `beliefs-rationality´ is satisfied is the possibility that 
agents´ mistakes are systematic. Let us explore this feature in some detail. First, Savage 
(1954, p. 20) admits that the axioms of SEU theory are preferably to be interpreted as 
principles that a rational individual ought to follow (i.e., as a prescriptive hypothesis) 
rather than as a descriptive hypothesis about how people actually choose among a set of 
possible `courses of action´.31 Arguably, the possibility that agents´ errors are systematic 
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due to the subjective (and potentially wrong) nature of probability evaluations leads him 
to admit that the descriptive and, hence, the predictive power of SEU theory is rather 
limited unless it is supplemented by an additional assumption about the characteristics of 
subjective probability evaluations of individuals. Second, his recognition that SEU theory 
only applies to `small worlds´ also suggests that, even if we accept that the main 
usefulness of the theory is normative, the latter is valid solely in an, relatively small, 
section of reality. We believe that Savage´s admission that: (i) SEU theory only applies 
to ` small worlds´, and (ii) that its main usefulness is normative lends support to our notion 
that the former is a particular implementation of RPo in which agents do exhibit `means-
rationality´, `ends-rationality´, and `beliefs-rationality´. In particular, fulfilment of 
`means-rationality´ and ` ends-rationality´ stems from compliance with the axioms of SEU 
theory and the (expected) utility maximizing behaviour of individuals respectively 
whereas fulfilment of `beliefs-rationality´ stems from the fact that, although probability 
is subjective and, hence, liable to error, agents know the set of consequences associated 
to any conceivable `act´ under every possible `state of the world´.  
Now, the combination of the three types of rationality alluded to above yields a 
type of rationality known as ‘substantive rationality’ (SR) (Simon, 1976). SR is a type of 
rationality that is concerned exclusively with the consequences or outcomes of rational 
choice. In particular, Simon (1976, p. 130) denotes behaviour as being substantively 
rational ‘when it is appropriate to the achievement of given goals within the limits 
imposed by given conditions and constraints’. Thus, as with classical decision theory, the 
interest lies not so much in how decisions are made but in what decisions are made. In 
short, SR constitutes a special type of application of RPo in that, in addition to both 
consistent and purposeful behaviour, it is assumed that agents´ beliefs are correct on 
average. As we have noted above, it is this approach to human rationality that lies at the 
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core of standard consumption theory, SEU theory and macro-models that incorporate 
REH. Indeed, some scholars have argued that RPo is the principle that underlies the 
methodology of mainstream economics (Farmer, 1998; Oakley, 1999).32  
 
4.1.2.1. Rationalizing the `objectivist´ version of SA 
Now, one can rationalize RPo as a methodological decision according to which 
the theoretician assumes beforehand that the mistakes made by agents (by `mistakes´ we 
mean decisions that are adequate from the point of view of P-S as seen by the agents but 
inadequate from the viewpoint of the P-S as seen by the theoretician) are declared to be 
less interesting for the purpose of understanding agents´ behaviour and, especially, for  
generating predictions than the modelling mistakes made by the theoretician. In other 
words, a rationale for RPo is that, although agents´ mistakes cannot be ruled out a priori 
— so RPo would be compatible with fallibility — nevertheless the theoretician chooses 
to ignore the former for methodological reasons. What are these reasons? First, that the 
theoretician gains little, if anything, by learning that agents make mistakes because (i) 
she already knows it and, more importantly, (ii) that the nature of the mistakes agents 
make is likely to change over time in an unpredictable way and so learning about them is 
of little help for the purpose of generating predictions. To be sure, learning about the 
mistakes agents have made in the past may be helpful if we had the assurance that the 
same mistakes (i.e., mistakes triggered off by the very same factors) will be repeated in 
the future. As we explained above, it is this scenario that may justify the adoption of RPs. 
However, if such condition is not satisfied there is arguably very little we can learn from 
the mistakes made by agents in the past other than for the purpose of historical analysis. 
A second reason for adopting this methodological decision would be that, if it were not 
adopted then in the wake of an erroneous prediction the theoretician might be tempted to 
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sidestep its falsification by arguing that agents´ beliefs and decisions were, on a particular 
episode — the one subject to the test — different from what one would have `objectively´ 
expected and to utilize this apparent `anomaly´ as a justification for the (adverse) result 
of the empirical test. By contrast, if RPo is adopted then the onus of proof will inescapably 
rest on the theorist´ view of P-S. In other words, the adoption of RPo implies that the 
theorist rules out the possibility that a wrong prediction generated by the model can be 
ascribed to agents´ mistakes and, hence, she forces herself to avoid resorting to 
immunizing strategies to prevent the refutation of the model.       
According to the rationale for RPo we have suggested above, ascribing a role to 
agents´ errors in the situational model (i.e., to discrepancies between their view of P-S 
and the theoreticians´ view of P-S) will prevent us from generating predictions unless 
agents´ errors are predictable. Yet, one possible reason why agents´ errors may actually 
be unpredictable is that agents may `learn´ from their past mistakes so that their future 
mistakes will tend to differ from previous ones. Thus, in order to generate predictions, a 
hypothesis which assumes that agent´s view of P-S does not coincide with the theorist´s 
view of it (i.e., RPs) will need to be coupled to an additional assumption according to 
which agents´ errors tend to persist over time and, hence, are predictable. However, to 
the extent that this assumption implies that agents do not `learn´ from their mistakes, it is 
in conflict with PTKL. To be sure, if agents `learn´ from their previous mistakes so that 
they do not repeat them, their future mistakes will tend to differ from their previous 
mistakes and, unless the range of potential mistakes is limited, their future mistakes will 
thus be unpredictable. By contrast, if the theoretician adopts RPo instead of RPs, this 
problem does not arise because there is no presumption that agents´ view of P-S differs 
from the theoretician´s.  
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As we will argue below, the adoption of RPo necessarily implies the imposition 
of the theoretician´s view of P-S upon agents. Does this mean that there is no tension 
between the `objectivist´ version of SA and PTKL? We believe not. Firstly, PTKL only 
implies that agents `learn´ by trial and error-elimination so behaviour that is `rational´ 
according to PTKL may not be appropriate to the `logic of the situation´ as faced by 
agents. To be sure, the errors that agents made in the past occurred in the environment 
that surrounded them at that time so that if the latter changes in an unpredictable way 
agents may make new (and different) errors and, hence, they may make decisions that are 
inappropriate to the `logic of the (new) situation´. Secondly, since the theoretician´s view 
of P-S does not necessarily coincide with agents´ view of it, further assumptions will need 
to be made to justify the coincidence of the theoreticians´ and agents´ views. These 
additional assumptions will be presented and discussed below. In any case, we may 
anticipate that these assumptions are problematic in the sense that if it is assumed that 
agents actually behave according to PTKL it is doubtful that their decisions will be 
appropriate to the `logic of the P-S´ as seen by the theoretician, even `on average´. In 
short, the nature of tension between PTKL and RPs differs from the nature of tension 
between PTKL and RPo in that, in the former case, tension stems from the fact that the 
adoption of RPs implies that agents may repeat the same mistakes they made in the past 
in a way hardly compatible with `learning´ by trial and error-elimination as posited in 
PTKL whereas, in the latter case, it is assumed that agents´ view of P-S coincides, at least 
on average, with the theoretician´s view of P-S so that their behaviour is always 
appropriate to the objective `logic of the P-S´ yet, as we argue below, the mechanisms by 
virtue of which such coincidence is justified can hardly be reconciled with PTKL.  
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4.1.2.2. How do the views of the agents and the theoretician tend to converge?  
We suggested above that the adoption of RPo implies de facto the imposition of 
the theoreticians´ view of P-S upon agents´. However, social scientists do not usually see 
things this way. An example is mainstream economics where a number of devices have 
been suggested in the literature to (implicitly) justify the adoption of RPo. To be sure, 
such mechanisms are seemingly viewed by mainstream economists as reasons why they 
need not care about agents´ beliefs when reconstructing P-S because an `objective´ P-S 
can be said to exist `out there´ that is sufficiently independent of agents´ beliefs (and 
actions) so the theoretician can reconstruct P-S as she sees it. According to us, there are 
two devices through which the neglect of agents´ beliefs by the theoretician is normally 
justified: (i) the operation of the `law of large numbers´ in the social domain, and (ii) the 
presence of `learning´ by individuals. However, as we argue below, both mechanisms are 
problematic. Let us address the first mechanism. According to it, agents´ decisions may 
turn out to be objectively wrong in retrospect but nevertheless their mistakes will tend to 
cancel each other out provided the number of individuals is large enough. The former 
implies that the scope for fallibility at the aggregate level in this version of RPo is 
negligible since it is restricted to random mistakes associated to transitory factors. There 
is some textual evidence which suggests that several influential social scientists implicitly 
resort to this mechanism to justify the adoption of RPo. For instance, Nobel Laureate in 
Economics John Hicks (1956, p. 55) writes that `the preference hypothesis [in the context 
of neoclassical utility theory] only acquires a prima facie plausibility when it is applied 
to a statistical average´. More explicitly, Gibbard & Varian (1978) describe optimizing 
behaviour as capturing the ‘central tendency’ of rational economic behaviour or:  
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‘If deviations are random or more precisely, are not systematic, there might be 
good reason to have some faith in the conclusions of the [economic] model even though 
the assumptions, strictly interpreted, are implausible. Perhaps a case in point is the 
economist´s assumption of perfect optimizing behaviour. Of course, this assumption is 
strictly speaking, false, but, so long as errors in optimization are not systematic, this 
hypothesis may be useful in describing the “central tendency” of economic behaviour. 
Furthermore, in models where individual units´ behaviour is being aggregated, non-
systematic errors may be expected to “wash out” in the process of aggregation’ (op. cit., 
p. 670).  
 
Likewise, it has been argued in the sphere of sociology that it is not necessary to 
claim that all agents optimize but, instead, that the tendency to optimize is the most 
important non-idiosyncratic factor at work so that the operation of a sort of ‘law of large 
numbers’ guarantees that optimizing behaviour dominates (Goldthorpe, 1998, p. 169). 
We believe this assumption (i.e., the `law of large numbers´) implicitly lies at the core of 
neoclassical economics where agents are modelled as if they were infallible – when they 
exhibit perfect foresight – or as if their mistakes were random (Muth, 1961). More 
specifically, this assumption is implied when the optimizing assumption is applied in 
modelling exercises. However, let us note that the `law of large numbers´ in the field of 
statistics assumes that the different trials of a stochastic process are: (i) independent and, 
crucially, (ii) have the same distribution so that, as the number of such trials tends to 
infinity, the probability distribution of a random variable concentrates around the finite 
expected value of each of the trials.  
Now, it is unlikely that these conditions will be satisfied in the case of agents´ 
view of P-S. For one thing, there are likely to be significant interdependencies among 
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agents´ (subjective) view of P-S owing to the presence of conventional elements so that 
condition (i) is likely to be violated. Further, agents´ (subjective) view of P-S may differ 
substantially from others agents´ which also violates condition (ii). Thus, the conditions 
for reliance on the `law of large numbers´ as it exists in statistics for the purpose of 
providing a rationale for the coincidence, on average, between agents´ view of P-S and 
the theoreticians´ view of P-S are not warranted. Consequently, the adoption of RPo can 
solely be justified on strict methodological grounds. That said, we believe that some 
advocates of RPo assume that if the theorist´s view of P-S diverges significantly from 
agents´ view of P-S such discrepancy will tend to be eliminated over time by means of 
other mechanisms such as: (i) trial and error-elimination, and (ii) imitation of successful 
strategies by agents (Alchian, 1950). In other words, advocates of RPo might argue that 
the occurrence of learning at the individual level based on trial and error-elimination 
and/or the imitation of the successful strategies of others will make agents´ view of P-S 
eventually converge to the theoretician´s (objective) view of P-S so that, for the sake of 
analytical convenience, we may ´confidently assume that agents´ beliefs are correct `on 
average´. However, the imitation of successful strategies requires that some other agents 
have previously `learnt´ to perform some tasks adequately so that the presence of some 
kind of learning is a sine qua non condition for the imitation of successful strategies to 
allow other agents to make decisions that are appropriate to the `logic of the situation´. 
Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, we will leave the latter aside. In other words, the 
theoretician assumes in this case that the operation of a negative feedback mechanism 
whereby agents systematically revise their (wrong) beliefs until the latter coincide with 
the theoretician´s view of P-S justifies the adoption of the methodological decision to 
assume that agents´ beliefs are correct `on average´. In short, `learning´ is the second 
mechanism (additional to the `law of large numbers´) by virtue of which mainstream 
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economists implicitly justify the assumption that agents´ view of P-S coincides, at least 
`on average´, with the theorist´s.33 For instance, Nobel Laureate R. Lucas characterizes 
the type of situations on which economic theory focuses as the end-result of an adaptive 
learning process:34  
 
‘Economics has tended to focus on situations in which the agent can be expected 
to “know” or to have learned the consequences of different actions so that his observed 
choices reveal stable features of his underlying preferences… Technically, I think of 
economics as studying decision rules that are steady states of some adaptive process, 
decision rules that are found to work over a range of situations and hence are no longer 
revised appreciably as more experience accumulates…’ (Lucas, 1986, p. 218).  
 
However, for this feedback mechanism to be effective, it is necessary that: (i) the 
former is fast and accurate enough, and (ii) P-S remains constant until the convergence 
process has been completed.35 Yet, as Tversky & Kahneman (1986, p. 90) insist, such 
conditions rarely arise in the real world. In particular, the former can hardly be satisfied 
when agents make decisions in a changing environment in which it is hard to ascertain 
whether an observed outcome is a direct consequence of our decisions or a consequence 
of someone else´s decisions. Furthermore, Popper (1994, p. 4) insists that no optimal state 
of adaptation is ever reached by the application of the method of trial and error-
elimination owing to: (i) the continuous change in the environmental situation, and (ii) 
agents´ inability to eliminate all their errors. That said, we believe that it is the reliance 
on the alleged efficacy of `learning´ at the individual level that makes some scientists 
implicitly assume that any negative result that occurs in the wake of empirical tests can 
be ascribed only (or mainly) to their own modelling mistakes (i.e., to their own failure to 
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capture the `objective´ P-S properly) rather than to agents´ mistakes. Thus, although RPo 
accounts for the presence of learning, it exhibits some clear differences with PTKL in that 
`learning´ at the individual level is unlikely to warrant that agents´ decisions will be 
adequate to the `logic of the situation´ as it is seen by the theoretician.  
 
4.1.3. The dichotomy between `rational´ and `irrational´ behaviour 
According to Simon (1965, p. 84), theoretical models based on ‘substantively’ 
rational individuals share a common framework characterised by: (i) a set of alternative 
courses of action that are available to the individual, (ii) knowledge that permits the 
individual to predict the precise consequences of choosing each course of action, and (iii) 
a criterion for determining which set of potential consequences she prefers. In such 
models, rationality is usually defined as ‘the ability of actors to select that course of action 
which leads to the most preferred set of predicted consequences’ (op. cit.).36 Therefore, 
SR assumes that the surrounding environment is either known or knowable (i.e., the 
stochastic environment is stable), and that individuals have sufficient cognitive abilities 
to deal with a complex reality. SR is the type of rationality actors are assumed to exhibit 
in models that adopt strong versions of RPo such as the ones that prevail in mainstream 
economics. In particular, agents who exhibit SR must fulfil ends-rationality, means-
rationality, and beliefs-rationality. This is depicted below in the third row of Table 1. In 
turn, this implies that behaviour that falls short of maximizing is deemed ‘irrational’ 
(Becker, 1962). More specifically, violation of `means-rationality´ and/or `beliefs-
rationality´ is interpreted by mainstream economists as signalling `irrational´ behaviour. 
Likewise, Popper (1966[1943a]), p. 97) explains that `when we speak of "rational 
behaviour" or of "irrational behaviour" we mean behaviour which is, or which is not, in 
accordance with the logic of the situation´. Thus, Popper´s notion of rationality in the 
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context of SA bears, arguably, a strong resemblance to the notion of rationality in 
mainstream economics.  
That said, we believe that the charge of `irrationality´ is a direct implication of the 
adoption of RPo and, particularly, of the imposition upon agents of the theoretician´s view 
of P-S. More specifically, we believe that the `irrationality´ charge that is applied to those 
agents who fail to maximize a given pre-specified objective function obeys ultimately to 
a failure to distinguish between the `rationality of the theoretician´ and the `rationality of 
agents´. For instance, the implicit assumption by mainstream economists that agents´ 
(subjective) view of P-S coincides, on average, with the theoretician´s view of P-S implies 
that all behaviour that falls short of the rationality standard ascribed to the theoretician is 
`irrational´. However, we believe that if agents´ view of P-S does not coincide with the 
theoretician´s then the former cannot be blamed for being `irrational´. In particular, an 
individual cannot be said to be `irrational´ if, for instance, her beliefs are wrong. Rather, 
as PTKL has it, we can only be said to be `irrational´ if we refuses to revise our (wrong) 
beliefs.   
The counterpart to SR is the notion of ‘procedural’ rationality (PR). According to 
Simon (1976, p. 131), ‘behavior is procedurally rational when it is the outcome of 
appropriate deliberation’.37 PR shifts attention from the consequences of choice to the 
process of choice where the emphasis is placed in the presence of a decision process based 
on the use of simple heuristics or ‘rules of thumb’.38 PR can thus be characterised as the 
ability of actors to use simple heuristics that are adequate for a specific purpose. Reliance 
on simple heuristics to make decisions assumes that, most of the time, actors face 
situations characterised by (i) Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1971[1921]), or (ii) where 
the ‘optimal’ solution is intractable. The former corresponds to scenarios where either we 
do not have an exhaustive list of potential consequences of a certain decision or else to 
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situations where, even if such a list were available, it is impossible to attach numerical 
probabilities to them. In turn, the latter corresponds to situations where there are 
insurmountable constraints on agents´ ability: (i) to identify optimal actions given a set 
of beliefs and desires, and (ii) to acquire the information relevant to the problem at hand. 
In contrast, SR implies that, in conditions of imperfect knowledge, agents make decisions 
by following Bayes’s rule or by maximizing their expected utility, as in SEU theory.  
 Now, we believe PR captures properly the type of rationality implied by PTKL. 
As we noted above, the acquisition of knowledge in Popper’s account runs parallel to the 
process of adaptation to a partly unknown (and changing) environment in which some of 
the errors made in the past by individuals are purged by virtue of a learning process that 
consists essentially of subjecting their hypotheses or conjectures to trial and error-
elimination. Crucially, Popper emphasises that our adaptation to the surrounding 
environment is often successful and often unsuccessful. More specifically, some errors 
will escape and this possibility is one of the reasons our knowledge is always fallible 
(Popper, 1990, p. 47). In turn, Popper (1994, p. 4) insists that the systematic application 
of the method of trial and error-elimination will not result in an ‘optimum’ adaptation to 
the surrounding environment. Instead, and due to the partial elimination of errors, our 
adaptation to the environment is always imperfect. It follows from this that the observed 
states of adaptation can never be the result of convergence to an optimum. Should all 
errors be systematically purged and the environment be stable, the process of adaptation 
to the latter would eventually be perfect and only then could the state of adaptation be 
interpreted as the outcome of a convergence to an optimum. In this scenario, individuals 
would be fallible only to the extent that the changes in the environment cannot be fully 
anticipated. The learning method of trial and error-elimination consists of an adaptation 
mechanism whereby errors are eliminated and new hypotheses are subject to trial. As 
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some commentators note (Kerstenetzky, 2009; Lagueux, 2006), the watershed between 
`rational´ and `irrational´ behaviour in PTKL is marked by the unwillingness of agents to 
correct their wrong beliefs or, as it were, by the incorrigibility of their beliefs. This is 
clearly stated by Popper in the following quotation: 
       
 `The main distinction, I suggest, is that a healthy person´s beliefs are not 
incorrigible: a healthy person shows a certain readiness to correct his beliefs. He may do 
so only reluctantly, yet he is nevertheless ready to correct his views under the pressure of 
events, of the opinions held by others, and of critical arguments… the mentality of the 
man with definitely fixed views, the "committed" man, is akin to that of the madman… 
but in so far as he is committed, he is not rational´ (Popper, 1985, p. 364; 1994, p. 180, 
emphasis added). 
 
 This suggests, as noted above, that there are two different notions of rationality 
in Popper´s work: (i) behaviour that is in accordance with the `logic of the situation´ 
(Popper, [, p. 97; 1944-45, sections 31 & 32), and (ii) willingness to revise one´s wrong 
beliefs (Popper, 1985, p. 364). We have argued above that there is a certain tension 
between these two notions of rationality when the relation is approached from the 
standpoint of the `rationality of the agents´ and we argue below that there is no such 
tension when the relation is approached instead from the standpoint of the `rationality of 
the theoretician´.       
 Next, unlike most models based on RPo, both praxeology and models based on 
RPs imply that agents´ view of P-S may be wrong and, hence, that their decisions may 
turn out to be wrong ex-post. In the case of RPs, the theoretician is assumed to adopt the 
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viewpoint of actors and, thus, she is supposed to be able to distinguish between her own 
view of P-S (i.e., the `rationality of the observer´) and agents´ (subjective) view of P-S 
(i.e., the `rationality in the observed´). Furthermore, in the case of models based on RPs, 
agents are usually assumed to exhibit means-rationality (and `ends-rationality´). If so, 
then their mistakes can only be ascribed to wrong beliefs and not to an inconsistent or 
inadequate behaviour given the information available to them. However, as far as agents 
are concerned, there is no mechanism that ensures an adequate, let alone efficient, use of 
the available information. Rather, decision-making in a context of uncertainty can only 
be the result of a process of systematic deliberation. In other words, although we cannot 
rule out that a given correct decision is the outcome of sheer chance, it is much more 
likely that correct decisions will be the result of agents´ systematic deliberation given the 
knowledge they possess. In short, the type of rationality agents exhibit if RPs is adopted 
can be denoted as `procedural´. In turn, this implies that PTKL and RPs share the feature 
that agents are fallible, i.e., their beliefs may be wrong ex-post. By contrast, as we 
explained above, the scope for fallibility is negligible if RPo is adopted because although 
individuals make mistakes the latter are assumed to cancel out at the aggregate level.       
 Now, by adopting RPs the theoretician seeks to identify agents´ partially wrong 
beliefs and thus to explain their behaviour accordingly (i.e., by stressing the divergence 
of agents´ behaviour from what one would expect if their beliefs were `correct´). By 
contrast, it is quite unlikely that the theorist can provide a `rational´ reconstruction of 
agents´ apparently wrong behaviour by pointing instead to their inadequate behaviour 
given their correct beliefs (i.e., to absence of means-rationality). To be sure, to provide 
such an account of agents´ inadequate behaviour by appealing to the notion that some 
agents exhibit, for instance, inconsistent behaviour or weak willpower, implies a large 
element of psychologism and, hence, a great loss of inter-subjectivity, accountability, and 
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transparency in theoretical analysis. Further, such diagnose of inadequate behaviour as 
based on a violation of the assumption of `means-rationality´ may apply to some or even 
to a very small proportion of individuals but it will hardly apply to the majority of them 
which, according to us, precludes its use in the social sciences. This suggests that, even 
though it is not true that agents always make an adequate use of the information available 
to them and, to the extent that we accept as universally valid the assumption that agents´ 
behaviour is always goal-oriented, it is unclear whether we can speak of a dichotomy 
between `rational´ and `irrational´ behaviour in models which adopt RPs. By contrast, to 
the extent that agents only exhibit `ends-rationality´ in praxeologic models, we cannot 
speak of the existence of such a dichotomy in the latter. This is depicted in Table 1 below. 
  
67 
 
Approach Beliefs Rationality Dichotomy  
Praxeology Right or wrong ex-post 
Ends-rationality 
(instrumental) 
No  
Subjectivist 
SA 
Right or wrong 
ex-post 
Ends & means-
rationality 
(procedural) 
? 
Objectivist  
SA 
Right `on 
average´  
(e.g., `perfect 
foresight´ and 
`rational 
expectations´ 
models) 
Ends, means & 
beliefs-rationality 
(substantive) 
Irrationality 
⇒  failure of 
either means-
rationality or 
beliefs-
rationality  
(or both) 
Right or wrong 
ex-post  
(e.g., SEU 
theory) 
PTKL Right or wrong ex-post 
Ends-rationality 
(procedural) 
Irrationality 
⇒  
incorrigibility  
Table 1. Classification of approaches to rationality 
 
 Finally, let us note that it is the existence or otherwise of a dichotomy between 
`rational´ and `irrational´ behaviour in the context of SA that was the central object of an 
exchange between Nadeau (1993) and Lagueux (1993, 2010). In their contributions, 
which focus on the epistemological status of RP, Nadeau (1993) initially argued that RPs 
is the correct interpretation of Popper´s RP and subsequently argued that the former is a 
metaphysical statement and, as such, it is a priori true and irrefutable. By contrast, 
Lagueux (1993) held that RP should rather be interpreted as a methodological principle 
and, hence, that it is a false but approximately true principle in the sense there may be 
some instances where it does not hold. Nevertheless, he (as Popper does) believes that RP 
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is a sufficiently good approximation to the truth and thereby proposes a `statistical´ 
justification of RP in so far as he points out that `the rationality principle can be said to 
be "approximately true" only to the extent that it applies to a large number of cases´ 
(Lagueux, op. cit., p. 475). Both authors make use of Popper´s example of the `flustered 
driver´ to substantiate their arguments: 
 
 `For the rationality principle seems to me to be clearly false ― even in its weakest 
zero formulation, which may be put like this: “Agents always act in a manner appropriate 
to the situation in which they find themselves.”… In think one can see easily that this is 
not so. One has only to observe flustered drivers trying to get out of a traffic jam, or 
desperately trying to park their cars when there is hardly any parking space to be found, 
or none at all, in order to see that we do not always act in accordance with the rationality 
principle… Moreover, there are, obviously, vast personal differences, not only in 
knowledge and skill ― these are part of the situation ― but also in assessing or 
understanding a situation; and this means that some people will act appropriately and 
others not´ (Popper, 1985, p. 361; 1994, p. 172, emphasis added). 
  
Building on this, Lagueux comments:  
 
`Suppose that we try to explain the [Popper´s] example of the flustered driver 
using the rationality principle as understood by Popper, that is to say, as a principle that 
is empirical and false. It is clear that, in such a case, the rationality principle could be 
held responsible for the failure of an explanatory theory that was supported by it´  
(Lagueux, 1993, p. 475).  
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   By contrast, Nadeau (1993) writes: 
 
 `It seems to me to be evident that the RPs is logically irrefutable, in exactly the 
same way that, for Popper, probabilistic assertions or metaphysical statements are 
irrefutable... My critique of Popper can be clarified further by a brief examination of his 
example of the flustered driver... Popper uses this example to falsify the RP, but how does 
this example work exactly? It merely makes it apparent that the real or objective situation 
is such that, in spite of the fact that there are no available parking spaces, the driver 
persists in trying to park his car. However, it is rather surprising that, in his analysis of 
the situation, Popper does not connect the irrationality of the driver to the contradiction 
between the information that the latter has at his disposal and the chosen course of action. 
For if the driver does not know or does not believe that the parking space where he is 
desperately trying to park his car is insufficient, then his behavior does not contradict the 
RPs´ (Nadeau, 1993, pp. 461-62, emphasis added).  
 
In an attempt to clarify this controversy Lagueux (2010, pp. 104f) notes that, the 
`flustered driver´ in Popper´s example, represents an atypical behaviour that cannot be 
excluded and that such behaviour can be said to be `irrational´. However, he recognizes 
that, `if we base our judgement on the description alone, we cannot be sure that the 
flustered driver´s action is really irrational´ (op. cit., p. 104). This is because we can never 
be certain that the agent sees P-S in a way that renders his behaviour appropriate. In other 
words, according to Lagueux (op. cit.) the same behaviour can be interpreted as either 
`rational´ or `irrational´ depending on the observer´s viewpoint. We thus believe that 
Lagueux (op. cit.) ultimately admits there is no objective or neutral way of deciding 
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whether someone exhibits `means-rationality´ whenever there is no assurance that her 
beliefs are correct. We conclude that, in the case of RPs, the dividing line or watershed 
between `rational´ and `irrational´ behaviour is unclear.   
 
4.1.4. What version of RP is `more adequate´ in the social sciences?   
The theoretician´s methodological decision to ignore agents´ mistakes if RPo is 
adopted implies, for the reasons expounded above, assuming that agents´ (subjective) 
view of P-S converges over time to, or else, does not diverge in a significant way from 
the theoretician´s view of P-S. More specifically, we argued above that the adoption of 
RPo implicitly implies the imposition upon agents of the theoretician´s view of P-S. By 
contrast, and despite the above-mentioned tension between PTKL and RPs, we believe 
that a more natural strategy in the theoretical social sciences is to adopt agents´ view of 
P-S. There are at least three reasons for this. First, as Popper (1972, p. 179) admits, both 
the theoreticians´ and agents´ view of P-S are conjectured. Second, and more important, 
there is Hayek´s notion that, unlike the facts of the natural sciences — which are largely 
independent of the theoretician´s viewpoint — the `facts´ of the social sciences are all 
interpretations (Hayek, 1943).39 That is, according to Hayek, the concepts we use in the 
social sciences are not just abstractions like the ones used in the physical and natural 
sciences but they abstract from all the physical characteristics of the objects they refer to. 
Hayek (op. cit., p. 3) denotes the concepts we use in the theoretical social sciences as 
`teleological´ because, as he explains, such concepts can only be defined by postulating 
relations between three different terms: (i) a purpose, (ii) somebody who holds it, and (iii) 
an `object´ which the person in question thinks to be a suitable means to achieve that 
purpose. As he explains: 
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`We could say that all these objects are defined not in terms of their “real” 
properties but in terms of opinions people hold about them. In short, in the social sciences 
the things are what people think they are. Money is money, a word is a word, a cosmetic 
is a cosmetic, if and because somebody thinks they are. That this is not more obvious is 
due to the historical accident that in the world in which we live the knowledge of most 
people is approximately similar to our own… We are likely, for example, to think of the 
relationship between parent and child as an “objective” fact. But, when we use this 
concept in studying family life, what is relevant is not that x is the natural offspring of y 
but that either or both believe this to be the case (op. cit., emphasis added).    
 
Third, Hayek (op. cit.) also argues that in the type of P-S analysed in the social 
sciences agents´ interpretation of P-S becomes an `integral´ part of the latter thereby 
affecting subsequent developments. In particular, to the extent that agents understand P-
S via the internal models they create for that purpose, their understanding of the former 
will affect their decisions and, through this route, they may affect P-S itself. Let us use the 
example of `bank panics´ to illustrate this idea. The occurrence of a `bank panic´ in a 
private bank is not necessarily related to the actual liquidity position of the bank. Rather, 
the occurrence of a `bank panic´ is more likely to depend on its depositors´ view about 
the ability of the bank to cash their deposits on demand. If depositors have doubts about 
the ability of the bank to comply with its obligations when the former attempt to withdraw 
money from their accounts (and regardless of the `true´ liquidity position of the bank), a 
`bank panic´ will likely ensue and the bank will actually become illiquid. This is not to 
deny that depositors commonly take into account the `objective´ indicators related to the 
liquidity of the bank when evaluating the likelihood of the private bank going illiquid. 
Rather, our argument is that what really matters as far as depositors´ decisions are 
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concerned is not the (objective) information provided by the liquidity indicators but 
agents´ (subjective) evaluation of them. However, if the latter affects the former, then P-
S is not independent of depositors´ views and, at least in this example, it is not sound to 
argue that there is an `objective´ P-S which is, in principle, knowable by the theoretician 
but not by the agents. This idea, we believe, is captured in the following comment by 
Hayek:  
 
`Perhaps the relevant distinction comes out most clearly in the general and obvious 
statement that no superior knowledge the observer may possess about the object, but 
which is not possessed by the acting person, can help us in understanding the action in 
question´ (op. cit., emphasis added).   
 
Unlike the presupposition by social scientists (and Popper) that the theoretician 
possesses a wider perspective of P-S than agents do, Hayek (op. cit.) suggests that, since 
P-S depends on agents´ interpretation no matter whether the latter is right or wrong, it 
follows that the theoretician does not stand in a privileged position to observe the 
`objective´ P-S. Thus, and for these reasons, we believe that the `natural´ strategy for the 
theoretician is to seek to capture P-S as agents see it. That is to say, if there is not an 
`objective´ P-S that is (fully) independent of agents´ views, then the theoretician has a 
better chance of understanding social phenomena if she adopts agents´ viewpoint. This is 
not to deny, however, that there may be some circumstances in which the theoretician 
may prefer instead, for methodological reasons, to adopt RPo. In particular, there may be 
circumstances where P-S may be sufficiently independent from agents´ beliefs as to make 
it convenient to adopt RPo. Be that as it may, the adoption of RPo will actually imply the 
imposition of the theoretician´s view of P-S upon agents or, as Schumpeter (1984) would 
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put it, the model will capture the `rationality of the theoretician´ instead of the `rationality 
in the observed´.   
Now, the former discussion suggests that RPo represents a limit or extreme case 
of SA. In particular, we believe RPo represents a limit case of SA based on the implicit 
assumption that P-S is (fully) independent of agents´ beliefs and that, consequently, the 
theoretician can acquire `objective´ knowledge about P-S that is, somehow, superior to 
agents´. By contrast, Hayek´s ideas on the nature of the ` facts´ of the social sciences imply 
that there are several elements of P-S such as the knowledge and information that agents 
possess and the social (and even physical) constraints their behaviour is subject to which 
depend on agents´ beliefs so the theoretician cannot claim to possess superior knowledge 
about them. In other words, the adoption of RPo could a priori be justified if the 
theoretician were able to acquire knowledge of P-S that is not available to agents but if, 
as Hayek (op. cit.) suggests, this is not the case, that is, if P-S consists, at least partly, of 
agents´ beliefs, if follows that RPo constitutes a limit case whose adoption implies 
imposing the theoreticians´ (allegedly superior) view of P-S on agents. 
 
4.1.5. A reformulation of `situational analysis´  
Popper apparently ignores both Hayek´s ideas about the peculiar `facts´ of the 
social sciences and his own ideas about indeterminism in the natural sciences in his 
discussion of SA. For instance, in his most detailed presentation of SA (Popper, 1994, p. 
183, note 19), he argues that, if RPo is adopted, then the theorist reconstructs P-S as it 
actually is whereas, if RPs is adopted, she reconstructs P-S as agents actually see it. Yet, 
the way this is expressed by Popper is somewhat ambiguous since, in his attempt to clarify 
this issue, he seems to refer only to historical interpretation and, thus, it is unclear whether 
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the distinction he draws between RPo and RPs also applies to the other social sciences. 
Hereafter, we assume that it does but we should like to make it clear that this is our 
interpretation. Specifically, he writes that:  
 
`It seems to me now that there are at least three senses of `rationality´ (and, 
accordingly, of the `rationality principle´), all objective, yet differing with regard to the 
objectivity of the situation in which the agent is acting: (1) The situation as it actually 
was ― the objective situation which the historian tries to reconstruct. Part of this objective 
situation is (2) The situation as the agent actually saw it. But I suggest that there is a third 
sense intermediate between (1) and (2): (3) The situation as the agent could (within the 
objective situation) have seen it, and perhaps ought to have seen it´ (Popper, 1994, p. 183, 
footnote 19). 
      
The previous quotation highlights that, when drawing a distinction between RPo 
and RPs, Popper assumes that the theoretician possesses knowledge that is superior to 
agents´. Otherwise, he could not have defined the third and intermediate sense of RP as 
one in which P-S is `as the agent could (within the objective situation) have seen it, and 
perhaps ought to have seen it´ (op. cit.). That is, the explicit reference by Popper to the P-
S `as the agents could and perhaps ought to have seen it´ logically implies that he is 
assuming implicitly that there exists an `objective´ P-S and that the theoretician is in a 
better position than agents to observe it. Thus, we think Popper fails to take on board 
Hayek´s ideas about the peculiar `facts´ of the social sciences as well as his own views 
about indeterminism in the natural sciences. This takes us to our following claim. We 
believe that, arguably, the real difference between RPo and RPs is not that in the former 
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the theorist reconstructs P-S as it actually is (even if understood as being conjectural) 
whereas in the latter she reconstructs it as agents actually see it (also understood in a 
conjectural way) but, instead, that in the former the theorist reconstructs P-S as she sees 
it whereas, in the latter, the theorist reconstructs it as she believes agents see it. This 
suggests that the difference between RPo and RPs in this reformulated framework is not 
the `objectivity´ of the approach ― because both the theorist´s and agents´ view of P-S 
are subjective ― but the degree in which the subjectivity of the theorist manifests itself; 
in the case of RPo the implied subjectivity of the theorist is of a `first degree´ because it 
is her (direct) view of P-S that is at stake whereas in the case of RPs the subjectivity of 
the theorist is of a `second degree´ because in that case it is her view about agents´ view 
of P-S.  
Let us put it another way, if RPo is adopted the theorist reconstructs P-S as she 
sees it and, consequently, different theorists may reconstruct it in different ways (as it is 
commonly the case in the theoretical social sciences). Likewise, if RPs is adopted the 
theorist will reconstruct P-S as she thinks agents see it. Again, in this second scenario, 
different theorists may have very different views about how agents see P-S and, hence, 
may produce different theories about the same phenomenon. The reason is that, if P-S is, 
at least partly, as agents see it, then it follows that Popper´s distinction between P-S `as 
it actually is´ and P-S `as agents see it´ makes little sense. Indeed, we may add that in the 
extreme case in which P-S fully coincides with agents´ views (e.g., the Beauty Contest 
metaphor), P-S is as agents see it and, therefore, RPo and RPs would become equivalent 
if they were defined as Popper does.     
Now, this suggests that, as we show in Chart 1 below, SA exhibits a spectrum of 
potential scenarios according to the degree of independence of P-S from agents´ beliefs. 
At one extreme of the spectrum there are those cases characterized by full coincidence of 
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P-S with agents´ beliefs or, as it were, by the absence of elements in P-S whose properties 
can be said to be (fully) independent from agents´ beliefs. Again, an example of this 
scenario is Keynes´ Beauty Contest metaphor in which there are no objective `facts´ the 
theoretician can observe because agents´ opinions about the (relative) beauty of the ladies 
portrayed in the photos are subjective. At the other extreme of the spectrum there is the 
typical scenario in the natural and physical sciences in which the `facts´ can be said to be 
fully independent from the observers´ viewpoint. Hayek´s (1943) suggests that in the 
social sciences there is no such scenario since P-S is never independent from agents´ 
beliefs and, hence, if we take Hayek´s ideas on board the former can be said to be a limit 
or extreme case. Between these two extreme cases there is a spectrum of potential P-S 
characterized by different positive degrees of dependence of P-S upon agents´ beliefs so 
that the lower the degree of dependence the closer the scenario will be to RPo. Finally, 
let us add that the case known as `self-fulfilling´ expectations (Merton, 1948) would 
correspond to the case in which agents´ beliefs, no matter whether they are right or wrong, 
bring about a change in P-S so that the latter eventually converges to the former. In our 
framework, this could only occur if P-S were at one end of the above-mentioned 
spectrum; the one characterised by coincidence of P-S with agents´ beliefs.     
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Chart 1. Spectrum of scenarios according to the degree of `independence´ of P-S from 
agents´ beliefs 
     Fully 
independent 
(e.g., natural 
 sciences)   
 
Let us finish off this section by adding that the former discussion highlights that, 
if RPo is adopted, the null hypothesis in an empirical test is not that the theorist´s view of 
the typical P-S is correct, as it is usually believed, but rather that agents´ view of the 
typical P-S coincides, on average, with the theorist´s. That is to say, to the extent that 
agents´ view of P-S is an integral part of the latter, only if there is a large coincidence (on 
average) between the agents´ and the theorist´ view of P-S will the hypothesis have a 
chance of withstanding the onus of proof when subject to an empirical test. In other words, 
an empirical test is not, if RPo is adopted, a contrast between the theorist´s view of P-S 
and the `objective´ facts, as is the case in the natural sciences. Rather, as we have argued 
above, the `facts´ of the social sciences are largely interpretations and, hence, rejection 
of the null hypothesis in this case does not imply that the theorist´s view of P-S does not 
capture the `objective´ facts appropriately since there are no `objective´ facts in the social 
sciences but, rather, that the theorist´s view of P-S does not coincide, on average, with 
agents´ view of P-S.          
  
4.2. PTKL versus SA: the `rationality of the theoretician´  
The last issue we should like to address is the compatibility or otherwise of the 
notion of rationality that stems from PTKL and SA as viewed from the perspective of the 
theoretician. If the discussion in the previous section has focused on the rationality of the 
Fully  
dependent 
(e.g., Beauty  
Contest) 
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agents who are the object of modelling by the theoretician, this section focuses on the 
`rationality of the theoretician´ or, as Schumpeter (1984) denotes it, the `rationality of the 
observer´. We believe that the apparently irreconcilable notions of rationality that stem 
from PTKL and SA when looked at from the standpoint of the agents consist, when 
approached from the standpoint of the theoretician, of the application of PTKL to two 
different problems. First, we share Lagueux´s argument that `true´ rationality in Popper 
actually consists of the corrigibility of one´s beliefs (Lagueux, 2006, p. 202).40 Second, 
and according to Popper, science represents a particular version of PTKL characterized 
by the application of the `critical method´:    
 
 `The difference between the amoeba and Einstein is that, although both make use 
of the method of trial and error or elimination, the amoeba dislikes erring while Einstein 
is intrigued by it: he consciously searches for his errors in the hope of learning by their 
discovery and elimination. The method of science is the critical method´ (Popper, 1972, 
p. 70).   
 
 Now, if science is characterized as the application of the `critical method´ to the 
object of knowledge, we may rationalize SA as the specific application of the ´critical 
method´ to the social sciences. That is, the theoretician of the social sciences proposes a 
reconstruction of the P-S in which actors find themselves by formulating a conjectural 
situational model where they make decisions on the basis of systematic deliberation. As 
such, the situational model proposed is only a conjecture according to which the former 
constitutes an `adequate´ oversimplification of the relevant P-S or: 
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`By conjectural analysis I mean a certain kind of tentative or conjectural 
explanation of some human action which appeals to the situation in which the agent finds 
himself… Admittedly, no creative action can ever be fully explained. Nevertheless, we 
can try, conjecturally, to give an idealized reconstruction of the problem situation in 
which the agent found himself, and to that extent make the action “understandable” (or 
“rationally understandable”)…´ (Popper, 1972, p. 179).   
The situational model constructed will then be subject to close scrutiny by the 
scientific community which will tell us the extent to which the different elements of the 
hypothetical P-S need to be modified. To the extent that the elements of the hypothetical 
P-S can be properly identified (i.e., it should consist of a set of observable elements such 
as physical and social constraints and assumptions about agents´ knowledge and 
information) both the situational model and the results of the empirical tests can be, in 
principle, openly criticized by the scientific community. That is, the significance of the 
situational model is that it is the `object´ against which criticism may be directed given 
the prior methodological decision to immunize RP from potential refutation. In turn, the 
role of RP (regardless of the specific version adopted) is to facilitate the implementation 
of the `critical method´ by helping scientists identify the `logic of the situation´ captured 
in the situational model. In this respect, it has been argued elsewhere that, in the context 
of Popper´s distinction among three ontological domains, the claim to objectivity in 
World 3 ― which consists of knowledge or thought in an objective sense such as 
problems, theories, and arguments ― stems from the notion that knowledge in World 3 
`resides in recorded form outside the mind of any agent, even its originator, and is, in 
principle, accessible by any other agent in that recorded form´ (Oakley, 2002, p. 464; also 
Popper, 1972, pp. 108-9). As Sassower (2006, p. 104) has observed, Popper `saw 
rationality as the way to inter-subjectivity, because it is too much to expect objectivity´. 
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In the absence of an `animating principle´ such as RP, it would be very hard to logically 
connect the elements of the situational model in an understandable way. 
     What is crucial, however, is that the situational model will undergo successive 
changes and refinements (that will let it acquire greater accuracy in the explanation of 
social phenomena) in the aftermath of `rational´ criticism by the scientific community. 
Viewed from this standpoint, it does not make any difference whether the theoretician 
adopts RPo or RPs as long as the situational model is subject to close scrutiny by other 
members of the scientific community. Then, as the situational model undergoes further 
refinements or modifications new predictions and explanations may eventually emerge. 
It is clear then that, as long as social scientists modify their models in order to make them 
capable of providing increasingly accurate explanations of social phenomena, their 
behaviour can be characterized as being `corrigible´ and, hence, as sticking to the type 
of rationality we have associated with PTKL. We may thus conclude that, although there 
is some tension between PTKL and SA when their relation is approached from the 
standpoint of `the rationality of agents´ such tension does not arise when such relation is 
approached instead from the standpoint of the `rationality of the theoretician´.        
     
5. Summary & conclusions 
A number of commentators have noted that there are two different approaches to 
rationality in Popper´s philosophy: the approach stemming from his evolutionary theory 
of knowledge and learning (PTKL) and the approach embodied in so-called `Situational 
Analysis´ (SA) and associated to his famous `Rationality Principle´ (RP). According to 
the former, we `learn´ by subjecting our hypotheses to trial and discarding those ones 
which turn out to be wrong. In addition, all knowledge is conjectural and fallible. In this 
setting, science is the `highest´ form of knowledge acquisition and is characterized by the 
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subjecting of scientific theories to the most severe forms of criticism by members of the 
scientific community including, of course, empirical testing. The notion of `critical 
rationalism´ was coined to capture Popper´s thesis that the way to maximize the rate of 
expansion of knowledge is to subject theories to an optimal amount of criticism. The 
notion of human rationality that stems from PTKL consists of the corrigibility of our 
(wrong) beliefs. In other words, PTKL implies that being `rational´ consists of revising 
our beliefs when they turn out to be wrong. Therefore, individuals who fail to do so are 
`irrational´. SA represents Popper´s methodological proposal for the social sciences. In 
turn, RP is a methodological principle according to which agents always act in a way that 
is adequate or appropriate to their problem-situation (P-S). It follows that, in the context 
of SA, `rational´ behaviour consists of acting in a way that is appropriate to the `logic of 
the situation´ whereas `irrational´ behaviour will consist of doing otherwise. However, 
Popper and several of his commentators have made an important distinction between the 
`objectivist´ and the `subjectivist´ version of SA. According to them, in the former the 
theoretician seeks to reconstruct P-S `as it actually is´ whereas in the latter she 
reconstructs it `as it is seen by agents´. In this respect, we argued that the former is based 
on the (implicit) assumption that there is a systematic discrepancy between the 
theoretician´s and agents´ view of P-S and that, under the null hypothesis, this implies 
that agents´ view of P-S is assumed to be, at least partially, wrong. We also proposed a 
rationalization of the `objectivist´ version of SA according to which the latter is based on 
a methodological decision to assume that the mistakes made by agents when making 
decisions are less interesting for the purpose of understanding agents´ behaviour and, 
especially, for the generation of predictions than the (modelling) mistakes made by the 
theoretician.            
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The purpose of this essay was to study the compatibility of these two apparently 
irreconcilable approaches. We have made five different claims. Our first claim was that 
there is a certain tension between PTKL and SA when their relation is analysed from the 
standpoint of the `rationality of the agents´ whose behaviour is captured in the model 
albeit the tension disappears when the relation is analysed from the standpoint of the 
`rationality of the theoretician´. Our second claim was that the nature of the tension 
between PTKL and SA depends on whether the theoretician adopts the `objectivist´ or the 
`subjectivist´ version of SA. In particular, we argued that the tension between PTKL and 
the `subjectivist´ SA stems from the fact that, in the latter, it is implicitly assumed that 
agents´ view of P-S is partially wrong which implies, in turn, that agents do not `learn´ 
from their mistakes as PTKL posits, i.e., that they exhibit a tendency to repeat the same 
mistakes so that the latter become predictable. We argued that this feature of the 
`subjectivist´ version of SA creates a tension with PTKL when the main purpose of the 
theoretician is to generate predictions but does not generate any tension with PTKL when 
the purpose is to perform historical interpretation. This raises the difficult issue of the 
legitimacy of adopting the `subjectivist´ SA when the main purpose of the modelling 
exercise is to generate predictions the latter being understood as the derivation of the 
logical consequences of theory. It was not the purpose of this study to settle this issue 
and, hence, issuing a verdict on it will require further work. By contrast, we argued that 
the tension between PTKL and the `objectivist´ SA stems from the fact: (i) that if agents 
behave according to PTKL it is not necessarily the case that their decisions will be 
adequate or appropriate to the `logic of the situation´ insofar as the former only implies 
that agents tend to eliminate their mistakes and, hence, we have that in the wake of 
changes in the surrounding environment agents´ decisions may not be adequate to the 
`logic of the (new) situation´, and (ii) that the adoption of the `objectivist´ SA implies de 
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facto the imposition of the theoretician´s view of P-S upon agents´. Yet, we argued that it 
is unlikely that, if agents behave according to PTKL by subjecting their conjectures to 
trial and eliminating the ones that turn out to be wrong, their view of P-S will eventually 
converge to the theoretician´s. Our third claim built on the ideas of Hayek (1943) about 
the nature of the `facts´ of the social sciences and was that, in the way it is presented by 
Popper and some of his commentators, the `objectivist´ SA represents a limit or extreme 
case based on the presupposition that P-S is (fully) independent of agents´ beliefs. Our 
fourth claim was closely related to the previous one and consisted of the idea that, if 
Hayek´s ideas on the nature of the `facts´ of the social sciences are duly taken on board, 
it follows that the natural strategy for social scientists is to seek to reconstruct P-S as 
agents´ see it rather than to reconstruct it as the scientist sees it. Our fifth and last claim 
was that, unlike what Popper and his commentators suggest, the difference between the 
`objectivist´ and the `subjectivist´ version of SA is not that in the former the theoretician 
reconstructs P-S as it actually is whereas in the latter she does it as agents see it but, 
rather, that in the former she reconstructs P-S as she sees it herself whereas in the latter 
she does it as she believes that agents actually see it. 
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Notes 
 
1 General criticisms of Popper´s methodological proposal for the social sciences can be found in Latsis 
(1983), Hands, (1985), Bunge (1996), Hutchison (1997), Oakley (1999, 2002), and Vanberg (2002).  
 
2 Recently, another version of RP has been proposed in Lagueux (2006, pp. 201-202) who suggests that, 
given the fact that refinements in model-construction in the social sciences imply that theoretical models 
exhibit more detailed descriptions of the situation, RP may also be enunciated as implying that `the agent 
will agree with what is clearly presented by the model itself as the appropriate thing to do´. Be that as it 
may, for the purpose of this study we focus hereafter on Popper´s version of RP.   
  
3 These ideas were expounded in his famous Logic of Scientific Discovery. That said, and as far as the social 
sciences are concerned, there is some consensus on the notion that it is not ‘falsificationism’ per se but 
‘critical rationalism’ ― of which falsification is only one possibility ― that is the true message of Popper´s 
philosophy (Caldwell, 1991; Notturno, 1998; Boland, 2003a). According to Hands (1991, p. 114), who 
nevertheless remains sceptical of this interpretation, `critical rationalism´ is an interpretation of Popperian 
philosophy due primarily to Bartley (1982).  
4 In his analysis of the role and status of RP Latsis (1983) focuses on Popper´s analysis of the `mind-body 
problem´, that is, the analysis of the manner in which mental states affect behaviour as discussed in his 
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paper `Of Clouds and Clocks´ (Popper, 1966). According to Latsis (1983, p. 139), RP represents Popper´s 
compromise solution to this problem whereby it is suggested that `our mental states control some of our 
behaviour and that this control is “of a plastic kind”´  
 
5 Interestingly, Hayek (1967a, p. 86) associates the notion of rationality in Classical economics to the ability 
to `learn from experience´ which is very close to PTKL.   
   
6 Incidentally, Loasby (2003, pp. 296-7) argues that Smith (1980[1795]) replaced Hume´s argument by a 
proto-Popperian theory of the growth of knowledge according to which all observed patterns that exhibit a 
sufficient degree of similarity are treated as (fallible) imaginative conjectures.   
 
7 Popper adopted Tarski´s theory that truth is correspondence with the facts or with reality (Popper, 1972, 
p. 44). 
 
8 Popper´s notion of `subjective knowledge´ also bears a strong resemblance to the notion of ‘reasoning 
instincts’ used in evolutionary psychology (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994, p. 330).  
  
9 According to Gattei (2009, p. 58), Popper´s World 3 bears a strong similarity to Plato´s theory of Ideas, 
and to Hegel´s theory of the Objective Spirit although he thinks it is ` closer to Bolzano´s theory of a universe 
of statements in themselves and truth in themselves, or to Frege´s universe of objective contents of thought´.  
  
10 As he aptly notes, a tautology, though obviously true, has zero truth content and zero verisimilitude.    
 
11 Of course, this applies to any premise aimed at providing a ‘closure’ for a model. As Loasby (1999, p. 
14) reminds us, ‘all closures are in some degree false. There can be no self-sufficient Cartesian scheme for 
deducing justified true knowledge from some original certainty’.  
 
12 This touches upon the issue of the incompatibility of Popper´s RP and his falsificationist methodology. 
For instance, Caldwell (1991, p. 13) argues that ‘Popper´s rationality principle represents an immunizing 
stratagem that is elevated to the status of an inviolable methodological principle’. In an attempt to reconcile 
both principles, Koertge (1979, p. 93) interprets RP as the Lakatosian hard-core of Popper´s research 
program in the social sciences whereas the positive heuristic is ‘his metaphysical theory of man as an 
evolving rational problem-solving animal’.  
 
13 Notwithstanding the intellectual authority of Popper, economists like Hayek (1967, p. 29) or Hutchison 
(1977, p. 43) question the applicability of Popper’s falsificationanist methodology to economics. Indeed, 
the applicability of strict falsificationism to the social sciences appears to be problematic even to Popper 
himself as noted in Hands (1985, p. 96). 
    
14 However, we will argue below that a clear antecedent of this distinction is in Hayek (1948[1937]).  
 
15 By contrast, we will argue below that the `subjectivist´ version of RP is a legitimate and potentially 
fruitful one in the social sciences.  
 
16 Yet, Zouboulakis (2014, p. 87) argues that it is clear that Popper has an `objectivist´ version of RP in 
mind. 
 
17 Prior to this clarification, Popper (1972) had already recognized the existence of two versions of SA: 
 
         `There are many cases in which we can reconstruct, objectively (even though conjecturally), (a) the 
situation as it was and (b) a very different situation as it appeared to the agent, or as it was understood, or 
interpreted by the agent. It is interesting that this can be dome even in the history of science´ (Popper, 1972, 
p. 179, footnote 27).  
  
18 However, it has been argued that, although the notion of `single-exit´ modelling and SA originates with 
Weber, for him this and related concepts were tools of historical analysis, not of theory (Langlois, 1995, p. 
230; 1998, p. 69). Interestingly, a philosophical foundation for Weber´s notion of `ideal type´ is in the 
school of phenomenology and, particularly, in Schutz´s concept of `second-order typifications´ (Schutz, 
1972). 
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19 The interrelation between the ideas of Hayek and Popper is discussed in Oakley (1999) and Caldwell 
(2003). For instance, Popper (1966[1943a])) appears to have been inspired by Hayek (1942) when 
expressing his crucial idea that both our institutions and traditions are largely the `indirect, the unintended 
and often the unwanted by-products´ of conscious and intentional human actions and, therefore, that `only 
a minority of social institutions are consciously designed, while the vast majority have just “grown”, as the 
undesigned results of human actions´ (Popper, (1966[1943a]), p. 93). Likewise, Hayek had already argued 
that social studies deal `not with the relations between things, but with the relations between men and things 
or the relations between man and man. They are concerned with man´s actions and their aim is to explain 
the unintended or undesigned results of the actions of many men´ (Hayek, 1942, p. 276).     
 
20 In this respect, let us mention that Menger (1950[1871]), p. 148) was one of the first social scientists to 
incorporate error within his model and to argue that all knowledge (both of the actors and of the theorist) 
is bound to be prone to errors. 
 
21 As von Mises explains:  
 
`Every human action aims at the substitution of more satisfactory conditions for less satisfactory. Man acts 
because he feels uneasy and believes that he has the power to relieve to some extent his uneasiness by 
influencing the course of events. A man perfectly content with the state of his affairs would not have any 
incentive to change things; he would have neither wishes nor desires, he would not act because he would 
be perfectly happy... Strictly speaking, only the increase in satisfaction (decrease of uneasiness) should be 
called end, and accordingly all states which bring about such an increase means´ (von Mises, 1944, p. 532).   
 
22 The notion of `instrumental rationality´ goes back as far as Max Weber´s sociological histories of world 
religions culminating with his classic study of modern European Christianity (Weber, 1904-5).  
 
23 For instance, in standard consumer theory, ‘means-rationality’ consists of the axioms of completeness, 
independence, reflexivity, and transitivity of preferences (Dow, 1995, p. 724). In the case of SEU theory 
developed by von Neumman & Morgenstern (1947) and, especially, Savage (1954), which represents the 
canonical theory of choice under conditions of uncertainty, ‘means-rationality’ is satisfied if the following 
four assumptions or axioms are fulfilled: cancellation, transitivity, dominance, and invariance. To this, we 
may add the more technical assumptions of comparability and continuity.  
 
24 In fact, Savage (1962, p. 14) refers to the notion of objectivity in knowledge as not `valid, fruitful or 
practical´.  
 
25 As noted in Beinhocker (2013), in the context of the social sciences, a prediction (unlike a forecast) 
amounts barely to the deductive logical consequences of a theory. It should be noted, however, that the 
predictions to be derived from the models in the social sciences differ from the predictions generated by 
the theories of the natural sciences. Building on Hayek´s distinction between `explanation in principle´ and 
`explanation in detail´ (Hayek, 1967b, p. 20), Popper (1994, p. 163) distinguishes between explaining or 
predicting singular events from problems of explaining or predicting a kind or type of event. According to 
Popper, the former can be solved without constructing a model ― no more than certain universal laws and 
the relevant initial conditions are needed ― whereas the latter is most easily solved by means of 
constructing a model (op. cit., p. 164). Further, he argues (Popper, op. cit., p. 165), that a model consists of 
`certain elements placed in a typical relationship to each other, plus certain universal laws of interaction — 
the "animating" laws´. Unlike theories, models try to capture the typical aspects of P-S in order to make 
statements about a type of event and, hence, they represent something akin to typical initial conditions (op. 
cit., p. 164). In turn, a statement about a typical event can be either an explanation of why that typical event 
occurred in the past, or else, a prediction, that is, a logical consequence of the theory.  
 
26 However, the generation of predictions does not seem to be, according to Popper, the main aim of the 
social sciences. For instance, according to Notturno (1998, p. 412, emphasis added), the `problem of 
situational analysis in the theoretical and historical social sciences, in Popper´s view, is not to construct 
models that predict or prophesize the future; it is to construct models that help us to explain and understand 
the past´. In this respect, Popper seems to view RPs as being particularly suited to the task of historical 
explanation:  
 
         `The historian´s task is, therefore, so to reconstruct the problem situation as it appeared to the agent, 
that the actions of the agent become adequate to the situation… Our conjectural reconstruction of the 
95 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
situation may be a real historical discovery. It may explain any aspect of history so far unexplained´ 
(Popper, 1972, p. 189). 
 
           To be sure, Popper (op. cit., p. 166, emphasis in original) explains that `the fundamental problem of 
both the theoretical and the historical social sciences is to explain and understand events in terms of human 
actions and [typical] social situations´ and, hence, does not mention the generation of predictions as the 
aim of the social sciences. 
 
27 It is clear that Popper admired neoclassical economics. For instance, he writes that:  
 
      `The social sciences never had for me the same attraction as the theoretical natural sciences. In fact, the 
only theoretical social science which appealed to me was economics´ (Popper, (2002[1976a]), p. 121). 
  
    Notwithstanding it, Blaug (1985, p. 287) argues that `Popper knew little about social sciences and less 
about economics´.   
 
28 Similarly, Hutchison (1997) does not distinguish between RPo and RPs yet his critical comments on RP 
seem to have RPo as his target. In particular, he refers to a `fortified´ version of RP that is pervasive in 
mainstream economics which includes the (very unrealistic) `full-knowledge´ assumption without which, 
he argues, RP is `almost empty´. Notwithstanding it, he argues that in its ‘fortified’ version, RP `seems a 
good or fair approximation in quite a range of cases, but no approximation at all in another important range 
of cases´ (op. cit., p. 139). 
   
29 He also refers to the `relative attractiveness´ for an individual of different actions (Savage, 1951, p. 61).  
   
30 Savage (1954) discusses the scope of his theory of rational decision-making and his notion of `small 
world´ in chapter 2: 
 
 `The argument might be raised that the formal description of decision that has thus been erected 
seems inadequate because a person may not know the consequences of the acts open to him in each state 
of the world. He might be so ignorant, for example, as not to be sure whether one rotten egg will spoil a 
six-egg omelette. But in that case noting could be simpler than to admit that there are four states in the 
world corresponding to the two states of the egg and the two conceivable answers to the culinary question 
whether one bad egg will spoil a six-egg omelette… 
 What in the ordinary way of thinking might be regarded as a chain of decisions, one leading to the 
other in time, is in the formal description proposed here regarded as a single decision. To put it a little 
differently, it is proposed that the choice of a policy or plan be regarded as a single decision… 
 The point of view under discussion may be symbolized by the proverb, “Look before you leap,” 
and the one to which it is opposed by the proverb, “You can cross that bridge when you come to it”… 
 Carried to its logical extreme, the “Look before you leap” principle demands that one envisage 
every conceivable policy for the government of his whole life (at least from now on) in its most minute 
details, in the light of the vast number of unknown states of the world, and decide here and now on one 
policy. This is utterly ridiculous, not — as some might think ― because there might be later cause for 
regret, if things did not turn out as had been anticipated, but because the task implied in making such a 
decision is not even remotely resembled by human possibility. It is even utterly beyond our power to plan 
a picnic or to play a game of chess in accordance with the principle, even when the world of states and the 
set of available acts to be envisaged are artificially reduced to the narrowest reasonable limits… 
 Though the “look before you leap” principle is preposterous if carried to extremes, I would none 
the less argue that it is the proper subject of our further discussion, because to cross one´s bridges when one 
come to them means to attack relatively simple problems of decision by artificially confining attention to 
so small a world that the “Look before you leap” principle can be applied there…´ (Savage, 1954, pp. 15-
16, emphasis added).        
 
However, according to Volz & Gigerenzer (2012, p. 1), most of the time we make decisions under 
Knightian uncertainty, while situations of risk are relatively rare and found mostly in gambling. They also 
note that Savage (1954, p. 16), makes it clear that applying Bayesian theory to decisions in uncertain or 
Knightian worlds would not make sense because there is no way to know all the alternatives and its likely 
consequences. Likewise, Arrow (2004, p. 54) argues that in uncertain, ill-specified worlds, maximization 
of expected utility ‘has no meaning at all’.       
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31 This can be ascribed ultimately to the fact that, as Savage (1954, p. 20) recognizes, `logic itself admits 
an empirical [or descriptive] as well as a normative interpretation´.  
 
32 For instance, Farmer (1982, p. 179) argues that the `rationality assumption´ is in the `hard core´ of the 
(Lakatosian) economist´s research programme. Matzner & Jarvie (1998) even suggest that Popper´s SA 
represents a soft version of `economic imperialism´ yet to be distinguished from a strong version they 
associate with the work of Gary Becker. In any case, they recognize that it was Popper — and not Gary 
Becker — who first formulated a programme for extending the logic of economics to the noneconomic 
social sciences (op. cit., p. 336).   
 
33 An alternative rationale to agents´ learning process for the adoption of the optimization assumption in 
mainstream economics is the ‘natural’ selection argument. This argument was originally proposed by 
Alchian (1950) in the context of economic competition and since then it has been advocated by a number 
of neoclassical theorists. Alchian (op. cit.) views the economic system as an adoptive mechanism which 
cleverly chooses among actions generated by the adaptive pursuit of `profits´. His argument starts with the 
premise that the realization of profits is the criterion according to which successful firms are selected. 
However, he admits that this process may be independent of the nature of the decision-making processes 
of economic agents. In particular, he recognizes that economic success does not require proper motivation 
but may instead be the outcome of fortuitous circumstances. Further, to the extent that profits accrue only 
to those firms who are better than their competitors, what matters for survival is one’s competitiveness 
relative to the others rather than their absolute proximity to an optimum. Nevertheless, he recognizes that 
conscious or purposeful behaviour (in addition to sheer chance) also plays a role in the selection of firms 
by the market. Two such examples of purposeful behaviour are: (i) imitation of strategies previously 
adopted by successful firms, and (ii) the adoption of trial and error strategies aimed at improving one’s 
adaptation to the environment. However, he makes it clear that the former should not be understood as 
mechanisms through which adequate or `rational´ actions can be selected thereby allowing firms to 
converge to an optimum in the form of profit maximization. This is because the latter would require the 
fulfilment of the two following convergence conditions (Alchian, 1950, p. 219): (i) that every single trial 
must be classifiable either as a success or as a failure, and (ii) the continual rising toward some optimum 
optimorum without the occurrence of intervening descents. In this respect, he writes: 
‘These convergence conditions do not apply to a changing environment, for there can be no 
observable comparison of the result of an action with any other… As a consequence, the measure of 
goodness of actions in anything except a tolerable-intolerable sense is lost, and the possibility of an 
individual´s converging to the optimum activity via a trial-and-error process disappears. Trial and error 
becomes survival or death. It cannot serve as a basis of the individual´s method of convergence to a 
“maximum” or optimum position.’ (op. cit.).   
 
 The upshot of Alchian´s discussion is that successful adaptation within a stable environment may 
give ex-post the appearance of rational or optimizing behaviour at the individual level even though no ex-
ante rational calculation actually occurred. Further, and as Loasby (1999, pp. 20-21; see also Vromen, 
1995, pp. 32-33) insists, the economic `survival´ argument can only allow its advocates to claim that 
surviving firms will have achieved results which are, on average, closer to the maximisation of profits than 
those firms that did not survive and, hence, it does not allow them to use it as a justification for the 
occurrence of optimization at the individual level as Friedman (1953, p. 22), for instance, does. Although 
with significant qualifications, developments of Alchian´s argument can be found in Friedman (1953) and 
Becker (1962) and critical assessments of the `survival´ argument are in Vromen (1995), Loasby (1999) 
and Lagueux (2010).   
  
34 By contrast, Arrow (1986, p. S385) criticizes the view that the optimizing assumption can be justified as 
being the result of a process of learning and adaptation. 
 
35 Wible (1984-85, p. 271) characterizes the approach to decision-making and expectations formation 
embedded in neoclassical economics as one of instantaneous rational assessment and hypothesizes that its 
origin is the emphasis in the ‘logic of justification’ of knowledge rather in the ‘process of discovery’ of 
knowledge made by proponents of the logical positivist school of philosophy.   
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36 Although Hayek (1967a, p. 89) does not mention the term SR explicitly, he seems to have this notion in 
mind when he characterises the approach to rationality inherent in the philosophical tradition he denotes as 
`constructivist rationalism´ and which is no other that the Cartesian tradition which is directly related to 
Descartes and goes back at least as far as Plato in Ancient Greece and whose main representatives are, 
according to him, Hobbes, Rousseau, Voltaire, Hegel and Marx. In particular, he describes the approach to 
rationality embodied in this approach as follows:  
 
`In moral philosophy the constructivist rationalism tends to disdain any reliance on abstract mechanical 
rules and to regard as truly rational only behaviour such as is based on decisions which judge each particular 
situation “on its merits”, and chooses between alternatives in concrete evaluation of the known 
consequences of the various possibilities´ (op. cit., emphasis added).  
  
37 Note the similarity of this definition with Koertge´s (1975) reformulation of RP provided above. 
  
38 PR is coupled to its sister notion of ‘bounded’ rationality (BR). According to Simon (1979), economic 
agents´ knowledge is subject to three different types of constraints: (i) limited ability to process, analyse, 
and store information, (ii) uncertainty, and (iii) the presence of social institutions. BR stems from the fact 
that the existence of these constraints prevents economic agents from ‘optimizing’. Simon coined the term 
‘satisficing’ to denote a decision-making rule that attempts to meet an acceptability (minimum) threshold. 
In contrast to ‘satisficing’ behaviour, the purpose of optimal decision-making is to find the best option 
available.     
 
39 This idea is discussed in detail also in Hayek (1942).  
  
40 For instance, in The Open Society and its Enemies, Popper (1966[1943a], p. 97) states that `the method 
of applying a situational logic to the social sciences is not based on any psychological assumption 
concerning the rationality (or otherwise) of "human nature"´. In this respect, Oakley (1999, p. 35) notes 
that Popper stresses in his Harvard lecture (Popper, 1985, 1994) that, in the context of SA, `rationality had 
no ontological significance and was not intended as a theory of human action´.   
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II. Keynes´s Approach to Macroeconomic Modelling: a 
Popperian Reconstruction 
 
`Orthodoxy is the death of knowledge, since the growth of knowledge depends entirely on the 
existence of disagreement’ (K. Popper, The Myth of the Framework: In defence of science and 
rationality, 1994, p. 34).  
 
1. Introduction 
As we showed in the previous essay, Hume was sceptical about the rationality of 
human behaviour since he believed that individual behaviour was grounded on `custom 
and habit´, that is, on the assumption that the `future resembles the past´ in spite of the 
inexistence of an `inductive logic´. This paradoxical situation was denoted by Hume as 
the `problem of induction´. Hume´s philosophical analysis remained unchallenged for 
more than two hundred years as Keynes (1920, pp. 303-04) recognized. In the previous 
essay we discussed the `solution´ to the problem of induction propounded by Popper 
which we denoted as Popper´s evolutionary theory of knowledge and learning (PTKL). 
However, the focus of our discussion was not so much on PTKL itself as on the tension 
with Popper´s methodological proposal for the social sciences referred to as `Situational 
Analysis´ (SA). Chronologically, there is a prior-to-Popper attempt to provide a solution 
to Hume´s `problem of induction´: Keynes´s (failed) attempt to construct an objective 
epistemological theory of probability in his Treatise on Probability (Keynes, 1920). As 
we will see, Keynes´s aim was not to only to answer Hume but to answer Cambridge 
philosopher G. E. Moore (1993[1903]) who argued that the highest expected `good´ 
would result if individual behaviour consisted of following rules insofar as the latter 
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represent the accumulated knowledge in our society. Keynes´s proposal to solve the 
`problem of induction´ in his Treatise consists of replacing the notion of `certain´ 
knowledge, which Hume showed to be unattainable, by the notion of `probabilistic´ 
knowledge. Keynes´s main argument was that, though we cannot attain the former, we 
can nevertheless attain the latter if only we adopt inductive procedures. The main 
innovation in the Treatise on Probability are logical probability relations. As noted in 
Andrews (1999), the latter look like Platonic Universals in the sense that they exist in a 
`logical space´, are independent of individual opinions and can only be discovered via 
intuition. In the Treatise, Keynes proposes an objective epistemological theory of 
probability. As we will see below, such proposal is grounded upon an inductive theory of 
knowledge and learning. However, the notion of logical probability relations was 
criticized by Ramsey (1978[1931]) in his Truth & Probability and Keynes ended up 
yielding to Ramsey´s criticisms in `My Early Beliefs´ published in 1938 (Keynes, 1973a, 
p. 445).  
Next, the textual evidence suggests that by the second half of the 1930s Keynes 
had abandoned most of the ideas he had advocated in the Treatise and adopted instead a 
pragmatic approach to human behaviour which, as we shall show below, is remarkably 
similar to Hume´s views. Indeed, Keynes´s attempt to solve the `problem of induction´ in 
his Treatise was a failure and this ultimately forced him to return to the point where Hume 
had left off about two hundred years earlier. The return to Hume is transcendental for the 
methodology of economics since, as some commentators recognize, Keynes´s later 
economic writings are based on a theory of human nature that is similar to Hume´s (Davis, 
1994; Andrews, 1999). Therefore, we take Hume´s theory of human nature as a key 
feature of Keynes´s later economic writings, including the General Theory (Keynes, 
1936) and his paper in the Quarterly Journal of Economics (Keynes, 1937). This view 
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consists of the notion that people make decisions on the basis of inductive procedures 
which amount to adopting social rules and conventions which are widely believed to have 
worked well in the past. The rules and conventions Keynes refers to in his later economic 
writings are, for some purposes, equivalent to Hume´s old idea that individual behaviour 
is grounded on `custom and habit´. In particular, the chief convention of all, according to 
Keynes, is the assumption that `the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely, 
except in so far as we have specific reasons to expect a change´ (Keynes, 1936, p. 152).  
The next issue we address in the essay is the compatibility of Keynesian macro-
theory with PTKL. This is an issue which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been 
addressed in the literature on Keynesian economics. We make several claims. First, the 
replacement of the assumption that economic agents assume, unless they have specific 
reasons to think otherwise, that the `future will resemble the past´ can be conceptualized 
in a way that makes Keynesian macro-theory congenial to PTKL. More specifically, we 
propound the notion of `hegemonic´ conjectures (HC) to denote the social conventions 
which are central to Keynes´s macroeconomic analysis in his later economic writings. If 
we interpret HC as conjectures which are held provisionally by economic agents as long 
as the former believe that they provide valid guidelines upon which to ground decisions, 
then, it will be argued, the notion of HC provides a link between PTKL and Keynesian 
theory. As our argument goes, HC will be kept as long as they yield good results and will 
be `scrapped´ if agents believe that this is no longer the case. This implies that HC exhibit 
an evolutionary dimension in that they are retained by economic agents as long as the 
former appear to aid decision-making in a context of genuine uncertainty yet they are 
replaced by other (new) HC if economic agents no longer believe they provide a valid 
basis for decision-making. Now, the replacement of `old´ HC will take place in the 
aftermath of the occurrence of a substantial discrepancy between expected and realized 
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outcomes. This, in turn, will set off the search for new HC. We will denote the process of 
search for `new´ HC as a `confidence´ crisis in the sense that the `old´ HC have been 
abandoned but the `new´ HC have not yet emerged. Thus, we view `confidence´ crisis in 
a way that is, arguably, reminiscent of T. Kuhn´s theory of scientific revolutions (Kuhn, 
1962). Lastly, we argue there is a parallelism between the notion of `confidence´ crisis 
and the explanation of economic downturns in Keynes´s macro-theory. In the latter, a 
downturn is heralded by the observation that there is a very large discrepancy between 
expected and realized outcomes. In turn, this brings about a fall in `confidence´ and an 
increase in liquidity preference. In short, we argue that the notion of HC provides a link 
between Keynes´s macro-theory and Popper´s theory of knowledge and learning in that, 
in both cases, the expansion of knowledge (conventional or otherwise) over time is the 
result of a process of trial and error-elimination.          
Next, the convention that `the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely, 
except in so far as we have specific reasons to expect a change´ is at the very core of 
Keynesian macro-theory and is, in turn, responsible for two criticisms Keynesian theory 
has frequently been subject to1: (i) the alleged `irrational´ behaviour of the agents whose 
behaviour Keynesian models seek to capture, and (ii) the nihilism of Keynesian theory. 
To this, we may add another potential criticism that stems from the fact that, on the one 
hand, Keynes ― in his criticism of the pioneering work of Tinbergen ― argues that the 
use of statistical inference methods is valid in economics only if we can show that the 
probability distributions of economic variables exhibit a sufficient degree of stability over 
time whereas, on the other hand, his macro-theory is based upon the assumption that 
economic agents believe, unless they have good reasons to believe otherwise, that `the 
existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely´. 
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Now, we will argue below that the three criticisms referred to above are a direct 
implication of the adoption by mainstream theoreticians of the `objectivist´ version of 
Popper´s `Rationality Principle´ (RPo) we discussed in the previous chapter. First, we 
argued in that chapter that the adoption of RPo implies that the theoretician reconstructs 
the problem-situation (P-S) `as she believes it is´. In the case of mainstream theory, the 
former implies that agents are assumed to exhibit `ends-rationality´, `means-rationality´ 
and, `beliefs-rationality´. Now, the assumption of `beliefs-rationality´ implies, in turn, 
that economic agents´ view of P-S is assumed to be similar to the theoretician´s. In such 
circumstances, the theoretician can `close´ the model in a way that a number of testable 
predictions can be extracted. Now, we argue below that mainstream economists assess 
Keynes´s theory under the (often implicit) assumption that there must be a `coincidence´ 
between the agents´ and the theoreticians´ view of P-S. Thus, if the theoretician does not 
believe that `the future will resemble the past´ ― as Keynes does ― it follows that the 
construction of theoretical models where economic agents believe that `the existing state 
of affairs will continue indefinitely, except in so far as they have specific reasons to expect 
a change´ is, from the viewpoint of mainstream economists, flawed. Second, the 
accusation of `nihilism´ is related to the fact that the possibility of generating clear 
testable predictions in Keynes´s theory is, according to some mainstream economists, 
precluded by the fact that economic agents´ expectations are exogenous and may change 
capriciously. However, as we will argue below, the latter also stems from the fact that, 
unlike in neoclassical economics, in Keynes´s macro-theory the theoretician does not 
`impose´ her view of P-S upon the agents. Lastly, the accusation of positing theoretical 
models where the behaviour of economic agents is `irrational´ or ad hoc is also a direct 
consequence of the fact that, in Keynes´s macro-theory, agents exhibit `ends-rationality´ 
and `means-rationality´ but not `beliefs-rationality. In other words, Keynesian economic 
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agents are not optimizers and, hence, from the standpoint of neoclassical theory, this is 
tantamount to `irrational´ behaviour (Becker, 1962). Nevertheless, we will argue that the 
failure to optimize by Keynesian economic agents ultimately stems from the fact that, 
whereas neoclassical theory presumes that there exists an `inductive logic´, Keynes´s 
macro-theory presumes the opposite.  
Now, we argued in the previous chapter that the adoption of the `subjectivist´ 
version of Popper´s Rationality Principle (RPs) implies that the theoretician reconstructs 
P-S `as she believes that agents believe it is´. We will argue below that, if Keynesian 
macro-theory is interpreted as an instance of RPs, the above-mentioned criticisms are 
unwarranted. First, even if the theoretician does not really believe that `the existing state 
of affairs will continue indefinitely´, she may nevertheless assume that economic agents 
believe so, or else, that they believe this is the best assumption they can make owing to 
the presence of uncertainty. Indeed, people make decisions every day in spite of the fact 
that, in many circumstances, they are uncertain of their future consequences. It follows 
that the interpretation of Keynesian macro-theory we propound based upon its implicit 
adoption of RPs implies, arguably, that there is no inherent contradiction in assuming that 
economic agents believe that `the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely, 
except in so far as they have specific reasons for expecting a change´ even though the 
theoretician does not believe so. Second, if it is assumed that economic agents believe for 
practical purposes that the `future will resemble the past´, then Keynesian theory cannot 
be accused of portraying individual behaviour as `irrational´ since the former is coherent 
with agents´ belief in the presence of a high degree of stability in economic affairs. Last, 
Keynesian macro-theory cannot be accused of `nihilism´ either since the assumption that 
economic agents believe that `the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely, 
except in so far as they have specific reasons to expect a change´ enables the theoretician 
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to construct macro-models that yield testable predictions (as opposed to forecasts) by 
which we mean the `logical implications´ of the theory.    
 The content of the essay is as follows. The following section presents Keynes´s 
approach to probability and expectations as presented in his Treatise on Probability. In 
section 3, we expound Ramsey´s critique on the notion of probability Keynes advocates 
in the Treatise as well as other relevant aspects of Ramsey´s thought as presented in his 
essay Truth & Probability. In section 4, we present the approach to expectations Keynes 
adopts in his later economic writings in the wake of his capitulation to Ramsey´s views 
as well as his views on the nature of economics and its object of study. We propose the 
notion of HC to illustrate the thesis that the theory of knowledge and learning implicit in 
Keynes´s macro-theory is compatible with PTKL. In section 5, we argue that some of the 
criticisms of Keynesian macro-theory by mainstream economists can be rationalized as 
stemming from the fact that the latter implicitly adopt the `objectivist´ version of RP 
whereas, according to us, Keynesian macro-theory is an instance of the `subjectivist´ 
version of RP. Further, we argue that, if reinterpreted in this fashion, Keynesian theory 
can answer most, if not all, the charges levelled at it. Finally, section 6 summarizes and 
concludes.     
 
2. The Treatise on Probability  
This section is devoted mainly to presenting Keynes´s philosophical work in his 
Treatise on Probability (Keynes, 1920). As we will see, this work stems partly from the 
attempt by Keynes to find a solution to the `problem of induction´ as posited by Hume 
two hundred years earlier and, partly, from an attempt to answer Cambridge philosopher 
G. E. Moore. There is an ongoing debate about the relevance of Keynes´s philosophical 
work for understanding his later economic writings. However, although we will refer in 
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passing to this debate at different points in our discussion, one reason for reviewing this 
episode of Keynes´s intellectual journey is that there are three key elements of Keynes´s 
later economic writings which are already present in his Treatise on Probability: (i) the 
possibility that some probabilities are unmeasurable, (ii) the notion of the `weight of the 
argument´, and (iii) the rejection of the frequency approach to probability in the social 
sciences. Another reason for reviewing the Treatise is that, in the aftermath of Keynes´s 
capitulation to Ramsey´s (successful) criticism of the notion of objective probability 
relations, Keynes implicitly adopted in his later economic writings a theory of human 
nature similar to Hume´s. In particular, Hume´s conclusion that human behaviour is not 
`rational´ insofar as it is grounded on `custom and habit´ could be applied, in principle, 
to Keynes´s theory of human behaviour as based on conventional knowledge. However, 
we will argue in subsequent sections that this is not the case since Keynes´s later macro-
theory can be rationalized in the light of both PTKL and RPs.     
 
2.1. The ethical roots of Keynes´s Treatise on Probability 
Bateman (1988) argues that Keynes´s Treatise on Probability is, at least partly, an 
answer to Moore´s Principia Ethica. Moore (1993[1903]) believed that our actions should 
be evaluated solely in terms of their consequences but, unlike utilitarians, he thought that 
the value placed on those consequences was an objectively identifiable amount of good.2 
Given the objective quality `good´, Moore´s fundamental questions were: (i) to make 
correct ethical judgements of what things possessed the quality `good´, and (ii) to identify 
the actions that caused `good´ things to come about. He concluded that we must follow 
certain rules which, according to him, represent the accumulated knowledge in our society 
that, in most cases, the rule results in the highest expected good. In other words, Moore´s 
conclusion was that the `best´ action was the one with the most likely good. In turn, this 
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implied that we should consider both the goodness of an action´s consequences and the 
relative frequency with which they occur. As Bateman (1988, p. 1100) notes, Moore 
`accepted that most of the rules adhered to in society did, in fact, generally cause the 
greatest good´. By contrast, Keynes and his friends were radically opposed to obeying 
rules in spite of the fact that they became members with Moore in the secret Cambridge 
society known as the Apostles. Many years later, in a piece titled `My Early Beliefs´ 
published in 1938, Keynes (1973a, p. 445) admitted that the large part played by 
considerations of probability in Moore´s ethics was a crucial contributory factor to his 
decision to study probability theory in the subsequent years.          
 In a series of notes Keynes wrote in 1905 titled Miscellanea Ethica he sought to 
attack Moore´s probabilistic argument for rules and chose to argue against Moore´s use 
of the frequency theory of probability (Bateman, 1988, p. 1101). In particular, in the piece 
titled `Ethics in Relation to Conduct´ Keynes sought to uncover the fallacies in Moore´s 
argument for rules. The alternative theory of probability he resorted to was one in which 
probability is an objective `degree of belief´ in a certain proposition rather than the 
relative frequency with which a certain phenomenon occurs. As Bateman (op. cit., 1102) 
recognizes, this theory of probability was a nascent version of the theory Keynes would 
propound some years later in A Treatise on Probability. According to him, the 
replacement of a frequency approach to probability by the notion of `degree of belief´ 
meant that:   
 
`In Keynes´s theory of probability the good of each possible outcome would be 
multiplied by the degree of belief that one had in its occurrence, giving a product of good 
and degree of belief. The summation of these products would represent the expected good 
of an action and might be said to represent the degree of expected goodness of the action. 
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This alternative conception freed one from Moore´s “rules of Common Sense” since one 
was no longer obligated to act according to a frequency of [past] outcomes. Each case 
could now be considered on its own merits´ (Bateman, 1988, p. 1102).      
 
Bateman (1988, p. 1103) also argues that Keynes followed Moore´s method of 
describing the `good´ in identifying the existence of a logical relationship as the basis for 
one´s `degree of rational belief´ in a proposition. Whereas Moore identified good as an 
objective concept that was indefinable in terms of anything else, Keynes (1920) also 
defined probability as an objective concept indefinable in terms of anything else.3 By 
putting together his (objective) notion of probability as the `degree of rational belief´ and 
Moore´s (objective) notion of good as indefinable in terms of anything else, Keynes 
concluded that it was possible to make expected utility calculations solely on the basis of 
our (objective) knowledge of both good and probability and, unlike Moore, without 
having to resort to long-run relative frequencies of outcomes (Keynes, 1920, ch. 26). In 
other words, Keynes adopted Moore´s notion of good and built on it by developing a 
logical theory of probability. He then replaced the frequency theory of probability upon 
which Moore´s ethics was based by his own notion of probability as `degree of rational 
belief´. The end result was an ethics that differed markedly from Moore´s in the sense 
that following rules was not justified. Lastly, as Bateman (1988, p. 1104) notes, Moore 
came to accept in Ethics (Moore, 1912) Keynes´s definition of probability as the `degree 
of belief´ in a proposition.          
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2.2. Hume, Keynes & induction  
Some scholars have suggested that Keynes wrote the Treatise on Probability to 
answer Hume (Fitzgibbon, 1988, p. 10; Davis, 1994, p. 142; Klant, 1985).4 For instance, 
Klant (1985) argues that Keynes´s main intention in writing the Treatise was to solve the 
`problem of induction´ that had been set out by Hume (2006[1748]). According to Keynes 
(1920), Hume´s case against induction had not yet been answered: `Hitherto Hume has 
been master´ (Keynes, 1920, pp. 303-04). He thought that the logical system of Russell 
(and Whitehead) was constrained to exploring logical deductions and, hence, could not 
deal with the non-deductive method of reasoning that most people employ. As Andrews 
(1999, p. 2) remarks, `Keynes wished to construct an analytical structure for probable 
reasoning that would, at least to a certain extent, parallel that which Russell and 
Whitehead had produced for deductive reasoning´. This way, he would answer to Hume 
who concluded more than two hundred years before that: (i) it is not possible to ground 
probabilistic judgements in reason, and (ii) that the former are held only on the basis of 
repetition or `custom and habit´. Hume (2006[1748]) believed that a priori theorizing 
cannot tell us much about empirical relationships of cause and effect and that all 
knowledge we have of them comes from experience. Furthermore, he thought we do not 
experience causality relationships `directly´ but rather infer them from the observation 
that certain phenomena concur. Yet, he argued that in order to infer from a constant 
conjunction of phenomena that a causality relation actually exists requires to make the 
additional (and unwarranted) assumption that the `future must conform to the past´ 
(Hume, 2006[1748], p. 652). As we know, Hume argued that this assumption was 
unprovable in the sense that it was not liable to demonstrative proof. Nevertheless, he 
concluded that despite the impossibility of proving it, people constantly make decisions 
that are based on it due to the fact that they have no better alternative if they seek to pursue 
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their interests (Hume, 2006[1748], pp. 269-70). Hence, his profound skepticism about 
human rationality.    
 Keynes apparently found Hume´s argument against induction powerful although 
inconclusive: ` Hume showed, not that inductive methods were false, but that their validity 
had never been established and that their possible lines of proof seemed equally 
unpromising´ (Keynes, 1920, p. 313). Unlike Hume, Keynes believed that there was a 
more robust foundation for probabilistic knowledge than `custom and habit´ and thought 
he had found it in the notion of probability as a logical relationship between two sets of 
propositions: premises and conclusions. In any case, his ulterior abandonment of the 
notion of probability that he had advocated in the Treatise led him to embrace a view of 
human rationality that was similar to Hume´s.           
Next, Keynes´s Treatise on Probability addresses the question how knowledge is 
acquired. According to Keynes (op. cit., pp. 3-4), knowledge is of two different forms: 
direct and indirect. First, direct knowledge is knowledge about (empirical) propositions 
concerning objects of direct acquaintance and where the propositions can derive from 
personal experience, sensorial perception or understanding. In any case, Keynes argues 
that the `true´ objects of knowledge and belief ― in opposition to the objects of direct 
acquaintance ― are not sensations, meanings, and perceptions but propositions. Keynes 
(op. cit.) denotes them as `primary propositions´. As he explains, the latter consist of 
propositions that capture our knowledge of the world and a further proposition that 
expresses a conjecture about the real world. For instance, given our current knowledge of 
the workings of the Eurozone and Greek history and politics, we think that it cannot be 
ruled out that Greece will eventually defect from the Eurozone. By contrast, indirect 
knowledge consists of `secondary propositions´ such as probability relations which are 
the result of arguments concerning `primary propositions´ and which may result either 
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from the application of `formal´ logic (i.e., demonstrative knowledge like mathematics) 
or `human´ logic (i.e., non-demonstrative knowledge).5 In our example, the `secondary 
proposition´ consists of the probability that Greece will eventually leave the Eurozone. 
According to Keynes, theory construction consists of generating indirect knowledge in 
the form of `secondary propositions´. In any case, he argues that in all knowledge there 
is always some direct element so that `logic can never be made purely mechanical´ 
(Keynes, op. cit., pp. 14-15) and it is on the basis of it that we seek to justify many further 
propositions or:  
 
‘That part of our knowledge which we obtain directly, supplies the premises of 
that part which we obtain by argument. From these premises we seek to justify some 
degree of rational belief about all sorts of conclusions’ (op. cit., p. 121).    
 
Next, by the time Keynes wrote the Treatise he was mainly concerned to provide 
a logical foundation for induction, such as Whitehead and Russell (1925) had done for 
deduction. He was a student of probability theory before he became an economist and 
developed his ideas on probability prior to those on uncertainty. He was concerned with 
probability as the foundation for rational decision making rather than with descriptive 
statistics or with probability as a feature of the world. According to Carvalho (1998, p. 
66), his main motive in writing the Treatise was to explain how a certain ‘degree of belief’ 
and the subsequent choice can be shown to be a logical consequence of a given set of 
premises and, hence, not merely a matter of the believer´s psychological features. Since 
he was reluctant to study the mechanisms through which the premises upon which 
decisions are based are generated, he skipped the issue by assuming that the premises 
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upon which the decision-making process is based were true knowledge (op. cit.). By so 
doing, Keynes was able to focus on deriving knowledge by argument. Consequently, the 
conclusion thus obtained was `rational´ to the extent that it did not depend on individual 
peculiarities but rather on criteria of consistency with `formal logic´.  
Now, Keynes was aware that in many real-world circumstances neither certainty 
nor impossibility can be shown by `formal logic´. In all such cases, the relation between 
the premises and the conclusion was only probable. As noted in Carvalho (1988, p. 72), 
probability is approached in the Treatise as part of a learning process, that is, the larger 
is the (direct) evidence that accumulates in the form of premises, the more likely the 
conclusions obtained by argument are. This `cumulative´ view of learning is a logical 
implication of the inductive theory of knowledge Keynes had adopted. Indeed, it will 
become clear below that the probability theory of the Treatise is based on an inductive 
theory of knowledge. This is evident in chapter II and Part III (Induction and Analogy) 
of the Treatise. An example of this is the following quotation from the Treatise:  
 
 ‘The validity of the inductive method does not depend on the success of its 
predictions. Its repeated failure in the past may, of course, supply us with new evidence, 
the inclusion of which will modify the force of subsequent inductions. But the force of 
the old induction relative to the old evidence is untouched. The evidence with which our 
experience has supplied us in the past may have proved misleading, but this is entirely 
irrelevant to the question of what conclusion we ought reasonably to have drawn from the 
evidence then before us’ (Keynes, 1920, p. 221).      
 
 Further, Keynes identifies knowledge with `certainty´ and, crucially, he assumes 
that knowledge (and, hence, certainty) is obtainable: 
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 ‘All knowledge, that is to say, which is obtained in a manner strictly direct by 
contemplation of the objects of acquaintance and without any admixture whatever of 
argument and the contemplation of the logical bearing of any other knowledge on this, 
corresponds to certain rational belief and not to a merely probable degree of rational 
belief’ (op. cit., p. 16). 
  
Notwithstanding it, as David Hume showed long ago, direct knowledge cannot 
generate a set of `true´ premises that allow us to maintain a conclusion with certainty 
because our knowledge is always finite whereas the evidence is potentially infinite and, 
hence, never conclusive. Unfortunately, Keynes did not provide any further discussion 
about the epistemological status of the premises in the Treatise and the development of 
his ideas on decision-making tended to shift from probability to uncertainty.6  
Next, Bateman (1991, p. 104) has argued that like Moore and Russell in the first 
decade of the 20th century Keynes `was committed to a very strict type of ontological 
realism; he believed that things and concepts have a real existence´. In this respect, he 
believed that there are propositions which describe the (non-physical) world and that the 
process of acquiring knowledge about it consisted of knowing these propositions. In turn, 
acquisition of knowledge was based on an inductive mechanism. A large part of the 
Treatise was thus devoted to the examination of the probabilistic nature of inductive 
arguments. Let us distinguish between the two types of inductive arguments Keynes 
identified. The first type is known as universal induction or arguments about invariable 
relations such as `all swans are white´ in which we seek to determine the correct `degree 
of belief´ in a given proposition that is either true or false. The other type of inductive 
argument is known as statistical induction and deals with arguments such as `ninety 
percent of swans are white´. Keynes devoted Part III (“Induction and analogy”) of the 
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Treatise to the analysis of universal induction and Part V (“Foundations of statistical 
inference”) to the analysis of statistical induction.  
Let us first address the case of universal induction. According to Keynes, every 
universal induction is made up of two elements: likeness and number. When we observe 
several instances of a phenomenon and make use of them to lend support for a universal 
induction, we rely on: (i) the fact that each instance exhibits the necessary likeness (e.g., 
all the observed birds are swans and they are all white), and (ii) the number of times we 
observe the same phenomenon. Keynes denoted these two elements of an inductive 
argument by analogy and pure induction respectively. He thought that pure induction was 
of very little use and that the correct way to make empirical arguments is through analogy. 
He then distinguished between positive and negative analogy (Keynes, 1920, p. 223). The 
former captures all the similar features shared by the observed instances whereas the latter 
refers to all their dissimilar features. According to Keynes (op. cit., p. 259), it is only an 
increase in negative analogy that enhances the validity of empirical arguments. 
Therefore, although the elements of an inductive argument are likeness (or analogy) and 
number, the latter is relevant only to the extent that it provides evidence about negative 
analogy.  
As Bateman (1990, p. 366) notes, Keynes´s justification for inductive arguments 
depended crucially on two explicit assumptions: (i) the `law of uniformity of nature´, and 
(ii) the existence of `limited independent variety´ (Keynes, 1920, ch. 22). Firstly, the 
validity of inductive arguments depended on the ability to ignore differences in time and 
space among all observed instances. In other words, one needed to assume both that past 
observations would be valid in the future and that the generalizations made held 
regardless of our geographical location. Secondly, Keynes also believed that a positive a 
priori probability ― which was a necessary condition for deriving the probability of a 
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generalization after n observations within his framework ― could be assigned to a 
`primary´ proposition provided it could be assumed that there were a finite range of 
features which were relevant to the generalization. As Bateman (1990, p. 366) observes, 
although Keynes felt that these assumptions were plausible, he could not prove them and 
consequently could not offer a justification for induction. 
Notwithstanding the previous conclusion, it has been suggested that Keynes´s 
discussion of statistical inductions served him to make the point that probabilities are not 
tantamount to relative frequencies. As Bateman (1990, p. 367) recognizes, Keynes 
believed that `the probability of observing a white swan was not necessarily the same as 
the percentage of swans which were known to be white´. More specifically, he believed 
that what one was trying to figure out was not what proportion of observed swans were 
white but what `degree of belief´ it was reasonable to hold in different statements about 
that proportion. He insisted that we should not confuse the past occurrence of a relative 
frequency with its future occurrence and that probabilities were `degrees of belief´ and 
not relative frequencies. In chapter 28 of the Treatise titled `The law of great numbers´ 
he traces the origin of the argument that after a large enough number of observations a 
stable pattern of frequencies will emerge and points to French mathematician Quetelet for 
the formulation of this law. Keynes concludes that `observation shows that some 
statistical frequencies are, within narrower or wider limits, stable. But stable frequencies 
are not very common, and cannot be assumed lightly´ (Keynes, 1920, p. 368). As we will 
see below, this rejection of a frequency interpretation of probability in the Treatise is a 
direct antecedent of his later claim, in the context of his criticism of Tinbergen´s 
pioneering work on the application of statistical methods to economics, that `economic 
data are not homogeneous through time´. Finally, an analysis of the foundations of the 
`law of great numbers´ is in chapters 29-31 of the Treatise where Keynes argues that it is 
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based on unwarranted assumptions about the distribution of the variables. The main 
source of Keynes´s disagreement with advocates of the `law of great numbers´ was that 
their method was not inductive:  
 
`[Keynes] felt that instead of examining many instances and trying to induce a 
pattern from these, they had relied on undifferentiated observations and assumptions 
about a pattern. His complaint was not that they had used formulas or theorems but that 
(in his perception) these were used to circumvent the process of induction; instead of 
explaining how one could induce the likelihood of a frequency, these methods assumed 
the problem away´ (Bateman, 1990, p. 368).       
 
Keynes´s alternative to the (relative) frequency theory of probability consisted of 
an extension of the elements of a universal induction to the case of statistical induction. 
In particular, he argued that in universal induction one observed a series of instances in 
varying circumstances and used this series to establish that a certain invariable relation 
(i.e., empirical regularity) held in many different circumstances. By contrast, in the case 
of statistical induction a series only represented one instance since one needed to count 
the relative frequency with which different characteristics appeared in the series. Thus, 
as Bateman (1990, p. 369) explains `in this case a “series of series” constituted the same 
thing as a series of observations in universal induction´. In particular, one would need to 
observe the relative frequency of occurrence of a certain feature (e.g., white swans) in 
many different series and increased the probability of the frequency´s future occurrence 
(e.g., that ten percent of all swans are white) by increasing the negative analogy (i.e., by 
observing that frequency in the widest array of circumstances) between series. In sum, 
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Keynes´s argument against early proponents of the frequency theory of probability was 
that their methods amounted to pure induction or number insofar as they did not take 
(negative) analogy into consideration (Keynes, 1920, pp. 445-46).          
                                                                                         
2.3. Probability 
Following Gillies (2000), interpretations of probability can be divided into (i) 
epistemological, and (ii) objective. According to the former interpretation, probability is 
concerned with the knowledge or belief of human beings. In other words, probability 
measures `degree of belief´, `degree of rational belief´, etc. However, `epistemological´ 
interpretations of probability can themselves be either objective or subjective. Keynes, 
Ramsey, De Finetti, and Savage all adopted `epistemological´ approaches to probability 
theory. Notwithstanding it, while Keynes initially adopted (in his Treatise) an objective 
`epistemological´ interpretation, Ramsey, De Finetti and, Savage adopted a subjective 
`epistemological´ interpretation of probability.7 By contrast, according to `objective´ 
interpretations of probability, the latter is a feature of the physical world which has 
nothing to do with knowledge or belief. In other words, human beings may know this 
probability or they may not but the probability is said to exist independently of whether 
it is known. Two well-known examples of `objective´ interpretations of probability are: 
(i) von Mises´s (1928) frequency theory of probability, and (ii) Popper´s propensity 
interpretation of probability8 (Popper, 1959). The frequency theory of probability has 
been adopted by most mathematicians and consists in the description of the forms and 
properties of the randomness exhibited by the object of knowledge. An implication of it 
is that, if the stochastic processes are stable (or ergodic) then repeated observation of the 
object of knowledge allows us to acquire knowledge about its underlying structure. It is 
this feature of stochastic processes that Keynes apparently rejected and which made him 
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sceptical of the application of statistical methods in economics. Likewise, his scepticism 
about the possibility of economic data being `homogeneous through time´ explains, to a 
large extent, his view of theoretical models as instruments for `explaining´ economic 
phenomena rather than for generating `forecasts´.    
The Treatise on Probability (Keynes, 1920) is, along with the work of Jeffreys 
(1939) and Carnap (1950), part of the `logical´ tradition in the theory of probability. In 
this tradition, probability is conceived as a logical relation between a conclusion and 
certain evidence. In Keynes´s view, logic had always considered such relationships but it 
had only dealt with the cases in which one´s information implied that a proposition was 
true or false. His project in the Treatise was to extend logic to those cases — the most 
common in science and life — where we are uncertain about a proposition given the 
evidence available. This feature is stressed in Runde (1990, p. 277) who explains that 
‘unlike the frequency theory of probability in which probability is interpreted as a 
property of the physical world, Keynes treats probability as a property of the way 
individuals think about the world’. In the same vein, Carvalho (1988, p. 71) points out 
that in the frequency theory of probability ‘the accumulation of knowledge does not 
change probabilities, because randomness is a feature of the object of knowledge, not of 
knowledge itself´. By contrast, Keynes´s notion of probability implies that a probability 
proposition may change when the evidence upon which reasoning is based changes.  
Next, in the Treatise Keynes draws a sharp distinction between the certainty of 
the conclusions of demonstrative logic and the inconclusiveness of non-demonstrative 
logic on which scientific (and non-scientific) arguments are typically based. As we have 
explained above, he defends the real existence of a logical relation between two or more 
propositions in those cases where it is impossible to construct a demonstrative argument 
from one to the other. He denotes this logical relation as the probability relation or 
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argument. Therefore, a conclusion a is related to a set of premises h by virtue of a 
probability relation. This is written as a/h=p, where p is the ‘degree of rational belief’ 
that the probability relation between a and h justifies. In turn, Keynes (1920) denotes this 
probability relation as a ‘secondary proposition’ which, as we explained above, 
constitutes a logical statement about the ‘primary proposition’ a. The probability of a 
conclusion a is always relative to a set of evidence h. If the relation between a and h were 
tautologous or true then p=1 whereas if it were contradictory or false then p=0. If the 
evidence did not guarantee the truth or falsehood of the proposition, there existed a 
`degree of rational belief´ between 0 and 1 in the propositions´ truth. The discovery of 
new evidence h1 will not affect the validity of the probability relation between a and h, 
but will yield a new one a/hh1. This way, Keynes extended Russell´s logic of certainty 
(true and false propositions) to uncertainty (i.e., to more or less probable propositions).  
Now, Keynes´s approach to probability might be interpreted as subjective since 
the amount of information and reasoning power may vary across individuals. However, 
Keynes stresses the objective component which he denotes as the ‘degree of belief’ it is 
rational to hold in a certain hypothesis given the evidence available (Keynes, 1920, p. 4). 
As Cottrell (1993, p. 27) notes, there is a Platonic element in Keynes´s interpretation of 
probability in the sense that probability relations exist in a certain logical space and are 
assumed to be perceived by individuals via intuition. This implies that, if opinions that 
are based on the same evidence differ, it follows that somebody´s perception must be 
wrong. In other words, Keynes´s approach to probability implies that probabilities are 
unique and have the same value for all the individuals who happen to possess the same 
information. By contrast, in subjective theories of probability the probabilities will take 
whatever value is assigned by the individual using them. This means, for instance, that in 
the subjective theory of probability originally propounded by Ramsey (1926) and De 
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Finetti (1937), any two individuals with the same information can assign different 
numerical values to the probability of a certain proposition whereas, in Keynes´s theory 
of probability, two individuals with the same information will assign the same value to 
the probability of a proposition. Crucially, the objectivity of probabilities in Keynes´s 
theory is not based on inter-subjective agreement among individuals ― as in the inter-
subjective approach propounded in Gillies (2000) ― but on the real existence of logical 
Platonic-like probability relations. As Lawson (1988, p. 44) concludes, the difference 
between Keynes´ approach to probability and the approach adopted by Ramsey (1926), 
De Finetti (1937) and, later on, Savage (1951) is that ‘although both approaches accept 
that probability exists only on the level of knowledge or opinion Keynes believes that 
probability is objectively determined’.  
 
2.4. Rationality 
Both Bateman (1987, pp. 101-102) and Andrews (1999, p. 6) make the point that 
Keynes´s argument for the objectivity of probabilities is related to the inductive theory of 
knowledge expounded in Parts III and V of the Treatise. According to Keynes, there is 
an essential connection between the inductive methods and the notion of probability he 
presents in the Treatise. In particular, he argues that an induction is just a particular 
application of his theory:  
 
`An inductive relation affirms, not that a certain matter of fact is so, but that 
relative to certain evidence, there is a probability in its favour´ (Keynes, 1920, p. 254). 
 
120 
 
That is, Keynes believed that probability is a `logical´ relationship between two 
propositions: (direct) evidence and conclusion. Further, he also believed that decisions 
are based on probabilistic judgements. To the extent that human behaviour is grounded 
upon objective probability relations, the former is `rational´. Thus, unlike Hume, who 
believed that human behaviour was grounded on `custom and habit´, he concluded that 
rational probability is the `guide of life´ (op. cit., p. 369). As Bateman (1991, p. 105) 
writes, `the end result of all this was a conception of probability which relied on intuition 
as the basis of rational choice´. Specifically, individuals were assumed to know the 
`correct´ probabilities of the various outcomes ― given the evidence available ― and to 
weight the value of each possible outcome by its probability. In turn, Keynes´s argument 
that probabilities are `rational´ is based on the idea that they had been inferred correctly 
from the available information through inductive methods (Bateman, 1987). Therefore, 
the whole process was rational. Be that as it may, we will see below that his view of 
rationality underwent a dramatic change in the aftermath of his acceptance of Ramsey´s 
criticism of logical probability relations (Ramsey, 1926) and those changes pushed him 
back towards the views on human nature held by Hume.     
In terms of the conceptual framework we used in the previous chapter, we may 
assert that the logical probability relations Keynes devised in the Treatise satisfy means-
rationality and beliefs-rationality (Hamlin, 1986).9 Yet, this is not to deny the possibility 
that realized outcomes may differ from ex-ante expectations. To be sure, an individual 
who makes decisions according to Platonic-like probability relations may well obtain a 
result which differs markedly from the expectation she held with a certain `degree of 
rational belief´ yet such unexpected outcome cannot be said to be a mistake but rather it 
is a mere consequence of the fact that, in Keynes´s Treatise, knowledge is probabilistic 
and, therefore, liable to error. Further, the theory Keynes developed in the Treatise can 
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be interpreted as being both a positive and a normative theory, that is to say, as being a 
description of human behaviour as well as a `guide´ to it. To be sure, Keynes´s assertion 
in the Treatise that human decisions are based upon probability judgements and that the 
latter are `rational´ insofar as they are built upon `correct´ inductive inferences makes it 
unequivocal that he conceived of probabilistic judgements as descriptions of individual 
behaviour. By the same token, if human behaviour is `rational´ it then follows that it is 
`desirable´ that the former be based upon logical probability relations.      
Next, O´Donnell (1990, p. 257) argues that part of the deeper analytical structure 
of the Treatise is constituted by two distinct domains of analysis. The first domain is the 
determinate domain, the ruler of which is strong rationality. As in Simon´s well-known 
notion of `substantive rationality´ (Simon, 1976), within the domain of strong rationality 
determinate answers are available to the questions posed and it is assumed that reason is 
capable of providing the answers. Our previous discussion about Keynes´s notion of 
probability as `degree of rational belief´ in the Treatise and its accompanying notions of 
`primary´ and `secondary´ propositions do correspond to O´Donnell´s notion of strong 
rationality. The other domain identified in O´Donnell (op. cit.) is the indeterminate one 
and is associated to the notion of weak rationality. As O´Donnell (op. cit.) argues, in the 
indeterminate domain ‘probabilities are unknown for want of reasoning power; it is 
theoretically impossible to compare probabilities; weights are also non-comparable; and 
agents are thus unable to combine probabilities and values where either or both are non-
numerical’. According to O´Donnell (1990, p. 258), the theory of the Treatise embraces 
both domains and, although the development of the determinate domain was Keynes´s 
major concern in and prior to the Treatise, the existence of an indeterminate domain was 
recognised albeit relegated to a subordinate position. Nevertheless, he adds that it is 
certainly the indeterminate domain that Keynes sought to develop in his later economic 
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writings.10 In turn, this serves him to insist on the `continuity´ thesis, that is, the claim 
that there is a basic continuity in Keynes´s conceptual framework between the Treatise 
on Probability and the General Theory) against advocates of the `non-continuity´ thesis, 
i.e., that there is a substantial change or a `break-up´ in Keynes´s thought between the 
Treatise and his later economic writings (Andrews, 1999; Bateman, 1987, 1990, 1991; 
Davis, 1994).11      
Be that as it may, O´Donnell (1990) insists that the absence of strong rationality 
in Keynes´s conceptual framework in his later economic writings is not tantamount to 
‘irrationality’. Rather, he contends that individuals will adapt to the new circumstances 
and develop strategies to ‘get by’. He groups such strategies under the heading of weak 
rationality; in the indeterminate domain rational individuals know that weakly rational 
procedures result from the lack of robust foundations in certain or probable knowledge 
and, hence, they have low and easily shaken, degrees of confidence in such procedures. 
Further, he argues that Keynes observes that despite being uncertain of the future people 
know certain facts of the existing situation as well as ways of ‘getting by’ in the absence 
of knowledge of the relevant (numerical) probabilities. Such ways of ‘getting by’ bear a 
resemblance to Simon´s notion of ‘procedural’ rationality (Simon, 1976). For instance, in 
the context of investment decisions, Keynes argues that investors often ‘endeavour to fall 
back on the judgement of the rest of the world which is perhaps better informed’ (Keynes, 
1937, p. 214). However, this interpretation of Keynes´s notion of rationality as implying 
two domains has been criticized in Bateman (1991). He refers to O´Donnell´s (1990) 
notion of weak rationality as follows: 
 
`Here all of Keynes´s careful argument about probability as the “guide of life” 
comes tumbling down. With one deft stroke, the people who follow social conventions 
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and conventional rules of behaviour are out on a par with those who have the full ability 
to recognise (and act upon) Platonic probabilities´ (Bateman, 1991, pp. 108-9).  
 
According to Bateman (op. cit.), O´Donnell´s interpretation of Keynes´s Treatise 
has two problems: (i) that Keynes never mentioned a second theory of rationality in his 
Treatise, and (ii) that his many references to `irrational´ behaviour in his later economic 
writings suggests that, far from having a dualistic theory of human rationality, he made 
`irrationality´ the basis of his macroeconomics. Although we do not subscribe the latter 
appraisal of the theory of human behaviour underlying Keynes´s General Theory, we 
share Bateman´s argument that presenting Keynes´s framework in the Treatise as made 
up of two different domains of analysis is inappropriate in that it places more emphasis 
on the existence of continuity in Keynes´s thought than it seems to be justified by the 
textual evidence. Having said that, we believe it is in the following ideas that appear in 
the Treatise where there is a clear connection between his previous work on probability 
theory and his later economic writings: (i) the idea that some probabilities may not be 
measurable, (ii) the `weight of an argument´, and (ii) the illegitimacy of the frequency 
approach to probability in economics.12 We address the first two issues in what follows.   
 
2.4.1. Uncertainty   
     Keynes does not explicitly define uncertainty in the Treatise. Uncertainty seems 
to be related to the absence of certainty but it is a particular lack of certainty. To be sure, 
Lawson (1987, p. 953) argues that in the Treatise Keynes identifies three different types 
of probability relations: (i) where a probability relation is numerically indeterminate and, 
possibly, not comparable to other probability relations, (ii) where probabilities are 
numerically determinate and take on values between unity and zero, and (iii) where 
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probabilities take the value of either unity or zero. According to Lawson (1985, p. 911), 
Keynes associates the first type to a situation of ‘uncertainty’ and the third type to a 
situation of ‘certainty’. Next, focusing on the first type of probability relation, Keynes 
(1920) identifies two scenarios in which `direct´ knowledge and, hence, certainty of a 
secondary proposition or probability relation concerning a given primary proposition a 
based on a certain type of evidence h is absent. The first scenario is when the secondary 
proposition a/h=p is unknown because the weakness of our reasoning and computing 
power prevents us from knowing what the probability relation is in spite of the (direct) 
evidence justifying a certain degree of knowledge (op. cit., p. 34). Let us refer to the type 
of uncertainty that stems from this first scenario as epistemological. The second scenario 
Keynes identifies is when probability relations can be said not to exist or when they are 
numerically immeasurable or indeterminate because there is no basis possible, given the 
existing evidence, for determining the numerical probability of the secondary proposition. 
Let us denote the resulting type of uncertainty as ontological.  
 Now, Lawson (1985, p. 914) insists that it is the second scenario where `direct´ 
knowledge of a secondary proposition is absent because there is no basis upon which to 
generate any (numerical) probability that corresponds to a situation of ‘uncertainty’ in 
Keynes. In other words, according to Lawson, ‘uncertainty’ is not a situation in which the 
probability relation is known and where the primary proposition a relative to the evidence 
h yields a numerical probability that is less than unity. Neither is it a situation in which 
an existing probability relation cannot be grasped due to our limited cognitive powers. 
Rather, he insists that ‘uncertainty’ in the Treatise arises when the probability relation 
that concerns a primary proposition a is numerically indeterminate. In short, Keynes´s 
notion of ‘uncertainty’ is ontological albeit, in some circumstances, the source of 
uncertainty may well be epistemological. According to Lawson, this interpretation of 
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Keynes´s notion of uncertainty in the Treatise is consistent with Keynes´s use of the same 
term in the General Theory and in his 1937 Quarterly Journal of Economics paper where 
he says that ‘very uncertain’ is not the same as ‘very improbable’ (Keynes, 1937, pp. 213-
14).  
 
2.4.2. The ‘weight of an argument’ 
Let us now address Keynes´ notion of the ‘weight of an argument’. Runde (op. 
cit, p. 133) denotes Keynes´s theory of expectations formation as a ‘two-tier theory of 
belief’ whereby probability is at a first level whereas weight is at the second level. The 
former represents a measure of our `degree of belief´ in a hypothesis relative to some set 
of evidence whereas the latter constitutes a measure of the `degree of completeness´ of 
the evidence on which that belief is based.13 According to Runde (1990), Keynes alludes 
to the notion of weight in the Treatise on Probability in, three different ways.14 According 
to the first conception of weight (weight1), ‘one argument has more weight than another 
if it is based on a greater amount of relevant evidence’ (Keynes, 1920, p. 77). The second 
conception of weight that Runde identifies (weight2) appears in Chapter 6 of the Treatise 
where weight is defined as the ‘balance of the absolute amounts of relevant knowledge 
and relevant ignorance on which a probability is based’ (op. cit., p. 280). To be sure, if 
we denote relevant knowledge and relevant ignorance by Kr and Ir respectively and 
weight by V, then the latter may be expressed as: 
                                                          V(a/h) = Kr/Ir                                                       (1) 
The third notion of `weight´ appears in Chapter 26 of the Treatise where Keynes 
makes it very clear that ‘the probability of a hypothesis is only one of the things to be 
determined and taken account of before acting on it’ (Keynes, 1920, p. 307). It is clear 
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then that, as long as probabilities are used as a guide to action, the other element when 
making decisions is weight. The third notion of weight (weight3) identified by Runde is 
the ‘degree of completeness of information on which a probability is based’ (op. cit., p. 
313). As Runde (op. cit.) remarks, if knowledge, information, and evidence are taken as 
being synonymous terms, as Keynes apparently does, then the ‘degree of completeness’ 
of the information on which a probability is based might be expressed as: 
                                                  V(a/h) = Kr / (Kr + Ir)                                                 (2)  
From expressions (1) and (2) we have that, as the amount of (absolute) relevant 
knowledge increases, the probability of proposition a may either rise or fall, depending 
on whether the new evidence is favourable or unfavourable.15 Thus, provided that Ir does 
not increase by more than Kr, the weight of the new probability will be higher than it was 
before. Yet, and following this interpretation, the discovery of new evidence may lead to 
a decrease in weight. This will be the case if, for instance, Ir increases by more than Kr. 
Runde (op. cit., p. 283) admits that this possibility is not explicitly contemplated in the 
Treatise and it may contradict some of Keynes´s statements. Notwithstanding it, he 
provides a number of examples taken from the Treatise itself which seem to imply the 
consequence that, if new evidence is discovered so that our (subjective) perception of 
ignorance increases (i.e., the degree of completeness of the information decreases) either 
because more options have now become available or because a larger array of possibilities 
can now be considered, then weight may decrease even if our (absolute) knowledge 
increases. In other words, according to Keynes, weight measures the ‘well groundedness’ 
of the argument and, hence, the confidence we place on it.16 Low weight means weaker 
foundations for decision making and low degrees of confidence whereas high weight 
implies strong foundations and higher degrees of confidence, even though the 
probabilities involved in both scenarios may be perfectly correct.  
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Now, whereas the first notion of weight we have identified above is objective, 
expressions (1) and (2) above corresponding respectively to the second and third notion 
of weight identified in Runde (op. cit.) are clearly subjective. In the case of the second 
version presented above, the ‘balance of the absolute amounts of relevant knowledge and 
relevant ignorance on which a probability is based’ (op. cit., p. 280) can only be a 
subjective perception because the absolute amount of factual evidence that is potentially 
available is infinite and, hence, no observer can `objectively´ know what the balance of 
relevant knowledge and ignorance is.17 Likewise, in the third notion of weight identified 
in Runde the `degree of completeness of information on which a probability is based’ can 
only be a subjective perception for the same reason that the amount of information is 
infinite and, hence, there is no way to know what the actual `degree of completeness´ of 
the information we possess is. In other words, there is no way to know how ignorant we 
are about something we ignore. This explains why the notion of weight appears to be 
confusing for Keynes himself as Cottrell (1993, p. 36) notes.18 Further, this suggests that 
the ‘two-tier theory of belief’ that Runde (op. cit.) refers to does not only comprise 
probability or `degree of rational belief´ and weight but really comprises an apparently 
objective notion of probability coupled to a subjective notion of `weight´. We believe it 
is for this reason that Keynes easily connected the notion of `weight´ of the Treatise to 
the twin notions of `confidence´ and `liquidity preference´ in the General Theory.19 In 
particular, the link is facilitated by the fact that two of the three versions of the notion of 
`weight´ displayed in the Treatise are subjective perceptions. The subjective nature of 
`weight´ also goes some way, according to us, towards explaining Keynes´s capitulation 
to Ramsey´s critique (Ramsey, 1978[1931]) when the latter argues that Keynes´s logical 
probability relations do not exist and that probability is subjective.      
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2.5. Some final remarks on the Treatise on Probability 
 We have shown that Keynes´s Treatise on Probability constitutes, at least partly, 
an answer to Hume by providing both an objective epistemological theory of probability 
and theory of rational decision-making based on an inductive theory of knowledge. As to 
the former, Keynes suggests that, although we cannot acquire `certain´ knowledge we can 
nevertheless attain probabilistic knowledge. However, if we can acquire `objective´ 
probabilistic knowledge by relying on inductive methods, the basis for both a `rational´ 
theory of decision-making under uncertainty and an answer to Hume have been laid out. 
Notably, Keynes assumes that individuals know via intuition the `correct´ probabilities 
of all possible outcomes ― given the evidence accumulated ― and weight the value of 
each possible outcome by its `correct´ probability. We have suggested above that this 
`embryonic´ theory of decision-making under uncertainty faces (at least) two problems: 
(i) the objectivity or `Platonic´ nature of logical probability relations and, arguably, (ii) 
our claim that the notion of the `weight of argument´ is subjective. The `objectivity´ of a 
priori probability relations was the focus of Ramsey´s critique of Keynes´s Treatise and 
will be addressed in the following section. As to our claim that the `weight of argument´ 
is subjective, we believe that it highlights the insurmountable conceptual difficulties of 
constructing a theory of human behaviour under uncertainty grounded, as Schumpeter 
(1984) would put it, upon the `rationality of the observer´.  
 According to us, the main conceptual difficulty the notion of a priori probability 
relations encounters is that the absolute amount of empirical evidence economic agents 
may come across is potentially infinite. In the frequency approach to probability this is 
dealt with by assuming that relative frequencies converge to a certain (constant) value as 
the number of observations increases. However, Keynes rejected the validity of the 
frequency approach to probability in the social sciences. As a result of it, he had to rely 
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on Platonic-like or a priori probability relations to justify their `objectivity´. Otherwise, 
how could he argue that such a priori probability relations are `objective´ if the amount 
of evidence that is potentially available and the different types if circumstances in which 
such evidence can be found are potentially infinite? As we will see below, the edifice 
laboriously constructed by Keynes in the Treatise crumbled irremediably when Ramsey 
criticised it. Keynes capitulated in the aftermath of it (Keynes, 1973a, pp. 338-39). The 
upshot of it is the apparent adoption by Keynes of a subjective epistemological theory of 
probability which would eventually pave the way to the final adoption of a theory of 
human nature similar to Hume´s and an (implicit) recognition of his inability to provide 
a solution to Hume´s `problem of induction´.    
 
3. Ramsey´s critique of the Treatise and his theoretical framework 
 Like Keynes, Ramsey grew up in Cambridge, was a student of both Moore and 
Russell, an Apostle and a contributor to the Economic Journal. In spite of his early and 
unexpected death in 1930 when he was only 26, he made long-lasting contributions to 
probability theory, philosophy, and economics. For instance, it is widely recognized that 
Ramsey´s critique of the Treatise on Probability in his `Truth and Probability´ (Ramsey, 
(1978[1931]) constitutes, together with De Finetti´s (1937), the foundation for Savage´s 
subjective expected utility theory (Savage, 1954), which is still the standard approach to 
analysing decision-making in economics.20 Before we present Ramsey´s critique of the 
Treatise let us note that in the foreword of the above-mentioned essay Ramsey suggests 
that there may be two legitimate approaches to probability:  
 
 `Probability is of fundamental importance not only in logic but also in statistical 
and physical sciences, and we cannot be sure beforehand that the most useful 
interpretation of it in logic will be appropriate in physics also. Indeed, the general 
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difference of opinion between statisticians who for the most part adopt the frequency 
theory of probability and logicians who mostly reject it renders it likely that the two 
schools are really discussing different things, and that the word “probability” is used by 
logicians in one sense and by statisticians in another´ (Ramsey, (1978 [1931], p. 59).  
 
Thus, as with Keynes´s (implicit) acceptance some years after the publication of 
the Treatise of the legitimacy of the frequency theory of probability in the context of the 
natural sciences, Ramsey suggests that, at least in physics, the requirements for the use of 
the frequency theory of probability are fulfilled. Therefore, in both cases (Keynes and 
Ramsey) there is a clear duality in the theory of probability. We will return to this issue 
below when we address Keynes´s ideas on the methodology of economics.  
 
3.1. Ramsey´s critique 
We now address the essence of Ramsey´s critique of the Treatise on Probability. 
As we will see below, this critique had a dramatic impact on the views Keynes adopted 
on probability theory and the methodology of economics at least from 1932 onwards and, 
hence, it is an indispensable ingredient in any attempt to understand Keynes´s later 
economic writings.  In a much-quoted paragraph, Ramsey writes:  
 
`But let us now turn to a more fundamental criticism of Mr. Keynes´ views, which 
is the obvious one that there really do not seem to be any such things as the probability 
relations he describes. He supposes that, at any rate in certain cases, they can be 
perceived; but speaking for myself I feel confident that this is not true. I do not perceive 
them, and if I am to be persuaded that they exist it must be by argument; moreover I 
shrewdly suspect that others do not perceive them either, because they are able to come 
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to so little agreement as to which of them relates any two given propositions´ (Ramsey, 
(1978[1931], p. 63).  
 
In other words, Ramsey denies that there are `objective´ logical relationships to 
which our `degrees of belief´ refer and insists that we simply have subjective `degrees of 
belief´ in different propositions. As Bateman (1987, p. 106) explains, Ramsey´s critique 
implies that, if two individuals possess exactly the same information but they exhibit 
different `degrees of belief´ in a certain proposition, this does not imply ― unlike in 
Keynes´s a priori probability relations ― that one of them is necessarily `irrational´ or 
wrong. Rather, the dissimilarity in their evaluations implies that these two individuals 
have made assessments of the likelihood of different possible outcomes that reflect their 
own subjective `degrees of belief´. Ramsey coined the term `human logic´ to denote the 
subjective nature of the assessments people make and to emphasize the absence of an a 
priori probability relation. The obituary containing Keynes´s answer to Ramsey was 
published in the Economic Journal in 1931, a year after Ramsey died, and leaves little 
doubt about his capitulation:  
 
 `Ramsey argues, as against the view which I had put forward, that probability is 
concerned not with objective relations between propositions but (in some sense) with 
degrees of belief, and he succeeds in showing that the calculus of probabilities simply 
amounts to a set of rules for ensuring that the system of degrees of belief which we hold 
shall be a consistent system. Thus the calculus of probabilities belongs to formal logic. 
But the basis of our degrees of belief ― or the a priori probabilities, as they used to be 
called ― is part of our human outfit, perhaps given us merely by natural selection, 
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analogous to our perceptions and our memories rather than to formal logic. So far I yield 
to Ramsey ― I think he is right´ (Keynes, 1973a, pp. 338-39). 
 
 Therefore, while Keynes had advocated an objective epistemological theory of 
probability in the Treatise, he was now willing to accept a subjective epistemological 
theory of probability. Furthermore, Keynes was also willing to accept that the role that 
Ramsey assigned to the calculus of probabilities was to ensure the consistency of these 
subjective `degrees of belief´ (Bateman, 1987). What has gone largely unnoticed in the 
academic literature, however, is that when referring to the source of subjective `degrees 
of belief´, Keynes hints that they may have been `given us merely by natural selection, 
analogous to our perceptions and our memories rather than to formal logic´.21 Although 
Keynes, to the best of our knowledge, does not develop this idea elsewhere, he ponders 
the possibility that our expectations are determined by a `natural´ selection mechanism, 
i.e., through a trial and error-elimination process similar to Popper´s evolutionary theory 
of knowledge and learning (PTKL). Be that as it may, in the same quotation he seems to 
stick to an inductive theory of knowledge:  
 
 `But in attempting to distinguish “rational” degrees of belief from belief in general 
[Ramsey] was not yet, I think, quite successful. It is not getting to the bottom of the 
principle of induction merely to say that it is a useful mental habit´ (Keynes, 1973a, p. 
339).  
 
 As Bateman (1987, p. 107) suggests, while accepting the subjective nature of our 
`degrees of belief´, Keynes implies that consistent subjective `degrees of belief´ are not 
rational. Rationality in the Treatise stems from the fact that probabilities are assumed to 
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have been inferred correctly from the evidence available. By contrast, the rationality of 
probabilities in Ramsey´s framework stems from their consistency according to the rules 
of calculus of probabilities.22 In a similar vein, Andrews (1999, p. 8) argues that Keynes 
believed that Ramsey´s subjective theory of probability failed to distinguish `rational´ 
belief from belief in general. The reason is that Keynes continued to adopt an inductive 
theory of knowledge and, hence, to associate `rationality´ with probabilistic knowledge. 
Notwithstanding it, Keynes eventually adopted Ramsey´s (as well as Hume´s) view of 
rationality. Ramsey (1978[1931], p. 96) argues that `the human mind works essentially 
according to general rules and habits´, denotes `human logic´ as the `logic of truth´ or 
`inductive logic´, and states that `induction is such a useful habit, and so to adopt it is 
reasonable´ (op. cit., p. 100). However, this is remarkably similar to Hume´s approach to 
rationality. Indeed, Ramsey explicitly makes the connection between rationality and 
induction when he refers to Hume:  
 
 `Hume showed that it [induction] could not be reduced to deductive inference or 
justified by formal logic. So far as it goes his demonstration seems to me final; and the 
suggestions of Mr Keynes that it can be got round by regarding induction as a form of 
probable inference cannot in my view be maintained. But to suppose that the situation 
which results is a scandal to philosophy is, I think, a mistake…We are all convinced by 
inductive arguments and our conviction is reasonable because the world is so constituted 
that inductive arguments lead on the whole to true opinions´ (op. cit., pp. 98-99).     
 
 Thus, Ramsey equates `reasonable´ behaviour with the use of inductive methods 
and, in this way, he seems to subscribe Hume´s conclusion that, despite the absence of an 
`inductive logic´, there is a nevertheless a `human logic´ that is essentially inductive, i.e., 
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individuals make use of induction to make decisions. We interpret his insistence on 
induction as a kind of pragmatism:  
 
 `We all agree that a man who did not make inductions would be unreasonable: the 
question is only what this means. In my view it does not mean that the man would in any 
way sin against formal logic or formal probability; but that he had not got a very useful 
habit, without which he would be very much worse off, in the sense of being much less 
likely to have true opinions´ (op. cit.).  
 
 What is important for our purposes is that, as we noted above, Keynes not only 
accepted Ramsey´s critique of his notion of objective logical probability relations but he 
ended up adopting by 1938 a theory of human behaviour similar to both Ramsey´s and 
Hume´s.23 In My Early Beliefs (Keynes, 1973a, pp. 433-51), Keynes recalls the views of 
human nature held by the `Old Bloomsbury´ and charges himself and his friends at the 
1938 Memoir Club meeting with holding ideas that were `disastrously mistaken´ in the 
sense that it presupposed the idea that: 
 
 `The human race already consists of reliable, decent people, influenced by truth 
and objective standards, who can be safely released from the outward restraints of 
convention and traditional standards and inflexible rules of conduct, and left, from now 
onwards, to their own sensible devices, pure motive and reliable intuitions of the good´ 
(op. cit., p. 447).   
 
 The alternative view he adopts is as follows:  
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`We were not aware that civilisation was a thin and precarious crust erected by the 
personality and the will of a very few, and only maintained by rule and conventions 
skilfully put across and guilefully preserved´ (op. cit., p. 447).    
 
The adoption by Keynes in his later economic writings of a conventional theory 
of beliefs and human behaviour is, for most purposes, tantamount to Hume´s view that 
individual behaviour is grounded on `custom and habit´. In other words, conventions or 
`custom and habit´ are two examples of factors which affect human behaviour whose 
institutionalization can be ascribed ultimately to the fact that repeated observation (i.e., 
induction) has highlighted that their adoption yields desirable results. The paradox is that 
Keynes´s main intention in the Treatise was to answer both Hume (1978 [1739-40]) and 
Moore (1912) by propounding a solution to the `problem of induction´ and an ethics that 
were not based on the adoption of social rules. Notwithstanding it, his capitulation to 
Ramsey implied, as we will see below, that he ended up adopting a theory of human 
behaviour based on the reliance by individuals on conventions where any pretension to 
Platonic-like `objective´ rationality was abandoned and replaced by a modest claim to 
`reasonable´ behaviour.    
 
3.2. Ramsey´s theoretical framework  
The rest of this section is devoted to exploring other aspects of Ramsey´s essay 
Truth & Probability which may also have a bearing on the methodology of economics 
beyond the above-mentioned impact on the development of probability theory. More 
precisely, we will argue below that Ramsey (1978[1931]) introduces a methodological 
principle that exhibits a remarkable similarity to Popper´s `Rationality Principle´. Since 
Keynes (1973a, pp. 433-51) read Ramsey´s essay, it is quite likely that the approach to 
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modelling behaviour in the social sciences that Ramsey sketches in that piece had an 
impact on Keynes´s thought. We reproduce below the crucial textual evidence in Truth 
& Probability:      
 
 `In order therefore to construct a theory of quantities of belief which shall be both 
general and more exact, I propose to take as a basis a general psychological theory, which 
is now universally discarded, but nevertheless comes, I think, fairly close to the truth in 
the sort of cases with which we are most concerned. I mean the theory that we act in the 
way we think most likely to realize the objects of our desires, so that a person´s actions 
are completely determined by his desires and opinions. This theory cannot be made 
adequate to all the facts, but it seems to me a useful approximation to the truth… I only 
claim for what follows approximate truth, or truth in relation to this artificial system of 
psychology which like Newtonian mechanics can, I think, still be profitably used even 
though it is known to be false´ (Ramsey, (1978[1931], p. 75, emphasis added).  
 
 There are several ideas in the previous paragraph which deserve our attention. 
First, the general psychological theory Ramsey propounds, `the theory that we act in the 
way we think most likely to realize the objects of our desires´ is remarkably similar to 
Popper´s RP according to which `our actions are adequate to our problem-situations as 
we see them´ (Popper, 1994, p. 181). Notably, Popper says explicitly that he views his 
RP as the animating part of any social theory just as the laws of motion of planets are an 
integral part of Newton´s gravitational theory (Popper, 1994, p. 177) whereas Ramsey 
makes an analogy between his general psychological theory and Newtonian mechanics 
and adds that both theories are `approximately´ true. In this respect, both Ramsey and 
Popper recognize that the principle they propound is either a good enough (Popper) or a 
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useful (Ramsey) approximation to the `truth´ and, for both of them, the status of the 
principle is methodological. That said, there are, at least, two differences between these 
two versions of the principle. First, Ramsey emphasizes the uncertainty surrounding the 
consequences of our actions when he proposes that we behave in the way we think most 
likely to fulfil our desires, whereas the presence of uncertainty in Popper´s RP is more 
subtle in that it is fully absent from the `objectivist´ version (RPo) but is present in the 
`subjectivist´ version (RPs) insofar as there may be a `wedge´ between the objective P-S 
and agents´ view of it. Second, Ramsey (op. cit.) stresses the purposefulness of human 
action and then argues that the latter is completely determined by our desires and beliefs 
without any consideration being paid to the P-S, whereas Popper makes P-S the centre of 
his proposal by stating that `our behaviour is adequate or appropriate to the P-S we face´ 
and, hence, he implicitly denies that human behaviour is completely determined by 
desires and beliefs.          
 These ideas are depicted in Table 2 below which shows a tentative classification 
of probability theories and the resulting approaches to rationality. Keynes´s approach to 
probability and rationality in the Treatise is shown in the first row. As it turns out, the 
theory that emerges can be interpreted as being both a positive and normative approach 
to rationality. As we suggested above, Keynes´s approach to rationality in the Treatise 
implies fulfilment of means-rationality and beliefs-rationality. Next, both Ramsey and 
Keynes (in the wake of Truth and Probability) adopt a dualistic approach to probability 
in the sense that they believe that the adoption of the frequency approach to probability 
is legitimate in the natural sciences but inappropriate in philosophy (Ramsey) or in the 
moral sciences (Keynes).24 Furthermore, as we showed above, the main implication of 
Ramsey´s critique of the Treatise is Keynes´s acceptance of the notion that probabilities 
are subjective. In turn, we believe the former implies that any normative pretension was 
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abandoned by Keynes thereafter since: (i) the adoption of a subjective epistemological 
probability theory cannot imply fulfilment of `beliefs-rationality´, and (ii) fulfilment of 
means-rationality can only be understood as implying that behaviour is consistent with 
one´s desires and beliefs. Thus, we may characterize the theoretical framework Keynes 
adopted in the aftermath of Truth & Probability as being essentially `positive´.  
 
 Probability 
Theory 
Nature of 
probability 
theory 
Status of 
theory 
Type of 
rationality 
Popper´s 
rationality 
principle 
Keynes´s Treatise on 
Probability (1952[1920]) 
Objective & 
epistemological 
 
Positive & 
normative 
Means-
rationality 
& beliefs-
rationality 
―  
Ramsey´s 
critique of 
Keynes´s 
Treatise 
(1931) 
Philosophy Subjective & epistemological Positive  
Ends-
rationality, 
means-
rationality 
& beliefs-
rationality  
Subjectivist 
version 
Frequency 
theory 
(physics) 
Objective & 
aleatory Positive 
― ― 
Keynes´s 
later 
economic 
writings  
(1936, 
1937) 
Frequency 
theory 
(natural 
sciences) 
Objective & 
aleatory  Positive ― ― 
Conventional 
theory (moral 
sciences) 
Inter-subjective 
& 
epistemological  
Positive 
Ends-
rationality 
& means-
rationality 
Subjectivist 
version  
Table 2. Classification of probability theories in Keynes´s and Ramsey´s work 
 
  
 Similarly, Ramsey´s framework can be interpreted as being a positive approach. 
It is essentially a `logic´ for thinking about human behaviour under the premise that the 
latter is purposeful and consistent with one´s objectives and beliefs. As such, Ramsey´s 
framework implies fulfilment of both `ends-rationality´ and `means-rationality´ but not 
`beliefs-rationality´.25 Unlike in Savage´s (1954) framework, Ramsey does not assume 
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that the individual knows the consequences of adopting each possible course of action. 
Therefore, and unlike Savage´s framework, the absence of `beliefs-rationality´ prevents 
Ramsey´s framework from representing a normative theory. Further, the `logic´ Ramsey 
(1978[1931]) propounds to explain human behaviour and which was reproduced in the 
previous footnote implies that his approach represents an instance of what we defined in 
the previous chapter as RPs in the sense that the theoretician reconstructs P-S as `she 
believes the agent believes it is´. Though we do not wish to dwell on it, the adoption by 
Savage (1954) of Ramsey´s subjective epistemological interpretation of probability was 
coupled to the development of a framework where agents are assumed to know the full 
consequences of adopting each possible course of action or where economic agents 
exhibit `beliefs-rationality´. Therefore, whereas we argued in the previous chapter that 
Savage´s framework is an instance of RPo, we believe instead that Ramsey´s approach is 
an instance of RPs. Finally, last row in Table 2 below refers to the framework Keynes 
adopted in his later economic writings and which will be discussed in detail below. As 
some commentators have recognized, in his later economic writings Keynes adopted an 
approach where economic agents are viewed as falling back on social conventions that 
determine both expectations and confidence formation. Though Keynes does not refer 
explicitly in those writings to probability theory, it has been suggested by Gillies (2000) 
that he adopts an inter-subjectivist interpretation of probability insofar as probability is 
subjective (as in Ramsey´s theoretical framework) and the result of a complex process of 
interaction among the (interdependent) beliefs of a very large number of individuals.  
Finally, we argue in subsequent sections that the notion of rationality Keynes adopted in 
his later economic writings represents an instance of Popper´s RPs.     
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4. Keynes after Ramsey: the nature and role of conventions and the methodology 
of economics 
We showed above that Keynes´s explicit capitulation to Ramsey´s views in My 
Early Beliefs (Keynes, 1973a, pp. 433-51) heralded a new stage in his philosophical 
development. However, Keynes does not provide an explicit philosophical account of his 
views on human nature (Davis, 1994, p. 147). Since economics was the main focus of his 
intellectual activity in the last part of his life it is to economics that one must turn to 
investigate his later views on human nature. In this respect, it is widely recognized that, 
in his later economic writings, Keynes adopted a theory of conventional judgement and 
belief.26 We have argued above that the former exhibits a remarkable similarity with 
Hume´s dictum that human behaviour is ruled by `custom and habit´. Notwithstanding it, 
we will argue below that Keynes´s theory of conventional judgement and belief can be 
adjusted to make it compatible with PTKL. We also address below Keynes´s later ideas 
on both the methodology of economics and the nature of its object of study as they emerge 
from a number of letters addressed to Tinbergen, Kahn and, especially, Harrod in the late 
1930s.   
 
4.1. The nature and role of conventional knowledge 
An extensive discussion of the philosophical foundations of Keynes´s thought is 
in Davis (1994). Along with several other commentators he argues that, in the wake of 
Ramsey´s critique of his approach to probability in the Treatise, Keynes concluded that 
individual judgement required an anchoring in `convention and traditional standards and 
inflexible rules of conduct´ and that the only resource upon which people might draw to 
correct `individual errors in judgement rested in a society´s accumulated conventions, 
standards, and rules´ (op. cit., p. 104). Now, there are some characteristics of a society´s 
conventions, standards and rules referred to in Keynes´s later economic writings upon 
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which Davis (1994, ch. 4) focusses: (i) that they go beyond the simple summaries of past 
experience that the frequency approach to probability makes central to probability, (ii) 
that they possess a normative character above their quality as statistical description, (iii) 
that they possess objectivity as opposed to Ramsey´s subjectivist view of individual 
judgement as `degree of belief´, (iv) that they stem from interdependent judgement or 
mass psychology and, therefore, they presume the existence of a mechanism whereby 
individuals revise their judgements when they come into contact with the judgement of 
others and, finally, (v) that the formation of conventional expectations and confidence is 
a dynamic process. Our discussion below will focus on features (iii) through (v).   
Now, according to Crotty (1994, p. 119), Keynes provides two main reasons for 
people´s observed reliance on conventions, standards and rules. The first reason is that he 
views agents as ‘socially and endogenously-constituted human beings’ whose actual 
behaviour changes with circumstances in a dialectical and interactive way. The second 
reason is that conventions lull our disquietude by enabling us ` to hide from ourselves how 
little we can foresee´. In other words, the presence of radical uncertainty provokes 
disabling anxiety and the adoption of conventions helps mitigating this consciousness. As 
psychologists would put it, we do have a need to reduce our ‘cognitive dissonance’ 
(Festinger, 1957) and, to calm our nerves down, we collectively develop a conventional 
process of expectations and confidence formation. In the terminology of Choi (1993), the 
difficulty of finding an adequate ‘paradigm’ for ourselves encourages us to observe the 
paradigms that other people appear to use.27 However, as Winslow (1989, p. 1180) notes 
‘conventions do not provide a rational foundation for long-run expectations; they are just 
“market place idols”’ which help us substituting temporarily for the absence of 
knowledge. According to Keynes (1936, p. 152), the chief convention is the assumption 
that `the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely, except in so far as we have 
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specific reasons to expect a change´ (Keynes, 1936, p. 152). However, the most detailed 
discussion of conventional judgement and belief is in Keynes´s 1937 Quarterly Journal 
of Economics paper where he delineates the ways in which individuals `save their faces´ 
as rational agents: 28  
          
1. We assume that the present is a much more serviceable guide to the future than a 
candid examination of past experience would show it to have been hitherto. In 
other words, we largely ignore the prospect of future changes about the actual 
character of which we know nothing.  
 
2. We assume that the existing state of opinion as expressed both in prices and the 
character of current output is based on a correct summing up of future prospects, 
so we can accept it as such unless and until something new and relevant comes 
into the picture.  
 
3. Knowing that our own individual judgement is worthless, we endeavour to fall 
back on the judgement of the rest of the world which is perhaps better informed. 
That is, we seek to conform to the behaviour of the majority or the average. The 
psychology of a society made up of individuals each of whom is attempting to 
copy the others leads to what we may term a conventional judgement (Keynes, 
1937, pp. 214-15).      
 
Now, a few comments are in order. First, the assumption that agents believe that 
`the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely, except in so far as they have a 
specific reason to expect a change´ captures, synthetically, bullet points 1 and 2 in the 
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previous quotation. Yet, if we interpret this assumption as a behavioural hypothesis, it 
will only have empirical content if it is supplemented by a further assumption that tells 
us how often people have a specific reason to expect a change. For instance, if we argue 
that agents almost never have a specific reason to expect a change then, to the extent that 
individual behaviour tends to exhibit a stable pattern, the behavioural assumption will 
have high empirical content in the sense of exhibiting a high degree of testability. By 
contrast, if we argue that agents have a specific reason to expect a change very often so 
that individual is unlikely to follow a stable pattern, then the behavioural assumption  has 
low empirical content (i.e., it exhibits a low degree of testability) and, hence, will be of 
little use for modelling purposes. Presumably, Keynes (1937) implicitly assumed that 
economic agents normally do not have a specific reason to expect a change so that, most 
of the time, they tend to assume that the `future will resemble the past´. Be that as it may, 
the frequency with which agents relax this assumption in the light of events that make 
them change their mind and believe that `the future is unlikely to resemble the past´ is an 
empirical issue and, to the best of our knowledge, Keynes does not express his views on 
it.  
Our second comment is related to the `homogeneity of human behaviour through 
time´ implied by bullet points 1 and 2 above. As we will see in the following section, the 
main point of Keynes´s epistolary exchange with both Tinbergen and Harrod is his 
argument that the material of economics is non-homogeneous through time which then 
becomes the core thesis of his attack on the methodological stance adopted by Robbins 
and which Keynes identifies with the `natural science view´ (Keynes, 1973b, pp. 299-
300). The alleged non-homogeneity through time of the material of the social sciences 
stems from the fact that `knowing that our own individual judgement is worthless, we 
tend to fall back on the judgement of the rest of the world´ and that the `psychology of a 
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society made up of individuals each of whom seeks to copy the others´ tends to make 
their judgement change unpredictably over time (Keynes, 1973b, pp. 214-15). In turn, the 
conventional nature of beliefs makes expectations and confidence exhibit instability as in 
a bootstrap equilibrium. That said, a commentator might object that Keynes may have 
incurred in a logical contradiction here. To be sure, if economic agents normally believe 
that `the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely´ this will impart the economy 
with a high degree of stability and, hence, one would expect that the economic material 
exhibits a high (rather than a low) degree of homogeneity through time. However, we will 
argue below that this contradiction is only apparent and can be duly addressed if it can be 
shown that Keynes´s theory is an instance of RPs.                 
      Our third comment is related to our previous argument above that the approach to 
human nature that Keynes adopts in his later economic writings is similar to Hume´s in 
the sense that, despite the absence of an `inductive logic´, Keynes, like Hume does, 
assumes that people tend to believe that the `future will resemble the past´. To be sure, 
bullet points 1 and 2 above capture the idea Keynes assumes that economic agents tend 
to extrapolate the present into the future unless they think they have a specific reason for 
not doing so. However, it is the notion of interdependent beliefs (bullet point 3) that draws 
special attention in Keynes´s later economic thought. As Davis (1994, p. 145) writes, 
`what is relevant here from that discussion [on the role of conventions] is the idea that 
conventions play a role alternative to inductive methods in enabling us to account for how 
the future is based on the past´. Rather, within the context of Keynes´s theory of 
conventional judgement, induction must be viewed as `being relative to the reasoning 
particular individuals exercised in particular historical contexts´ (op. cit., p. 146). 
Keynes´s ideas into the conventional ways in which individual beliefs are formed are 
shown in the passage of the General Theory where he displays his `Beauty Contest´ 
145 
 
metaphor and in which he explains the complex interactive mechanism through which the 
prices of financial assets are determined:      
 
`Professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in 
which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, 
the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the 
average preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, 
not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to 
catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the 
same point of view… It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one´s 
judgement, are really the prettiest, or even those which average opinion genuinely thinks 
the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to 
anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, 
I believe, who practise the fourth, fifth and higher degrees´ (Keynes, 1936, p. 156). 
 
As Davis (1997, p. 209) remarks, `the idea that it is not the prettiest but those most 
likely to be thought the prettiest nicely captures the change in Keynes´s view of 
judgement´.29 Unlike the notion of `rational degree of belief´ he proposes in the Treatise 
on Probability, now the individual no longer intuits the [Platonic] quality of beauty, but 
rather she endeavours to form an interdependent judgement about what others facing the 
same dilemma may choose. In particular, each participant in the `beauty contest´ makes 
use of introspection to consider her own opinion, compares it to an opinion imputed to 
others, makes the necessary adjustments, and finally comes up with a new individual 
judgement that bears the imprint of mass psychology. In other words, according to this 
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view, individual beliefs are constructed within a complex structure of interdependent 
beliefs that works through an inter-subjective learning process whereby each individual 
‘puts herself in the shoes of others’ to discover others´ beliefs.   
 
4.2. The `rationality´ of conventional knowledge 
The notion that individual behaviour tends to conform to the behaviour of the 
majority suggests that the former is based, at least partly, upon the imitation of others.30 
However, `rational´ economic agents will only tend to imitate behaviour they perceive as 
having proved successful in the past when was adopted by others. In turn, the former will 
normally be behaviour grounded on beliefs which have withstood the operation of trial 
and error-elimination processes. Keynes does not explain how some conventions come to 
be replaced by others and, hence, what we say here has to be understood as one possible 
(and certainly not the only one) development of Keynes´s ideas on this issue.31 Be that as 
it may, we believe that this characterization of conventional behaviour under uncertainty 
is compatible and, indeed, complementary with PTKL.32 As we explained in the previous 
chapter, the notion of rationality that stems from PTKL is characterised by corrigibility, 
i.e., the ability to eliminate one´s mistakes. Now, if individual beliefs are formed by 
comparing our beliefs to other people´s beliefs and, especially, to the beliefs of those 
people who appear to have been successful in particular endeavours in the past and, at the 
same time, those beliefs which are thought to have been discredited by the facts are not 
adopted, it turns out that the formation of conventional beliefs will tend to take place in a 
way that is reminiscent of PTKL.33 Indeed, we believe that conventions, standards and 
rules can be viewed as conjectures or tentative hypotheses which emerge spontaneously 
as a response to a specific problem by virtue of a complex interactive process in which a 
large number of people participate. However, unlike the conjectures which are the usual 
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object of PTKL (for instance, in the case of theories of scientific progress), conventions, 
standards and rules exhibit a profound social dimension in the sense that they are the 
outcome of a complex process of interdependent beliefs among a large number of 
individuals.  
This profound social dimension and the fact that only those conjectures which 
agents believe not to have been discredited in the past will be adopted suggests that the 
conjectures which play a key role in Keynesian macro-theory exhibit a peculiar nature. 
For lack of a better name, let us denote them as `hegemonic conjectures´ (HC hereafter). 
Like other conjectures, HC will be preserved as long as economic agents believe that they 
are useful for addressing certain problems ― presumably because they see them as having 
been useful tools for guiding behaviour in the past ― and, as long as they are preserved, 
they will confer stability and predictability to both individual and collective behaviour. In 
other words, we believe that the complex interactive process involving a large number of 
individuals that, arguably, characterises the formation of conventional beliefs in Keynes´s 
theory is compatible with PTKL once the thesis that such interactive process is essentially 
based upon a trial and error-elimination mechanism is accepted. In consequence, we 
think that individual behaviour which broadly accords with HC as suggested above is 
`rational´ provided it exhibits corrigibility. That is to say, according to PTKL, the charge 
of `irrationality´ only applies to those individuals who consciously refuse to eliminate 
their errors. Similarly, in the context of Keynesian theory, the charge of `irrationality´ 
only applies to those individuals who abide themselves by conventions, standards and 
rules which are widely known to have yielded undesirable results in the past.34 
Our argument that Keynes´s theory of conventional beliefs as it appears in his later 
economic writings is, at least a priori, compatible with PTKL is not contradicted by the 
idea expressed by Davis (1997, p. 217) that, according to Keynes, `the conditions 
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associated with states of confidence concern the success or lack of success with which 
individuals come to assess each other´s opinions about markets´. That is, the success or 
lack of it is not related here to the relative past performance of behaviour based on the 
adoption of certain conventions but to the ability of individuals to reciprocally discern 
other people´s opinions. In other words, the idea we presented in the previous paragraph 
is that, if Keynes´s theory of conventional beliefs is to be made compatible with PTKL 
then this implies that people will tend to adopt those beliefs which appear not to have 
been discredited by the facts in the past whereas Davis (op. cit.) suggests that, according 
to Keynes, our confidence in a certain set of beliefs is a positive function of the success 
attained in reciprocally discerning other people´s beliefs. In other words, the degree of 
success would operate here at two different levels: beliefs (including expectations), and 
the confidence with which those beliefs are held on average. In the former case, it is the 
apparent degree of success exhibited by a set of beliefs in the past that will determine 
whether or not those beliefs become `hegemonic´. In the latter case, by contrast, it is the 
success in reciprocally discerning those beliefs, that is, the extent to which we manage to 
apprehend each other´s beliefs, that determines how confident we are about them. Be that 
as it may, we believe that the confidence with which people hold a set of beliefs will also 
depend positively on how widely that set of beliefs comes to be held across individuals. 
In turn, the more widely held a set of beliefs is the more stable expectations will be and, 
hence, it follows that the less widely held a certain set of beliefs is the more potential for 
macroeconomic instability there will be. With this, we believe we have a more 
encompassing theory of conventional judgement and belief with an evolutionary 
dimension and a capacity for enhancing and extending Keynes´s macro-theory. On the 
one hand, the notion that the likelihood that a set of beliefs comes to be widely adopted 
by economic agents depends positively upon the extent to which they are seen as not 
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having been discredited by the facts in the past provides Keynes´s macro-theory with an 
evolutionary theory of conventional belief anchored in PTKL. On the other hand, the 
notion that the (average) level of confidence with which a set of beliefs is held depends 
positively on the ability of economic agents to reciprocally discern each other´s beliefs 
and how widely those beliefs happen to be held provides Keynes´s macro-theory with an 
explanation for changes in the (average) level of confidence.35 
 
4.3. Business cycles and the expansion of conventional knowledge over time 
From our previous discussion it logically follows that HC may not be preserved 
indefinitely.36 A HC will be replaced by another one whenever people believe that it no 
longer yields good results if adopted or when a sufficiently large amount of experience 
has accumulated which suggests that it is inadequate in the sense of apparently leading to 
undesirable results. If the convention to be replaced happens to be a convention upon 
which the evaluation of the long-term profit expectations of investors was based, then a 
period of crisis may ensue as investors increase substantially their relative demand for 
liquid assets (i.e., liquidity preference increases) in the aftermath of higher uncertainty 
about the future. In turn, an increase in the degree of liquidity preference will lead to a 
decrease in both the level of aggregate demand and economic activity. In the context of 
Keynes´s macro-theory, an increase in the degree of liquidity preference is concomitant 
to a decrease in the marginal efficiency of investment. The demand for investment will 
decrease as both the marginal efficiency of investment decreases and the term premium 
embedded in financial assets and bank loan rates increases. The decrease in aggregate 
investment will initially lead to a decrease in aggregate output and income and this, in 
turn, will cause a further decrease in aggregate spending as aggregate consumption goes 
down due to the initial fall in aggregate disposable income. This way, the breakdown of 
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a critical convention in the evaluation of long-term profits brings about a downturn in the 
economy. Finally, the turbulent period will come to an end when the old convention is 
replaced by a new one.37    
 
4.4. The debate on the nature of economics and its object of study 
 A detailed discussion of Keynes´s involvement in several controversies related to 
the role of induction and statistical methods in economics is in Bateman (1990). The 
importance of this controversy goes beyond the role of statistical methods in economics 
insofar as it highlights the ideas that Keynes held on economic methodology over the 
latest part of his life. Of particular interest to us is the exchange that Keynes had with 
Tinbergen in the late 1930s because it took place when Keynes had already rejected most 
of the ideas he advocated in the Treatise and soon after he published the General Theory 
and his famous 1937 QJE paper. Keynes wrote a number of letters addressed to 
Tinbergen, Harrod, and Kahn where he expounds his ideas unambiguously. To this, we 
may add that the controversy is of high interest from the point of view of the history of 
economic thought since Keynes´s critique of Jan Tinbergen´s work represented the first 
systematic assessment of the multiple regression analysis the latter pioneered and which 
has had such a far-reaching impact on the ulterior development of economics.38  
 
4.4.1. The non-homogeneity through time of economic data 
It is not our purpose to reproduce in detail the terms of the exchange but only to 
summarize its main implications for Keynes´s views on methodology. As Bateman (op. 
cit.) notes, in the Tinbergen controversy Keynes argued that there is no a priori reason to 
expect that the economic data used in statistical analysis is stable in the long run and, 
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hence, that there is no reason for us to expect to infer stable correlations. This idea is 
expressed in the first letter Keynes addressed to the official of the League of Nations who 
had asked him to review Tinbergen´s work in August 1938: 
 
 `There is first of all the central question of methodology, ―the logic of applying 
the method of multiple correlation to unanalysed economic material, which we know to 
be non-homogeneous over time. If we were dealing with the action of numerically 
measurable, independent forces, adequately analysed so that we knew we were dealing 
with independent atomic factors and between them completely comprehensive, acting 
with fluctuating relative strength on material constant and homogeneous through time, 
we might be able to use the method of multiple correlation with some confidence… In 
fact, we know that every one of these conditions is far from being satisfied by the 
economic material under investigation´ (Keynes, 1973b, pp. 285-86).    
 
 Further down in the same missive, Keynes adds:  
 
 `Is it assumed that the future is a determinate function of past statistics? What 
place is left for expectation and the state of confidence relating to the future?... What 
place is allowed for non-numerical factors, such as inventions, politics, labour troubles, 
wars, earthquakes, financial crisis? One feels a suspicion that the choice of factors is 
influenced (as is indeed only natural) by what statistics are available, and that many vital 
factors are ignored because they are statistically intractable or unprocurable´ (op. cit., p. 
287, emphasis added).  
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  Therefore, it seems that for Keynes, the alleged non-homogeneity of economic 
material through time stems from the fact that the latter can be affected by a potentially 
large array of non-economic factors which are not taken account of in statistical data. 
However, as we show below, Keynes also suggests in another letter addressed to Harrod 
in 1938 (Keynes, 1973b, p. 300) that such non-homogeneity of economic material over 
time stems from the fact that individual behaviour is based upon conventional beliefs 
which, by their nature, may change through time. In any case, Tinbergen´s answer was 
that it can be assumed that non-economic factors affect economic variables in a non-
systematic fashion (i.e., they cancel each other out in the long run) so that their effect on 
the latter can be duly taken account of in the stochastic term of the statistical model. In 
any case, as Bateman (1990) notes, Keynes´s argument was not that the entire project of 
Tinbergen should be abandoned but that it needed to adopt a more inductive basis. In 
particular, as he explained twenty years before in Chapter 33 of the Treatise, he argued 
that, in order to carry out statistical inductions, we must previously examine series of 
series of economic data in order to determine whether the distributions of the variables 
are stable in as many circumstances as possible.39 Be that as it may, Bateman (op. cit., p. 
378) concludes that Keynes was not opposed to Tinbergen´s econometric work but only 
to attempts at statistical inference that were not preceded by a previous analysis aimed at 
ascertaining the suitability or otherwise of the data for making such inferences. 
4.4.2. Keynes´s view of the nature of economics and its methodology 
 Next, after having shown above why Keynes thought that the economic material 
is not homogenous through time we turn to discussing his views on the methodology of 
economics. According to us, there are three main ideas that emerge from the two letters 
that Keynes addressed to Harrod in 1938 (Keynes, 1973b, pp. 295-300).40 The first idea 
is his claim that `economics is a science of thinking in terms of models joined to the “art 
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of choosing models” which are relevant to the contemporary world´. The second idea is 
his claim that the objective of economics is not so much to `predict´ but to explain. The 
last idea is his notion of economics as a `moral science´ (in opposition to the `natural 
science view´ that Keynes attributes to Lionel Robbins) which deals with introspection, 
motives, expectations, and psychological uncertainties. We will argue below that these 
three ideas highlight that Keynes´s view of economic models exhibits some similarities 
with Popper´s.  
 Firstly, we noted in the previous chapter that, building upon Hayek´s distinction 
between `explanation in principle´ and `explanation in detail´ (Hayek, 1967b), Popper 
(1994, p. 163) distinguishes between the problems of explaining or predicting singular 
events and the problems of explaining or predicting a kind or type of event.41 According 
to him, the former can be solved without constructing a model ― only certain universal 
laws and the relevant initial conditions are needed ― whereas the latter is most easily 
solved by constructing a model (op. cit., p. 164). That is, Popper shares with Keynes the 
view that models are, arguably, the most important instrument for analysis in the social 
sciences, including economics. Furthermore, he argues that in the context of the social 
sciences models consists of `certain elements placed in a typical relationship to each 
other, plus certain universal laws of interaction — the "animating" laws´ (Popper, 1994, 
p. 165). It is at this point where there is a difference between Keynes and Popper in their 
respective views of models in that Popper is more specific than Keynes is as to what a 
model must contain: (i) certain elements of the P-S placed in a typical relationship to each 
other, and (ii) the `rationality principle´. By contrast, Keynes does not allude to an 
`animating law´ and says that `the object of a model is to segregate the semi-permanent 
or relatively constant factors from those which are transitory´. Yet, we will argue below 
that the `rationality principle´ is implicit in Keynes´s macro-theory.  
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Secondly, we have shown above that Popper argues that models seek to capture 
the typical aspects of a P-S with a view to making statements about a type of event and, 
consequently, that they represent something akin to typical initial conditions (op. cit., p. 
164). He then adds that a statement about a typical event can be either an explanation of 
why that typical event occurred in the past, or a prediction. However, further down he 
makes it clear that `the fundamental problem of both the theoretical and the historical 
social sciences is to explain and understand events in terms of human actions and 
[typical] social situations´ (Popper, op. cit., p. 166). The latter leads Notturno (1998, p. 
412, emphasis added) to argue that the `problem of situational analysis in the theoretical 
and historical social sciences, in Popper´s view, is not to construct models that predict or 
prophesize the future; it is to construct models that help us explain and understand the 
past´. Now, we think we need to distinguish at this stage between `predictions´ and 
`forecasts´. As Beinhocker (2013) notes, in the theoretical social sciences, a `prediction´ 
(as opposed to a `forecast´) amounts to deriving the deductive logical consequences of a 
theory. When Popper makes a distinction between problems of explaining or predicting 
singular events from problems of explaining or predicting a type of event, we think he 
really means that forecasting, as opposed to deriving the deductive logical consequences 
of a theory, is not generally possible in the social sciences.42 More specifically, the main 
problem of using models in the social sciences for forecasting purposes stems from the 
fact that they use typical initial conditions. Accordingly, we believe that Popper makes 
use of the term `prediction´ in the quotation above to refer to a legitimate objective of 
both the natural and the social sciences but his next comment further down in the same 
essay suggests he should have distinguished between `prediction´ in the natural sciences 
which amounts to `forecasting´ and `prediction´ in the social sciences which consists of 
the derivation of the deductive logical consequences of a theory. If our interpretation is 
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correct, then Popper´s position is rather similar to the position Keynes advocates when he 
makes it clear that `the object of statistical study is not so much to fill in missing variables 
with a view to prediction, as to test the relevance and validity of the model´ (Keynes, 
1973b, pp. 295-6).  
The third and last idea we identified above is Keynes´s notion of economics as a 
`moral science´ in contrast to the `natural science´ view that Keynes seems to attribute to 
Robbins. Firstly, Keynes argues that `the pseudo-analogy with the physical sciences leads 
directly counter to the habit of mind which is most important for an economist proper to 
acquire´ (Keynes, 1973b, p. 299, emphasis added). Next, he emphasizes that economics 
is a moral science´ and makes it clear that it deals with introspection, values, motives, 
expectations and psychological uncertainties (op. cit., p. 300). He then closes the 
paragraph with a metaphor whereby he explains why the material of economics is not 
homogeneous through time:   
 
 `One has to be constantly on guard against treating the material as constant and 
homogeneous. It is as though the fall of the apple to the ground depended on the apple´s 
motives, on whether it is worth while falling to the ground, and whether the ground 
wanted the apple to fall, and on mistaken calculations on the part of the apple as to how 
far it was from the centre of the earth´ (Keynes, 1973b, p. 300). 
 
That is, he seems to argue that the non-homogeneity through time of the material 
of economics stems mainly from the fact that, being a `moral´ science, economics deals 
with the motives, expectations and psychological uncertainties of economic agents, all of 
which are subjective and, crucially, liable to experience unpredictable changes.43 By 
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contrast, and building upon Hayek (1942, 1943), we argued in the previous chapter that 
the `natural´ sciences deal with objective facts in the sense that their nature is (largely) 
independent of the viewpoint of the observer and which, by their nature, are unlikely to 
undergo unpredictable changes. Now, we believe that the quotations reproduced above 
suggest that the `habit of mind´ that Keynes thinks is important for economists (and we 
add social scientists) to acquire is precisely the methodological position we associated in 
the previous chapter with RPs, i.e., with the view that the social scientist should try to 
reconstruct P-S not as she believes it is (objectively) but, instead, as she believes that 
agents believe it is.  
 
5. Keynes´s views on economics and the `rationality principle´ 
The main purpose of this section is to argue that Keynes´s view of economics as 
a ` moral´ science and the ` natural science view´ he associates with Robbins (1932) exhibit 
an analogy with the `subjectivist´ and `objectivist´ version of RP respectively More 
specifically, we will argue below that Keynes´s macro-theory can be interpreted as an 
instance of RPs. We will also argue that Keynes´s attempt to distinguish his view of 
economics as a `moral´ science by emphasizing the role introspection plays in the former 
is misleading. In this respect, Robbins is known for his defence of the key role 
introspection plays in allowing us to grasp the premises upon which economic theory is 
grounded.44 In other words, we think that introspection also plays a role in neoclassical 
economics and that the difference between Keynes´s view of economics as a `moral´ 
science and his view of neoclassical theory as an approach that employs a methodology 
that resembles the `natural´ sciences has to be ascribed to other characteristics of these 
approaches. In particular, we will argue below that the key difference between these two 
approaches lies in their respective adoption of different versions of RP.   
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5.1. The role of introspection in neoclassical economics 
If we identify the approach Keynes associates with Robbins with neoclassical 
economics then, it is clear that, as Robbins (1932) argues, the role of introspection is to 
grasp the basic human dispositions upon which the theoretician must build her models. 
For instance, in terms of the framework presented in the previous chapter, introspection 
is the source of the notion that individual behaviour exhibits both `ends-rationality´ and 
`means-rationality´. In the case of `ends-rationality´, we noted above that, following von 
Mises (1944), human behaviour is purposeful or oriented towards the achievement of 
certain aims. Likewise, in the case of the notion of `means-rationality´, we defined it as 
the idea that individual behaviour is consistent for a given set of beliefs and objectives. 
We made it clear that fulfilment of ends- and means-rationality is common to models that 
adopt either RPo or RPs in that, in both cases, the behaviour of agents is assumed to be 
purposeful and adequate to the P-S. Yet, we also argued that a common feature of all the 
theoretical models that adopt RPo is that the theoretician `imposes´ her view of P-S upon 
the agents. This means that, in addition to fulfilment of both `ends-rationality´ and 
`means-rationality´, economic agents are also assumed to exhibit `beliefs-rationality´. In 
other words, agents are assumed to exhibit ` substantive´ rationality (Simon, 1976). As we 
explained, the modern neoclassical version of this approach to rationality is captured in 
Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) theory (Savage, 1954), which entails that agents know 
the consequences of all possible courses of action under every `state of the world´ so that 
the only source of uncertainty is the (subjective) probability that agents attach to the latter. 
However, and unlike the notions of `ends-rationality´ and `means-rationality´, we believe 
that the assumption of `beliefs-rationality´ does not stem from introspection. Rather, the 
latter is an ` artefact´ of the theoretician aimed at closing her model in a way that testable 
predictions can be generated. That is, by assuming that economic agents exhibit 
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`substantive´ rationality, the theoretician can `close´ her theoretical model in a way that 
clear testable predictions can be derived.45 But, crucially, in order to do so, the 
theoretician has to ignore the fact that we can never be sure that our knowledge is `true´, 
i.e., that there is not an `inductive logic´. As we argue below, Keynesian theoreticians do 
not assume there is an ` inductive logic´ and, for this reason, they do not assume that agents 
exhibit `beliefs-rationality´. We will also argue that, in order to circumvent this barrier 
they resort to a particular type of introspection; they `put themselves in the shoes of 
economic agents´ so that they can get an idea of how they make decisions in the face of 
uncertainty.  
 
5.2. Keynesian uncertainty and the `logic of induction´  
We have argued that the adoption of the assumption of `beliefs-rationality´ in 
neoclassical economics logically implies that the theoretician assumes that there is an 
`inductive logic´, i.e., she believes that she can obtain `true´ knowledge by extrapolating 
the information of the past into the future.46 `True´ knowledge in this context means that 
every economic agent is (i) assumed to possess an exhaustive list of possible `states of 
the world´, and (ii) can attach numerical probabilities to each of them. But, surely, such 
alleged `true´ knowledge can only come from the past. Where else could it come from? 
By contrast, Hume (2006[1748]) showed long time ago that such an ` inductive logic´ does 
not exist. Thus, in neoclassical models ― or the models that Keynes associates to the 
`natural´ science view ― the theoretician reconstructs P-S `as if´ agents believed that an 
`inductive logic´ exists.   
We have noted that the assumptions of `ends-rationality´ and `means-rationality´ 
are shared by models that adopt RPo and RPs and, consequently, that all such models 
make use of introspection. The difference between neoclassical and Keynesian models 
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must thus lie elsewhere. Unlike neoclassical theoreticians, Keynesian theoreticians do not 
assume that agents exhibit `beliefs-rationality´. Rather, they assume that agents have to 
make decisions in a context of `uncertainty´ in the sense of both Keynes (1920) and 
Knight (1971[1921]).47 That is, as opposed to SEU theory, in Keynes´s macro-theory 
economic agents do not possess an exhaustive list of possible `states of the world´, do not 
know the full consequences of adopting different courses of action under different 
circumstances and cannot attach numerical probabilities to all the possible `states of the 
world´. The reason for the existence of `uncertainty´ is usually associated to Keynes´s 
assumption that `economic data is not homogenous through time´ or, in more technical 
terms, to the non-ergodic nature of the world.48 The latter implies that the `future will not 
resemble the past´ and, hence, the impossibility of knowing the full consequences of 
adopting different courses of actions under different `states of the world´. However, we 
believe that the ultimate cause of the existence of genuine uncertainty in the economy is 
not so much the absence of homogeneity through time of economic data but the absence 
of an `inductive logic´. In other words, `uncertainty´ is ultimately implied by Popper´s 
claim that all knowledge is conjectural and, hence, provisional. Even if we observe that 
economic data is homogeneous through a long period of time we cannot claim that the 
former will continue to be homogeneous in the future. In the absence of an `inductive 
logic´ we can never claim that `the future will resemble the past´. Such claims can only 
be conjectural. However, this may also be applied to the opposite claim, that is, to the 
claim that economic data is not homogeneous through time. To be sure, if Keynes´s claim 
that economic data is not homogeneous through were `true´ the former would be a 
powerful reason for making us be uncertain about the future. Yet, the former is only a 
conjecture that may eventually turn out to be false. That is, it is a conjecture. Thus, there 
is a deeper reason for being uncertain about the future than the possibility that the world 
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is not ergodic; we cannot guarantee that the `future will resemble the past´. In short, 
according to us, the primary source of genuine uncertainty in a market economy is not the 
alleged non-homogeneity through time of economic data but the fact that, due to the lack 
of an `inductive logic´, we cannot guarantee that the `future will resemble the past´.    
 
5.3. Mainstream criticisms of Keynesian macro-theory  
By assuming that the `future will not resemble the past´ Keynesian theoreticians 
have been exposed to the criticism that, since economic agents cannot confidently use the 
information obtained from the past to prophesize the future, their beliefs cannot be fully 
specified in their models (i.e., the theoretician cannot assume that economic agents exhibit 
`beliefs-rationality´) and, hence, no forecasts can be derived because economic agents´ 
decisions will depend on `exogenous´ and, hence, unpredictable changes in their beliefs. 
In particular, Keynesian macro-theory has often been denoted as `nihilistic´ by some 
neoclassical economists (Coddington, 1982) allegedly because, by assuming that the 
`future will not resemble the past´, Keynesian macro-models are unable to generate 
testable predictions. However, we believe the accusation of `nihilism´ is unjustified. As 
we explained above, the implicit adoption by neoclassical economists of a modelling 
approach based on RPo and the construction of models based upon the assumption that 
economic agents exhibit `substantive´ rationality allows them to generate neat testable 
predictions.49 Yet, we argued in the previous chapter that the adoption of RPo implies 
that the theoretician `imposes´ upon the agents her view of P-S. More specifically, and 
given the absence of an `inductive logic´, we argued that the assumption that economic 
agents exhibit `beliefs-rationality´ entails the `imposition´ of the theoretician´s view of P-
S upon them.    
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Next, Keynesian theoreticians do adopt RPs instead of RPs. As we argued in the 
previous chapter the adoption of RPs implies that the theoretician seeks to reconstruct P-
S as `she believes that economic agents believe it is´. We have also argued above that 
Keynesian theoreticians believe that the `future will not resemble the past´. Rather, they 
believe that economic agents tend to believe the opposite. More specifically, Keynesian 
theoreticians observe that, in spite of the fact that the `future will not resemble the past´, 
this does not prevent economic agents from actually making decisions. According to 
them, economic agents make decisions because, most of the time, they `ignore´ that the 
`future will not resemble the past´. Furthermore, they `ignore´ it for good reasons; if they 
didn´t, they would be paralysed! At this stage, Keynesian theoreticians are `forced´ to 
rely on introspection in order to adopt agents´ viewpoint, i.e., they adopt RPs. That is, 
instead of `imposing´ upon agents their view of P-S ― which as we argued above is the 
strategy implicitly adopted by neoclassical economists ― they `put herself in the shoes 
of economic agents´ in order to understand how they make (often good) decisions in spite 
of the genuine uncertainty they face. For lack of a better name let us denote this type of 
introspection as empathic introspection.   
We may add to this that, although the adoption by Keynesian theoreticians of the 
viewpoint of agents stems from their need to understand how the latter make decisions in 
spite of finding themselves in a situation of genuine uncertainty there is an even more 
fundamental reason for doing so. As we remarked in the previous chapter, Hayek (1942, 
1943a) claims there are no objective `facts´ in the social sciences because, in the latter, 
`things are what people believe they are´.50 However, if `things are what people believe 
they are´, it seems to us that the natural strategy for the theoretician is to `put herself in 
the shoes of agents´. It was for this reason that we argued in the previous chapter that the 
adoption of RPs is the natural approach in the social sciences. To this, let us add that 
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Hayek (1943a) insists that the theoretician does not possess herself any information that 
is not possessed by the agents themselves. Therefore, the adoption of RPs rather than RPo 
in the social sciences can be advocated not only on the grounds that, owing to the lack of 
an `inductive logic´, the theoretician needs to rely on `empathic´ introspection to acquire 
knowledge about how economic agents make decisions in a context of genuine 
uncertainty. The adoption of RPs instead of RPo can also be defended on the grounds 
that: (i) the P-S that agents face is `as they see it´ rather than as the theoretician sees it, 
and (ii) the theoretician does not possess any information that is not possessed by the 
agents.   
Next, the assumption Keynes (1936, p.152) makes according to which economic 
agents believe `the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely, except in so far as 
they have specific reasons to expect a change´ does not prevent him, however, from 
generating testable predictions. We thus believe that the charge of nihilism thrown upon 
Keynesian macro-theory by neoclassical economists is unwarranted. Some examples of 
testable predictions that stem from Keynesian macro-theory are the following: (i) the 
inability of money wage cuts to eliminate involuntary unemployment and their potential 
destabilizing effects, (ii) the ineffectiveness of monetary policy during recessions, and 
(iii) the existence of involuntary unemployment due to too high real (long-term) interest 
rates rather than to `too high´ real wages. These predictions have to be understood as the 
`logical implications´ of the theory which stem from the premise that economic agents´ 
long-term expectations and confidence are formed conventionally and, hence, they are 
given in the short term. As Crotty (1994) argues, it is the stability and predictability that 
social conventions confer to individual and collective economic behaviour that provides 
the behavioural foundations for Keynesian macro-modelling. Specifically, the adoption 
of social conventions by agents helps generate orderly and stable patterns of economic 
163 
 
behaviour across individuals thus opening up the possibility of doing macroeconomic 
analysis. He denotes the stability generated by decision-making under uncertainty based 
on conventional behaviour as `conditional´ stability and defines it as a situation where 
behavioural equations are stable under conditions that hold most of the time but which, 
at the same time, as in the celebrated Minsky´s (1982) `financial instability hypothesis´, 
creates the conditions for occasional bouts of macroeconomic instability.  
Lastly, the accusation by some mainstream economists that Keynesian macro-
models are made up of economic agents who behave `irrationally´ is also, according to 
us, a direct consequence of the fact that, unlike in neoclassical economics, in Keynesian 
macro-theory economic agents are no assumed to exhibit `substantive´ rationality. In 
other words, Keynesian economic agents are not optimizers and, from the standpoint of 
neoclassical theory, this is tantamount to `irrationality´ (Becker, 1962). However, we 
believe the association of `rational´ behaviour with optimizing behaviour is arbitrary. To 
be sure, this notion of rationality does not stem from philosophy of science but from a 
concrete tradition in the history of economic thought: neoclassical economics. As we have 
argued above, such notion of rationality presupposes that there is an `inductive logic´ 
theoreticians can take advantage of. In particular, if the existence of an `inductive logic´ 
is assumed, the theoretician can assume that she can acquire `true´ knowledge about P-S 
which, when combined with the knowledge she can obtain via introspection about the 
basic premises of human behaviour, allows her to construct models where she `imposes´ 
upon the agents her alleged `true´ view of P-S. However, if the existence of an `inductive 
logic´ is denied, such `true´ view of P-S becomes unattainable. We have argued above 
that Keynesian theory does not presume the existence of an `inductive logic´. In 
particular, we argued that Keynesian theoreticians believe that the `future will not 
resemble the past´ yet they realize that economic agents make decisions in spite of it. It 
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is for this very reason that Keynesian theoreticians adopt RPs, that is, they resort to 
`empathic´ introspection in order to understand how agents behave. Their main result is 
that economic agents fall back on social conventions to make decisions. But, crucially, 
reliance by economic agents on conventional knowledge in the absence of an `inductive 
logic´ does by no means imply that their behaviour is `irrational´. Rather, in the absence 
of an `inductive logic´ such behaviour is `rational´ insofar as the former is coherent with 
economic agents´ belief in the presence of a high degree of stability and predictability in 
economic affairs. We conclude that the charge of `irrational´ behaviour by economic 
agents in Keynesian macro-models made by some neoclassical economists is arbitrary 
and, hence, unwarranted.  
 
5.4. Keynesian macro-theory in the light of Popper´s Rationality Principle  
The modelling technique adopted by Keynesian theoreticians which we denoted 
above as `empathic´ introspection constitutes a heuristic device the theoretician relies on 
to gain understanding of what is a very complex process.51 Thus, in Keynesian macro-
theory the role of introspection is two-sided: (i) to gain insight into the motivations of 
individual behaviour in the fashion of neoclassical economists by taking advantage, as 
Hayek (1943b) would put it, of the existence of an analogy between the mind of the 
theoretician and the mind of the other human beings, and (ii) to `put oneself in the shoes 
of others´ to understand how economic agents behave in different circumstances, i.e., to 
adopt their viewpoint. Now, according to Keynesian macro-theory, there are two main 
typical situations economic agents may `believe´ to find themselves in:  
 
1. Situations characterised by the absence of a significant discrepancy between 
expectations and realised outcomes which makes economic agents `believe´ 
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that the past is a good enough guide to the future. In such situations, economic 
agents will tend, perhaps unconsciously, to extrapolate the past into the future. 
Confidence will be high and liquidity preference low. These are the so-called 
`tranquillity´ periods.  
 
2. Situations characterised by the presence of a significant discrepancy between 
expectations and realised outcomes which makes economic agents `believe´ 
that the past is not a valid guide to the future. The former will typically lead to 
the breakdown of previously-held conventions as well as to the search for new 
conventions upon which to ground decision-making. Confidence will be low 
and liquidity preference high. These are the so-called `turbulence´ periods.  
 
As we noted above, `tranquillity´ periods provide the foundations for Keynesian 
macro-modelling. In particular, and following Crotty (1994), we denoted the stability that 
results from decision-making under uncertainty based on conventional behaviour as 
`conditional´ stability. In turn, we have pointed out that `conditional´ stability refers to a 
situation where behavioural equations are stable under conditions that hold most of the 
time but which may unpredictably `break down´ in the aftermath of the occurrence of 
occasional bouts of macroeconomic instability. Consequently, Keynesian macro-theory 
recognizes the inherent instability of decentralized market economies and, hence, the 
inability of macroeconomic models to become a tool for macroeconomic forecasting. The 
purpose of theory is not, according to Keynesian theory, to generate quantitative forecasts 
but to generate `predictions´ or logical implications of the theory which help us 
understand how market economies work and which can, in turn, serve as a basis for policy 
analysis.   
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Next, there are several elements of Keynes´s macro-theory which, according to 
us, lend support to our claim that it constitutes an instance of RPs. First, and foremost, 
there is his `Beauty Contest´ metaphor (Keynes, 1936, p. 156). The standard theory in 
economics for the formation of financial asset prices is that the latter represent the 
discounted stream of the future expected capital income they will generate for asset 
holders. But this is how the theorist believes financial asset prices are `objectively´ set. 
By contrast, as we have noted above, Keynes argues that the prices of financial assets are 
determined largely by the speculative behaviour of financial market participants. In 
particular, he claims that the decision of market participants to either sell or purchase a 
financial asset depends on: (i) her perception as to whether there is a `bull´ or a `bear´ 
market (i.e., whether she expects asset prices to rise or fall in the near future) and, (ii) 
particularly, her beliefs about how the other market participants think that asset prices are 
likely to behave in the near future as well as her beliefs about how other market 
participants believe that other market participants, in turn, expect asset prices to behave. 
To summarize, Keynes´s theory of financial asset prices is built upon the notion that the 
latter are set by a complex interactive process characterised by the interdependency of 
conventional beliefs among a very large number of financial market participants. But, in 
our view, this insight stems from the fact that Keynes adopts the point of view of market 
participants to understand how they behave or, put another way, he `puts himself in the 
shoes of financial market participants´.52 Yet, `putting himself in the shoes of economic 
agents´ is, according to us, what the macroeconomist does if he adopts RPs. 
According to us, there are other instances of the theoretician `putting herself in the 
shoes of the agents´ in Keynes´s theory. Firstly, there are the so-called `fundamental 
psychological laws´ to which he alludes in his General Theory: (i) the psychological 
propensity to consume,53 (ii) the psychological attitude to liquidity preference, and (iii) 
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the psychological expectation of future yield from productive capital-assets. The first law 
corresponds to households, the second one corresponds to speculators, and the third one 
corresponds to entrepreneurs. In all three cases, the behaviour of economic agents towards 
consumption, liquidity and long-term investment is a `rational´ response to the 
uncertainty they face. However, it is in the last two psychological laws that the adoption 
by the theoretician of the viewpoint of economic agents is clear. To be sure, economic 
agents´ liquidity preference and long-term profit expectations are closely related to their 
`confidence´ where the latter is a subjective measure of the `degree of completeness´ of 
the factual evidence on which their (uncertain) beliefs are based.54 Specifically, the lower 
agents´ confidence is, the lower their demand for investment and the higher their liquidity 
preference will be. Furthermore, such behaviour is `rational´ in the presence of 
uncertainty.55 To be sure, the notion that a fall in the (subjective) `state of confidence´ of 
economic agents is coupled to an increase in liquidity preference and a decrease in 
investment demand reflects the (implicit) decision of the theoretician to adopt agents´ 
viewpoint. Secondly, there is Keynes´s argument for the downward rigidity of money 
wages which he ascribes to the fact that workers care, mostly, about relative (money) 
wages so that they will not oppose an across-the-board decrease in real wages brought 
about by a rise in the general price level yet they will ferociously oppose attempts to cut 
their money wages down since the latter will presumably occur in a piecemeal fashion, 
i.e., money wage cuts will not take place at the same time but will occur sequentially. 
Lastly, Keynes´s important distinction between short-term and long-term expectations is, 
arguably, another instance of what we have denoted as `empathic´ introspection. In this 
case, Keynes associates short-term expectations with the level of demand for their 
products that entrepreneurs expect to face in the short-term, where the latter denotes the 
time span necessary to complete the production process. As some scholars have noted, it 
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appears that Keynes implicitly accepted that entrepreneurs rely on simple extrapolative 
methods to estimate the demand for their output in the short run and that, consequently, 
the short-run production decisions of business firms are, in his macro-model, assumed to 
be endogenously-determined.56 By contrast, he argues that long-term expectations 
depend on a large array of factors and, hence, he treats them as an `exogenous´ variable. 
Be that as it may, the key point is that Keynes´s distinction between short- and long-term 
expectations reflects his adopting the viewpoint of entrepreneurs when having to make 
production and investment decisions respectively.         
 
6. Summary and conclusions   
We showed in the previous chapter that Hume was sceptical about the rationality 
of human behaviour because he believed that the latter was grounded upon `custom and 
habit´, that is, on the assumption that the `future will resemble the past´ in spite of the 
inexistence of an `inductive logic´. This paradoxical situation was denoted by Hume as 
the `problem of induction´. We showed the `solution´ proposed by Popper to the latter 
which we denoted as Popper´s evolutionary theory of knowledge and learning (PTKL). 
Nevertheless, there is a prior-to-Popper attempt to `solve´ the `problem of induction´: 
Keynes´s (failed) attempt to provide an objective epistemological theory of probability in 
his Treatise on Probability. Keynes´s aim was not only to answer Hume but also to 
answer Cambridge philosopher Moore (1993[1903]) who had argued that the highest 
expected `good´ would result if individual behaviour consists of following rules insofar 
as the latter represent the accumulated knowledge in a society. Keynes´s proposal to solve 
the `problem of induction´ consists of replacing the notion of `certain´ knowledge, which 
Hume showed to be unattainable, by the notion of `probabilistic´ knowledge. Now, his 
argument was that, though we cannot attain the former, we can nevertheless attain the 
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latter. Keynes´s main innovation in the Treatise was the notion of `logical probability 
relations´. As Andrews (1999) has argued, the latter resemble Platonic Universals in the 
sense that they exist in a `logical space´, are independent of individual opinions, and can 
only be discovered via intuition. Yet, the existence of `logical probability relations´ was 
successfully criticized by Ramsey (1978[1931]) and Keynes capitulated to Ramsey´s 
critique in 1938 (Keynes, 1973a, p. 445) so that by the second half of the 1930s Keynes 
abandoned most of the ideas he had advocated in the Treatise and adopted a pragmatic 
approach to human behaviour which is remarkably similar to Hume´s views. In other 
words, he implicitly admitted the impossibility of providing a solution to the `problem of 
induction´. We showed that, in the same essay where he criticizes Keynes´s Treatise, 
Ramsey (op. cit.) sketches a theoretical framework which is believed to have served as a 
benchmark for Savage´s (1954) Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) theory. However, we 
argued that, whereas Savage´s framework adopts the ` objectivist´ version of Popper´s RP, 
Ramsey adopts the `subjectivist´ version instead. Nevertheless, it does not seem that the 
framework sketched in Ramsey (op. cit.) inspired in any significant way Keynes´s later 
economic writings even though it is clear he read Ramsey´s essay and accepted his 
criticism of the Treatise.   
Next, the view Keynes adopts in his later economic writings appears to consist of 
the notion that we make decisions by using inductive procedures which essentially 
amount to adopting the social rules and conventions which are widely believed to have 
yielded good results in the past. The rules and conventions Keynes identifies in his later 
economic writings are, for our purposes, equivalent to Hume´s old idea that individual 
behaviour is grounded upon `custom and habit´. In particular, the chief convention of all, 
according to Keynes (1937), is the assumption that `the existing state of affairs will 
continue indefinitely, except in so far as we have specific reasons to expect a change´ 
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(Keynes, 1936, p. 152). We have argued that this assumption plays an essential role in 
Keynesian macro-theory in that it enables the theoretician to construct models in which: 
(i) economic agents behave in a `rational´ way in a context of genuine uncertainty, and 
(ii) testable predictions can a priori be generated.  
The main purpose of this essay was to show that Keynesian macro-theory can be 
provided with strong epistemological foundations. In particular, we have argued that the 
former is essentially compatible with PTKL. Furthermore, we have also argued that the 
methodology underlying Keynes´s macro-theory can be interpreted as an instance of the 
`subjectivist´ version of Popper´s `Rationality Principle´ (RPs). As to the former case, we 
tried to show that the formation of both conventional expectations and confidence in 
Keynes´s macro-theory can be viewed as the ultimate result of a complex social process 
characterized by trial and error-elimination of beliefs based on conventional knowledge 
where those conventions that are believed by economic agents to lead to the making of 
wrong decisions tend to be replaced by new conventions that emerge spontaneously. In 
this respect, we coined the term `hegemonic conjectures´ to denote those conventions that 
are used by economic agents because they believe them to represent a valid guide for 
decision-making. The term `hegemonic conjectures´ captures two different ideas: (i) that 
the rules and conventions economic agents rely on resemble tentative hypotheses or 
conjectures in the sense that they are provisional and, hence, do not represent a claim to 
be `true´ knowledge and, (ii) that they become `hegemonic´ or widely used by economic 
agents through a complex social process. To the extent that the process whereby these 
social conventions emerge and die out is based on trial and error-elimination, we argued 
that the growth of conventional knowledge over time in Keynes´s theory resembles the 
evolutionary process of expansion of knowledge in general in PTKL. In this respect, we 
also suggested that the evolution of conventional knowledge in Keynes´s macro-theory is 
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analogous to Kuhn´s (1962) theory of scientific evolution insofar as the mechanism 
whereby a certain set of conventions is replaced by another one in the former exhibits a 
number of similarities with the mechanism whereby a scientific paradigm is superseded 
by another one in the latter. In particular, we believe that the role played by `anomalies´ 
in Kuhn´s framework is similar to the role played by `confidence´ crisis in Keynes´s 
macro-theory. As we explained, a `confidence´ crisis can be seen as taking place in the 
wake of the occurrence of a large observed discrepancy between expected and realized 
outcomes so that the social conventions that agents have been using for some time are no 
longer widely believed to represent a valid guide for decision-making. However, we also 
noted that there may be some conventions which remain `hegemonic´ indefinitely 
because of their simplicity and proved effectiveness. For instance, the three conventions 
Keynes refers to in his 1937 Quarterly Journal of Economics paper (Keynes, 1937) and 
which were the object of our discussion above are clear examples of social conventions 
which, to the extent that they remain in use indefinitely, provide the basis for Keynesian 
macro-modelling. 
Next, we argued above that the convention that `the existing state of affairs will 
continue indefinitely, except in so far as we have specific reasons to expect a change´ is 
at the core of Keynesian macro-theory and is directly responsible for two criticisms the 
latter has frequently been subject to: (i) the alleged `irrational´ behaviour of Keynesian 
economic agents, and (ii) the nihilism of Keynesian macro-theory. Notwithstanding it, we 
argued that these criticisms stem from the adoption by mainstream economists of the 
`objectivist´ version of Popper´s `Rationality Principle´ (RPo). Now, we showed in the 
previous chapter that, in the context of neoclassical economics, the former implies that 
economic agents are assumed to exhibit `substantive´ rationality (i.e., to be optimizers). 
Furthermore, the adoption of RPo implies that economic agents´ view of the `problem-
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situation´ (P-S) is assumed to coincide with the theoretician´s. This, we argued, allows 
neoclassical economists to `close´ the model in a way that neat testable predictions can 
be derived. Yet, we argued that the `substantive´ rationality assumption presupposes that 
an `inductive logic´ exists that allows economic agents to acquire `true´ knowledge. 
Crucially, the adoption of RPo by neoclassical economists implies, according to us, that 
they assess Keynes´s macro-theory under the implicit assumption that there must be a 
coincidence between the agents´ and the theoreticians´ view of P-S. Thus, for instance, if 
the theoretician does not really believe that `the future will resemble the past´ ― as in 
Keynes´s case ― it follows that the construction of models where economic agents are 
assumed to believe, for practical purposes, that `the future will resemble the past´ is 
incoherent from the viewpoint of neoclassical theorists. Further, the charge of `nihilism´ 
by the latter stems from the fact that the possibility of generating testable predictions in 
Keynes´s theory is, according to them, precluded by the fact that agents´ expectations are 
assumed to be exogenous and, hence, to change unpredictably.  
Now, we argued that the two charges alluded to above are unjustified and can be 
answered by showing that Keynes´s theory is, unlike neoclassical theory, an instance of 
RPs. As we explained in the previous chapter, the latter implies that the theoretician seeks 
to reconstruct P-S not `as she believes it is´ but, rather, `as she believes that gents believe 
it is´. First, the charge that Keynesian models posit economic agents who exhibit 
`irrational´ is related to the fact that, in Keynes´s macro-theory, agents are not assumed 
to exhibit `beliefs-rationality´. Yet, we argued that this is because, unlike neoclassical 
economists, Keynesian theoreticians (rightly) assume that there is no `inductive logic´ 
(i.e., `true´ knowledge cannot be attained). Besides, the adoption of RPs in Keynesian 
macro-theory implies, according to this interpretation, that though the theoretician does 
not believe that `the future will resemble the past´, she may nevertheless assume that 
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agents believe this is the best working assumption they can make owing to the presence 
of genuine uncertainty in the economy. It follows that the interpretation of Keynesian 
macro-theory we propound implies that it is not contradictory to assume that economic 
agents believe that `the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely, except in so far 
as they have specific reasons for expecting a change´ even though the theoretician does 
not believe so. Likewise, if we assume that economic agents believe, for practical 
purposes, that the `future will resemble the past´, then Keynesian theoreticians cannot be 
accused of portraying economic agents´ behaviour as being `irrational´ since such 
behaviour is coherent with agents´ belief in the presence of a high degree of stability in 
the economy. Next, and according to our interpretation, Keynesian macro-theory cannot 
be accused of `nihilism´ either since the assumption that economic agents believe that 
`the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely, except insofar as they have specific 
reasons to expect a change´ allows Keynesian theoreticians to construct macro-models 
that generate testable predictions (as opposed to quantitative forecasts). Some examples 
of these predictions as well as some examples of different parts of Keynesian macro-
theory that illustrate the implicit adoption of RPs were provided. In short, our 
interpretation of Keynesian macro-theory as an instance of RPs is conducive to both a 
`rationalization´ of the typical criticisms the former is usually subject to as well as to an 
answer of them.  
Finally, Keynesian economists tend to associate the existence of `uncertainty´ in 
the economy to the non-ergodic nature of the economic world. To be sure, the alleged 
non-ergodicity of the world is consistent with Keynes´s claim ― which was the basis for 
his criticism of Tinbergen´s pioneering work on statistical inference in economics ― that 
`economic data is not homogeneous over time´. By contrast, we argued above that a 
logical implication of our interpretation of Keynesian macro-theory is that the primary 
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cause for the existence of genuine uncertainty in the economy and its impact on agents´ 
behaviour is not so much the absence of homogeneity through time of economic data and, 
hence, the alleged impossibility of extrapolating the past into the future, but the absence 
of an `inductive logic´. In other words, `uncertainty´ is ultimately implied by Popper´s 
claim that all knowledge is conjectural and, hence, provisional. Consequently, even if 
economic data appears to be homogeneous through a long period of time, this is by no 
means a proof that the former will remain homogeneous in the future. That is, in the 
absence of an `inductive logic´ it cannot be shown that `the future will resemble the past´. 
Such claim is conjectural. This suggests that the relevance of the notion of non-ergodicity 
for Keynesian macro-theory is, according to us, overemphasised insofar as an even more 
substantial reason for the existence of uncertainty is the conjectural nature of human 
knowledge.  
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Notes 
 
1 These two criticisms do appear, in different forms, in most of the critical surveys of Post-Keyensian (PK) 
economics which have been published over the last decades. Some examples are Coddington (1976, 1982), 
Yellen (1980), Tarshis (1980), Walters & Young (1997), and Kakarot-Handtke (2012). In turn, the 
responses of PK economists to these criticisms are, for instance, in Eichner & Kregel (1975), Hamouda & 
Harcourt (1988), Crotty (1980, 1994), and Lavoie (2014).  
 
2 In turn, this was based on Moore´s conception of the real existence of non-natural (or non-physical) 
entities which Keynes took on board when developing his theory of probability in the Treatise. The belief 
in the real existence of such non-physical entities is known as Platonism. As noted in Bateman (1991, p. 
105), `Moore believed in good, and Keynes in probabilities, in exactly the same sense as Plato believed in 
universal ideal forms´.   
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3 This is explained by Keynes as follows:  
 
 `… in the sense important to logic, probability is not subjective. It is not, that is to say, subject to 
human caprice. A proposition is not probable because we think it so. When once the facts are given which 
determine our knowledge, what is probable or improbable in these circumstances has been fixed 
objectively, and is independent of our opinion. The Theory of Probability is logical, therefore, because it is 
concerned with the degree of belief which it is rational to entertain in given conditions´ (Keynes, 1952[ 
1920], p. 4).    
 
4 In a similar vein, Dow (2009, p. 14) points out that Keynes´s Treatise addressed the same question that 
Hume raised with his `problem of induction´.  
 
5 Carabelli (1988) uses the term `ordinary logic´ to refer to `human logic´ whereas Winslow (1986) uses 
the latter term which was originally coined by Ramsey (1978[1931]).  
 
6 According to Lawson (1985), Carvalho (1988), Carabelli (1988) and O´Donnell (1990) this shift did not 
require a significant change in his basic theoretical framework, however. By contrast, Andrews (1999), 
Bateman (1987, 1990, 1991) and Davis (1994) hold the opposite thesis. 
 
7 Similarly, Gillies (2000) has recently propounded an inter-subjective interpretation of probability as an 
additional version of the subjective epistemological interpretation of probability.   
  
8 Popper (1990, p. 12) makes it clear that statistical averages will exhibit a tendency to remain stable only 
if the physical conditions remain stable. He makes this phenomenon the basis of his ‘propensity theory of 
probability’ (Popper, 1959) which is an objective interpretation of the theory of probability. Popper (1990, 
p. 8) associates the subjectivist theory of probability in the field of physics to Heisenberg and Einstein but 
he makes clear that he adopts an objectivist theory. According to this interpretation, propensities are real 
forces that stem from physical realities. What is even more important, he recognizes that in our changing 
real world propensities change all the time: 
 
             ‘With the introduction of propensities, the ideology of determinism evaporates. Past situations, 
whether physical or psychological or mixed, do not determine the future situation. Rather, they determine 
changing propensities that influence future situations without determining them in a unique way… Quite 
apart from the fact that we do not know the future, the future is objectively not fixed. The future is open: 
objectively open’ (Popper, 1990, pp. 17-18). 
       
9 It could be argued that it is the absence of ends-rationality that prevents the notion of logical probability 
relations from providing a full-fledged theory of human behaviour.  
 
10 According to O´Donnell (1990), the picture that emerges from Keynes´s analysis in the General Theory 
is also of a ‘two-dimensional’ and ‘two-domain’ type of analysis. The two dimensions are expectations and 
confidence whereas the two domains are short-term and long-term expectations (O´Donnell, 1990, p. 260). 
In the first domain, short-term expectations are typified by uncertainty in the context of relatively high 
weight and confidence whereas, in the second domain, long-term expectations are characterised by 
uncertainty coupled to either high or low confidence depending upon the situation. The expectations-
confidence pair in the General Theory is, according to O´Donnell (op. cit.), a generalized version of the 
probability-weight pair in the Treatise. This leads him (op. cit., p. 263) to contend that Keynes advanced a 
pioneering theory of rationality under radical uncertainty consisting of two independent dimensions with 
economic agents forming expectations about outcomes and degrees of confidence about the latter.  
11 O´Donnell (1990, p. 259) notes that the `continuity vs. change´ issue in Keynes´ philosophical views 
after 1921 has led to a division of opinion. On the one hand, there are those like Winslow (1986, 1989) or 
Davis (1994) who argue that in 1932, and under the strong impact of Ramsey´s (1978[1931]) criticism of 
Keynes´s later views, Keynes switched to a non-logical theory of probability. In a similar vein, Shackle 
(1984, p. 391) writes that ‘Keynes the economist abandoned probability in any technical form… Keynes´s 
probability theorizing has no overt bearing on the economics which he published’. On the other hand, there 
are those like Lawson (1985), Rutherford (1984, p. 381), or Carvalho (1988, p. 72) who argue that Keynes 
did not adopt an alternative conception of probability but rather continued to work within the theoretical 
framework of the Treatise on Probability. Other authors adopt a middle-ground position. For instance, 
O´Donnell (op. cit.) argues that Keynes´s thought continued to be grounded on the conceptual framework 
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of the Treatise albeit there was an internal change of emphasis within his framework after 1932 which 
consisted of an increase in the relative significance of the ‘indeterminate’ domain and ‘weak’ rationality. 
Likewise, Runde (1997, p. 241) maintains that, in his later work, Keynes gave up his ontology of logical 
probability relations albeit he continued to regard qualitative probability comparisons as basic to epistemic 
probability.       
 
12 In this respect, Andrews (1999, p. 10) argues that these two notions have outlasted other elements of the 
Treatise because they are not crucial to its central argument. As we show below, its central argument was 
rejected by Keynes in the wake of Ramsey´s critique of it.  
 
13 According to Runde (1990), the dichotomy between probability and confidence (and weight) can also be 
extended over to Keynes´s distinction between ` risk´ and ` liquidity´ premium alluded to in a letter addressed 
to Townshend and written after the publication of the General Theory:       
 ‘I am rather inclined to associate risk premium with probability strictly speaking, and liquidity 
premium with what in my Treatise on Probability I called “weight”. An essential distinction is that a risk 
premium is expected to be rewarded on the average by an increased return at the end of the period. A 
liquidity premium, on the other hand, is not even expected to be so rewarded. It is a payment, not for the 
expectation of increased tangible income at the end of the period, but for an increased sense of comfort and 
confidence during the period’ (Keynes, 1973b, reproduced in Runde, 1990).  
 Be that as it may, a reading of Keynes´ writings suggests that he does not view `confidence´ and 
`weight´ as being interchangeable albeit he would probably concede that they tend to move in the same 
direction in which case the appropriate conception of weight is ‘some [subjective] measure of the degree 
of completeness of the information on which a decision is based’ (Runde, 1990, p. 287). Thus, if we take 
expression (2) above as the most adequate interpretation of the notion of weight, then the greater the weight 
of evidence in favour of a certain forecast the more robust the basis on which to formulate it and, hence, 
the more confident we will be that our forecast is an appropriate guide to action.  
14 The notion of `weight of the argument´ also appears in the General Theory in the context of Keynes´ 
discussion of investment decision-making.  
 
15 However, Rutherford (1984, p. 379-80) argues that ‘Keynes contended that even a large quantity of 
favorable evidence could not logically impart a high probability to a hypothesis if the evidence emanated 
from repetitions of identical experiments or observations made under identical conditions’ (Keynes, 
1952[1920], pp. 217-219). According to him, it follows from this that a certain amount of evidence will 
mean more (less) if it is collected under varied (similar) conditions.  
 
16 For instance, Dow (1995, p. 726) points out that, according to Keynes, `more weight [should] be given 
to facts of which we are more certain than to facts of which we are very uncertain even if they are more 
relevant to the argument´. 
 
17 Similarly, Dow & Dow (2011, pp. 6-7) argue that `the degree to which ignorance is recognised is 
ultimately a matter of psychology´ and, hence, they implicitly suggest that the `weight of an argument´ is 
subjective.  
 
18 In particular, and referring to the notion of `weight´, Keynes writes that `the question to be raised in this 
chapter is somewhat novel; after much consideration I remain uncertain as to how much importance to 
attach to it´ (Keynes, 1952[1920], p. 71).  
 
19 Keynes alludes to `weight´ in the General Theory (1936, p. 148) and in a letter to Townshend written in 
1938 (Keynes, 1973b, p. 293) where Keynes relates `weight´ to the notion of `liquidity premium´. In the 
General Theory, Keynes gives it an explanatory role in three different areas: uncertainty, confidence, and 
liquidity preference. Specifically, `weight´ exerts two effects on the current level of investment. First, it 
influences the marginal efficiency of capital through its impact on the level of confidence. Second, it 
influences the rate of interest through its relation to liquidity preference.   
 
20 Savage´s theory builds upon the work of both Ramsey (1978[1931]) and De Finetti (1937) who showed 
that subjective probability could be defined in terms of preferences over gambles and of von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1947) who provided the first axiomatic derivation of expected utility theory. Another 
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example is Ramsey´s optimal growth model (Ramsey, 1978[1931], ch. 11) which represents the standard 
approach to analysing optimal growth in macroeconomics.  
 
21 Likewise, in his critique of Keynes´s notion of a priori probability relations, Ramsey (1978[1931]), p. 
94) suggests that a priori probabilities would be `determined by natural selection´. However, it has been 
suggested that one of the reasons Keynes failed to provide an alternative to the frequency approach to 
probability in the Treatise was that `he made use of an epistemology of intuition that lacked a theory of 
error´ (Davis, 1994, p. 102). We argue below that Keynes adopted in his later economic writings a theory 
of human behaviour based on conventional judgement which can, in turn, be provided with a trial and error-
elimination mechanism in a way that makes the former compatible with evolutionary epistemology.    
 
22 However, Ramsey´s notion of `human logic´ implies, according to Keynes, more than mere consistency 
of thought: 
 
`[Ramsey] was led to consider “human logic” as distinguished from “formal logic”. Formal logic 
is concerned with nothing but the rules of consistent thought. But in addition to this we have certain “useful 
mental habits” for handling the material with which we are supplied by our perceptions and by our memory 
and perhaps in other ways, and so arriving at or towards truth; and the analysis of such habits is also a sort 
of logic´ (Keynes, 1973b, p. 338) 
 
23 See, for instance, Winslow (1989, p. 1178). 
 
24 Keynes implicitly accepted the validity of the frequency approach to probability in the natural sciences 
in a letter addressed to Harrod on 4th July 1938 the full content of which is shown in a footnote below. 
 
25 This may become clear after reading a fragment of the discussion where he introduces his framework:  
 
 `Let us give an instance of the sort of case which might occur. I am at a cross-roads and do not 
know the way; but I rather think one of the two ways is right. I propose therefore to go that way but keep 
my eyes open for someone to ask; if now I see someone half a mile away over the fields, whether I turn 
aside to ask him will depend on the relative inconvenience of going out of my way to cross the fields or of 
continuing on the wrong road if it is the wrong road. But it will also depend on how confident I am that I 
am right; and clearly the more confident I am of this the less distance I should be willing to go from the 
road to check my opinion. I propose therefore to use the distance I would be prepared to go to ask, as a 
measure of the confidence of my opinion...´ (Ramsey, 1978 [1931], pp. 76-77, emphasis added). 
 
 Indeed, Ramsey´s notion of `degree of belief´ is precisely the measure of the confidence of one´s 
opinion and is, thus, subjective. In any case, the paragraph highlights that the distance I am willing to go 
out of my way to check my opinion is also the maximum distance I should be willing to go out of my way 
to check my opinion if I really wished to realize the objects of my desire. We believe the example shows 
that Ramsey´s framework is an example of RPs in that `the theoretician reconstructs P-S as she believes the 
agent believes it is´.     
  
26 This is nicely explained in Davis (1994):  
 
          `In Keynes´s later career, then the effort to explain the operation of the economic world produced a 
change in philosophical thinking that forced abandonment, modification, and replacement of much that 
Keynes had previously believed. Intuition in the Moorean sense was replaced by individual expectation. 
The focus on probability became secondary to the focus on convention. Rational behaviour as a principal 
concern in the analysis of individual judgement was supplanted by a preoccupation with the effects of 
interdependence and uncertainty… Unfortunately, Keynes never clearly articulated his philosophical 
conversion, largely no doubt on account of the tremendous demands upon his time made by economics and 
policy´ (Davis, 1994, pp. 146-7).   
 
27 Choi (1993, pp. 63-66) provides some insightful ideas stemming from psychology which enhance the 
Keynesian argument that economic agents rely on conventional `rules of thumb´ when making decisions. 
For instance, he argues that our confidence in the way we do things tends to be reinforced by the approval 
of others as well as by our belief that our own behaviour merits the applause of others.   
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28 Runde (1997, p. 228) argues that should Keynes have written a ‘second edition’ of the General Theory 
he would have elaborated on the theme of conventional methods of expectations formation as surrogates 
for mathematical calculus and the way in which such methods contribute to financial market instability.  
   
29 Keynes´s insight is eloquently put in Iwai (2009, p. 8, emphasis added):  
 
         `In the end, the only reason a particular face is selected as the prettiest is that every competitor [in the 
Beauty Contest] believes every other competitor believes she is selected as the prettiest, without any support 
from reality, either objective or subjective. The prettiest is the prettiest merely because she is selected as 
the prettiest. What we see here is the working of the “bootstrapping” logic of Baron Münchausen who 
claimed he had pulled himself out of a swamp by pulling on his own bootstraps´.   
 
30 For instance, Littleboy (1990, p. 29) argues that `one of Keynes´s most important innovations lay in the 
realization of the significance of conventions that arise when transactors, confronted by an uncertain 
environment, are psychologically disposed to act in a manner in which they study and imitate the actions 
of others´. He advances a theory of macroeconomic dynamics grounded on the interaction of different 
conventions in different spheres of the economic system (op. cit., pp. 289ff).   
 
31 Davis (1997) argues that the theory of the formation of social conventions in Keynes´ theory remains 
undeveloped. For instance, he notes the interactive character of the formation of conventional judgements 
and suggests that in a hypothetical ‘second edition’ of the General Theory Keynes would have focused on 
the interaction between individual and average opinion and on how confidence varies according to the 
degree of coincidence between them. He discusses several hypothetical scenarios where, depending on the 
degree of coincidence between individual and average opinion, the ‘shared’ degree of confidence may 
either vary or remain stable (op. cit., pp. 216-17). However, he does not see an evolutionary dimension in 
Keynes´s approach to the formation of conventions albeit he writes that ‘for Keynes, then, the conditions 
associated with states of confidence concern the success or lack of success with which individuals come to 
assess each other´s opinions about markets’ (op. cit., p. 217). Notwithstanding it, Howitt (1997, p. 241) 
points out that it would have been natural for Keynesian economics to follow the approach suggested by 
behavioural or evolutionary economics in the study of the causal mechanisms underlying the formation of 
conventional expectations.           
  
32 Similarly, as noted in Lawson (1985, p. 918), the notion of rationality that stems from Keynes´s macro-
theory is compatible with Simon´s notion of ‘bounded’ rationality.  
33 Arguably, it may not be possible for some individuals to observe directly how successful other people 
have been in the past and, further, the success or lack of it of the latter may not be a direct outcome of the 
adoption by some people of particular beliefs. As to the former issue, some people may assume that those 
who have a higher social status have adopted beliefs which tend to be correct on average as in Veblen´s 
theory of social emulation (Veblen, 1924[1899]). As to the second issue, we need to assume that success is 
mainly associated to the holding of `correct´ beliefs.   
 
34 In this account of Keynes´s macro-theory there is, arguably, very little scope for `irrational´ behaviour. 
In some interpretations of the former, `irrationality´ is usually associated to the notion of `animal spirits´.  
However, as Dow & Dow (2011, p. 7) note, Keynes recognised that `animal spirits´ is less relevant to 
decision-making than conventional judgement, at least in the context of financial markets. Keynes uses the 
term `animal spirits´ three times in chapter 12 of the General Theory where he refers to the decision by 
entrepreneurs to invest in real capital:     
 
 `Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be 
drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirits ― of a spontaneous urge 
to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits 
multiplied by quantitative probabilities… Thus if the animal spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous 
optimism falters, leaving us to depend on nothing but a mathematical expectation, enterprise will fade and 
die… But individual initiative will only be adequate when reasonable calculation is supplemented and 
supported by animal spirits, so that the thought of ultimate loss which often overtakes pioneers, as 
experience undoubtedly tells us and them, is put aside as a healthy man puts aside the expectation of death´ 
(Keynes, 1936, pp. 161-62, emphasis added).  
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 We thus believe that `animal spirits´ plays a marginal role in Keynes´s theory. To us, the role of 
`animal spirits´ in Keynes´s theory is similar to Hume´s idea that the ultimate driver of human action is not 
reason but sentiment or passion or as he puts it: ‘I shall endeavour to prove first, that reason alone can never 
be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the 
will’ (Hume, 1978[1739-40], p. 413). In terms of the conceptual framework used in the previous chapter, 
`animal spirits´ may only amount to (unconscious) aims of individuals and, as such, it has to be taken as 
given for the purpose of macroeconomic analysis. In the context of Popper´s SA, `animal spirits´ represent 
an exogenous element in the `problem-situation´ individuals find themselves. Be that as it may, we believe 
there is very little explanatory and predictive power we can gain by focusing on the role of `animal spirits´ 
and, hence, that a more promising avenue for research in macroeconomics is to study the conventional basis 
of economic behaviour.      
  
35 In this respect, Runde (1997) argues that, in chapter 12 of the General Theory, Keynes elaborates on the 
theme of conventional methods of calculation as surrogates for mathematical calculation and the ways 
through which conventional behaviour may lead to financial instability. He then conjectures that Keynes 
would have reinforced this part of his argument had there been a `second edition´ of The General Theory.   
 
36 However, some HC may withstand the passing of time if people keep on believing that they represent 
useful guides for behaviour. The three conventions Keynes (1937, pp. 214-15) refers to and which were 
listed above are examples of HC which have successfully withstood the passing of time.  
 
37 Incidentally, when referring to the notion of ‘sunspot’ equilibria in neoclassical theory, Arrow (1986) 
points out that the former refers to the existence of a continuum of equilibria in which one equilibrium is 
based on fundamentals and the remaining equilibria depend on the contingency that becomes relevant 
simply because everyone believes it is relevant. He adds that, in such cases ‘we can have situations where 
social truth is essentially a matter of convention, not of underlying realities’ (Arrow, 1986, p. S396, 
emphasis added).     
  
38 In particular, and in addition to the issue we address in this section and which concerns the alleged non-
homogeneity of economic material over time, Keynes also raises in those letters several issues related to 
the problem of omitted variables, lag lengths, and model specification in his correspondence with Harrod 
and Tinbergen.  
 
39 As Davis (1994, p. 144) writes, `that the future is not a function of “past statistics” and that one must 
always leave some room for “expectation and the state of confidence relating to the future” suggests that 
Keynes did not believe that there was much scope for inductive methods in economics´. Likewise, Nobel 
Laureate in Economics John Hicks declares that ‘I am bold enough to conclude from these considerations 
that the usefulness of “statistical” or “stochastic” methods in economics is a good deal less than is now 
conventionally supposed’ (Hicks, 1979, p. 129). 
  
40 We reproduce the letters below. The first letter addressed to Harrod was issued on 4th July 1938:  
 
`It seems to me that economics is a branch of logic, a way of thinking; and that you do not repel 
sufficiently firmly attempts à la Schultz to turn it into a pseudo-natural science. One can make quite 
worthwhile progress merely by using your axioms and maxims. But one cannot get very far except by 
devising new and improved models. This requires, as you say, “a vigilant observation of the actual working 
of our system”. Progress in economics consists almost entirely in a progressive improvement in the choice 
of models… But it is of the essence of a model that one does not fill in real values for the variable functions. 
To do so would make it useless as a model. For as soon as this is done, the model loses its generality and 
its value as a mode of thought… The object of statistical study is not so much to fill in missing variables 
with a view to prediction, as to test the relevance and validity of the model… Economics is a science of 
thinking in terms of models joined to the art of choosing models which are relevant to the contemporary 
world. It is compelled to be this, because, unlike the typical natural science, the material to which it is 
applied is, in too many respects, not homogeneous through time. The object of a model is to segregate the 
semi-permanent or relatively constant factors from those which are transitorily or fluctuating so as to 
develop a logical way of thinking about the latter, and of understanding the time sequences to which they 
give rise in particular cases… Good economists are scarce because the gift for using “vigilant observation” 
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to choose good models, although it does not require a highly specialised intellectual technique, appears to 
be a very rare one´ (Keynes, 1973b, pp. 295-7) 
The second letter addressed to Harrod was issued on 16th July 1938: 
`The point needs emphasising because the art of thinking in terms of models is a difficult ― largely 
because it is an unaccustomed ― practice. The pseudo-analogy with the physical sciences leads directly 
counter to the habit of mind which is most important for an economist proper to acquire. I also want to 
emphasise strongly the point about economics being a moral science. I mentioned before that it deals with 
introspection and with values. I might have added that it deals with motives, expectations, psychological 
uncertainties. One has to be constantly on guard against treating the material as constant and homogeneous. 
It is as though the fall of the apple to the ground depended on the apple´s motives, on whether it is worth 
while falling to the ground, and whether the ground wanted the apple to fall, and on mistaken calculations 
on the part of the apple as to how far it was from the centre of the earth´ (Keynes, 1973b, pp. 299-300, 
emphasis added). 
41 Although Popper apparently borrowed the terms `explanation in principle´ and `explanation in detail´ 
from Hayek (1967), to the best of our knowledge, these terms are mentioned for the first time in Watkins 
(1952).  
 
42 A classic discussion of this topic in the context of economics is in Papandreou (1959). He argues that (i) 
economists construct models rather than theories, and (ii) economic models are strictly explanatory devices. 
More precisely, he argues that economic models cannot be used as predictive devices because the conditions 
of their applicability cannot be set out in advance (op. cit., p. 1099).   
 
43 In the literature on Keynesian economics, the non-homogeneity of economic data is usually associated 
to the mathematical notion of non-ergodicity. According to Davidson (1996, p. 479), most mainstream 
economists implicitly assume the existence of a predetermined, immutable or ergodic world that can be 
fully described by objective conditional probability distributions. He identifies three different decision-
making economic environments: (i) the objective probability environment, (ii) the subjective probability 
environment, and (iii) the truly uncertain environment (Davidson, 1991). In the objective probability 
environment, the realm of the `rational expectations hypothesis´ (REH), decision-makers believe that the 
past is a statistically unbiased guide to the future. As Davidson explains, for the REH to provide a theory 
of expectations formation, not only must the subjective and objective probability distribution functions 
coincide at any point in time but they must also be derived from ‘ergodic’ stochastic processes. The latter 
exhibit the key property that ‘averages calculated from past observations cannot be persistently different 
from the time average of future outcomes’ (op. cit., p. 132). Non-ergodicity is sometimes likened to non-
stationarity. However, as Davidson (op. cit) makes clear, non-stationarity is a sufficient, but not necessary 
condition, for non-ergodicity.  
44 More specifically, Robbins argues that the ultimate premises of social science are human dispositions. 
As he explains, such dispositions `are so much the stuff of our everyday experience that they have only to 
be stated to be recognised as obvious´ (Robbins, 1932, p. 79). 
  
45 Notwithstanding it, this is not necessarily the case in practice. For instance, Heiner (1983, p. 561) notes 
that (neoclassical) optimization models are unable to imply the `Law of Demand´ (i.e., that an increase in 
the relative price of a commodity will lead to a decrease in its demand) which is, arguably, the simplest 
empirical regularity in economics. He notes that we can certainly use neoclassical consumer theory to argue 
that it is unlikely that a negative income effect will outweigh the substitution effect yet we cannot be sure 
that this will be the case. Notably, he comments the following:  
 
`I was told in a graduate price-theory class by Armen Alchian that the only clear implication of 
consumer theory is that with more income, a consumer will buy more of at least something. Harold 
Demsetz, when informed of this story, responded by saying, “well then just define holding cash balances 
as saving, and we have no testable implications, just one mass of tautologies”´ (op. cit., footnote 4).   
 
46 Of course, this presupposes that the statistical environment is stable. As we have explained above, the 
mathematical expression of this idea is represented by the notion of ergodicity. Incidentally, the latter is 
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identified by Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson (1969, p. 184) as the ‘sine qua non of the scientific method 
in economics’. 
 
47 Both Keynes (1920[1952]) and Knight (1971[1921]) associate the notion of uncertainty with non-
measureable probability. We have already referred above to the definition of uncertainty in Keynes´s work. 
As for the definition of uncertainty in Knight (op. cit.), Runde (1998, p. 543) argues that Knight proposes 
a tripartite schema of probability which can be restated as follows: 
1. ‘Classical’ or a priori probability which corresponds to the ideal case in which numerical 
probabilities can be computed by assigning them to equally probable and mutually exclusive 
possible outcomes such as the six sides of a perfect die.  
2. ‘Statistical’ probability which refers to situations in which frequencies may be obtained by 
carrying out an empirical (and complete) taxonomy of potential outcomes which are then divided 
into classes of less than perfectly homogenous trials. 
3. ‘Estimates’: this corresponds to situations in which it is either impossible to calculate a priori 
probabilities or where there is an insufficient number of trials which are ‘like’ enough to construct 
a reference class of trials in order to obtain frequencies. 
 
          As Runde (op. cit.) notes, this reformulated version of Knight’s taxonomy of probability situations 
leads to the key Knightian distinction between `risk´ and `uncertainty´. The former refers to situations in 
which decision-makers can calculate either a priori or statistical probabilities whereas the latter refers to 
situations in which it is not possible to obtain either a priori or statistical probabilities. Crucially, Knight 
makes it clear that, in practice, it is impossible to obtain an entirely homogenous taxonomy of different 
types of trials thereby making the theoretical distinction between ‘statistical’ probability and ‘estimates’ a 
matter of degree (op. cit., p. 225). 
 
48 We argued above that one of the themes of the Treatise on Probability that made its way into Keynes´s 
later economic writings is the possibility that probability is unmeasurable. Therefore, most interpretations 
of the notion of `uncertainty´ in Keynes tend to associate uncertainty with situations in which we cannot 
measure the relevant probabilities. Keynes refers to this scenario in his QJE paper (Keynes, 1937). For 
instance, he argues that entrepreneurs cannot rely on any ‘scientific’ evidence when making long-term 
investment decisions because most investment decisions are unique in the sense that any statistical data 
generated from the past is not useful to evaluate the statistical probability of different potential outcomes. 
As he explains in a much-quoted passage: 
‘By "uncertain" knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish what is known for 
certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty; nor is 
the prospect of a Victory bond being drawn. Or, again, the expectation of life is only slightly uncertain. 
Even the weather is only moderately uncertain. The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the 
prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, 
or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealth-owners in the social system in 
1970. About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. 
We simply do not know’ (op. cit., pp. 213-14, emphasis added).  
49 By contrast, in the theoretical framework developed in Heiner (1983, p. 561), the predictable features of 
individual behaviour do not arise from optimizing with no uncertainty in choosing their most preferred 
behaviour. On the contrary, Heiner shows that, in the special case of no uncertainty, the behaviour of fully 
optimizing agents who respond with complete flexibility to every perturbation in their environment would 
not produce easily recognizable patterns but rather would be extremely difficult to predict.  
   
50 An example of this is the story in John Ford’s classic Western `The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance´. 
Ranse Stoddard (James Stewart’s character) makes a career as a State Governor and U.S. Senator largely 
on the basis of his reputation as `the man who shot Liberty Valance´. However, as we all know, it was Tom 
Doniphon (John Wayne´s character) who really shot him.  
51 As Hempel (1949,  p. 467, emphasis added) argues:  
 
          `The method of empathy is, no doubt, frequently applied by laymen and by experts in history. But it 
does not by itself constitute an explanation; it is rather essentially a heuristic device; its function is to 
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suggest certain psychological hypotheses which might serve as explanatory devices in the case under 
consideration´.   
 
52 No doubt, the ability of Keynes to adopt the point of view of financial market participants in this case 
was, arguably, enormously facilitating by his own experience as a speculator in London´s stock market.  
 
53 In the General Theory Keynes (1936, p. 96) defines the `psychological law of consumption´ as the law 
according to which `men are disposed, as a rule and on average, to increase their consumption as their 
income increases, but not by as much as the increase in their income´.  
 
54 This account of the conduct of investors is, according to Runde (1990), consistent with the terms of the 
discussion in Chapter 26 of the Treatise where Keynes distinguishes between ‘the most probable forecast 
we can make and our confidence in that forecast’ (Keynes, 1952[1920], p. 286) and where he links low 
`weight´ to low confidence.  
55 That a decrease in `confidence´ and its associated increase in liquidity preference constitute a `rational´ 
response of economic agents is hardly questionable. For instance, in many choice situations more can be 
learned about the factors governing eventual outcomes after decisions have been made. This presents no 
problem where choices can be completely and costlessly reversed. But things are very different where they 
cannot. Such irreversibility entails that it may sometimes be `rational´ to suspend judgement and delay 
commitment until more information has been acquired. In this context, the function of liquidity is that of 
`giving us time to think´ (Hicks 1974, p. 57). In general, however, decisions cannot be postponed until all 
the evidence is available and, in such cases, the readiness and terms at which commitments to previous 
choices may be dissolved assumes importance (Runde 1994, p. 136). Therefore, in situations of uncertainty 
liquid assets carry a premium over illiquid ones. 
56 For instance, Carvalho (1988, p. 79) distinguishes between long-term investment decisions and short-
term production decisions. Unlike the former, short-term production decisions tend to be repetitive, do not 
normally imply irreversible commitments of financial resources and can be checked and reversed after very 
short intervals.  
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III. CONTEMPORARY MACROECONOMICS AND 
POPPER´S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND 
LEARNING  
 
`No period of history has ever been great or ever can be that does not act on some sort of high, 
idealistic motives, and idealism in our time has been shoved aside, and we are paying the penalty 
for it.´ (A. N. Whitehead, in Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead, ch. 32, 1954) 
 
1. Introduction 
 According to Woodford (2009) there was a substantial convergence of views in 
macroeconomics over the last two decades. The evidence for such convergence is the 
observation of a cessation of methodological struggles within macroeconomics. More 
specifically, he recognizes that a New Synthesis emerged in macroeconomics over the 
last two decades or so. A key component of the New Synthesis is the adoption by most 
macroeconomists of the ‘Rational Expectations Hypothesis’ (REH) as their usual way of 
modelling economic agents´ expectations formation. Likewise, Goodfriend & King 
(1997) argue that a ‘New Neoclassical Synthesis’ model emerged in macroeconomics in 
the 90s and note that REH is a key ingredient of it. More recently, Farmer (2013) has 
recognized that REH is a useful theoretical device which, if applied carefully, can help us 
understand what went wrong in the last financial crisis. This stands in stark contrast to 
those theorists who believe that contemporary macroeconomic and financial theory and, 
particularly REH, bears some responsibility for the onset of the last financial crisis 
(Guesnerie, 2013, p. 50). Recent critical assessments of REH add to criticisms made in 
the past as expounded by a number of scholars including several Nobel Prize Awards in 
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economics like, for instance, Arrow (1978), Tobin (1981), Krugman (2009), and Stiglitz 
(2011). Criticisms of REH tend to focus on the notion that it begs epistemological issues 
such as how market participants acquire the knowledge they need to produce ‘rational 
expectations’ (RE). For example, Frydman & Goldberg (2013, p. 130) argue that ‘REH 
has no connection to how even minimally reasonable profit-seeking individuals forecast 
the future in real world markets’. In a series of contributions, Frydman & Goldberg (2007, 
2011, 2013) argue that economists´ belief in the efficacy of REH stems from the premise 
that they have discovered a universally valid way to capture how individuals make 
decisions. However, this presumption has profound methodological implications. First, 
fallibility is restricted to economic agents´ inability to forecast exogenous shocks. 
Second, models which fully pre-specify how the surrounding environment unfolds over 
time obliterate agents´ creativity. As noted in Phelps (2007, p. xv), it is contradictory to 
adopt the REH premise that whatever change takes place in the future is either known or 
knowable in the present since ―as Schumpeter argued— change and innovation are key 
features of capitalist economies1. Third, by imposing onto macroeconomic models the 
restriction that economic agents´ expectations coincide on average with the conditional 
forecast generated by the theorist´ model it turns out that fully specified macroeconomic 
models rule out the possibility that agents´ beliefs independently affect outcomes in a way 
that model builders cannot fully pre-specify. Another way of saying this is that REH 
implies that, to the extent that agents´ beliefs are the product of macroeconomic theory, 
forecasting strategies are determined jointly at the individual and aggregate levels. As a 
result of it, it has been argued that macroeconomic models that adopt REH lack plausible 
micro-foundations (Frydman & Goldberg, 2013). Lastly, it may well be ‘irrational’ to 
behave as predicted by REH if market participants do not know the ‘true’ model and 
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know, in turn, that nobody knows it. Thus, the question emerges as to what the appropriate 
notion of rationality is in macroeconomic models if REH is abandoned.  
Now, we believe that the contradictions embedded in REH and the NNS model 
stem mainly from their flawed epistemological and ontological foundations. Therefore, if 
a substantial reorientation of macroeconomics is to take place in the future, the first task 
to address is to provide it with solid epistemological and ontological foundations. In view 
of this, the main claim we want to make is that Popper´s evolutionary theory of knowledge 
and learning (PTKL) offers such solid foundations. In particular, and unlike 
macroeconomic models grounded on REH, PTKL presupposes that the ‘true’ model of 
the economy is unknown by economic agents and theorists alike and presumes instead 
that: (i) all knowledge is conjectural, (ii) the adaptation of knowledge to the surrounding 
environment is always and everywhere imperfect, and, hence, never optimal, and (iii) 
economic agents´ decisions and actions may well bring about irreversible changes in the 
surrounding environment which they may not be able to fully anticipate. Further, PTKL 
implies that the main source of change in a complex adaptive system such as a market 
economy is the interaction between economic agents´ conjectures and their subsequent 
revisions in the face of observed discrepancies between expected and realized outcomes. 
In short, we argue below that PTKL may provide contemporary macroeconomics with 
robust epistemological and ontological foundations by allowing the former to take full 
account of human fallibility.    
The content of this essay is as follows. The following section contains a review of 
REH. We analyse REH in the light of PTKL and identify their differences in section 3. 
Since PTKL was reviewed in chapter 1 above, we refer readers to that chapter if need be. 
We explore the main elements of a new conceptual framework for macroeconomics 
grounded upon PTKL in section 4. The focus of our discussion will be on endogenous 
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change, the ephemeral nature of macroeconomic equilibrium, the `partial´ autonomy of 
expectations, and the notion of rationality. Finally, section 5 summarizes and concludes.      
 
2. The Rational Expectations Hypothesis 
No wonder REH has been the dominant approach to modelling economic agents´ 
expectations in macroeconomics over the last decades. REH has been interpreted as an 
attempt to provide macroeconomics with a theory of expectations formation that is a 
priori consistent with the optimization hypothesis. We owe its first formulation to Muth 
(1961) who suggests that expectations should be modelled in a way that allows them to 
change endogenously when the structure of the system changes:  
 
‘I should like to suggest that expectations, since they are informed predictions of 
future events, are essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economic 
theory… The hypothesis can be rephrased a little more precisely as follows: that 
expectations of businesses (or, more generally, the subjective probability distribution of 
outcomes) tend to be distributed, for the same information set, about the prediction of the 
theory (or the “objective” probability distributions of outcomes)’ (Muth, 1961, p. 316).    
 
 Therefore, according to Muth (1961, p. 316), REH implies that economic agents´ 
subjective expectations are, on average, equal to the ` true´ values of the variables. In other 
words, it is only the average of economic agents´ forecasts that will be equal to the 
mathematical expectation of the variable. As a result of it, the forecast of a given 
individual may not coincide with the latter.2 Yet, as Knudsen (1993, p. 153) observes, the 
reintroduction of the REH by Lucas entailed a reinterpretation of it. In particular, REH 
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was now reinterpreted as implying that the expectations of every single agent were correct 
on average. The reason Lucas (2001, p. 13) characterizes REH this way is that, under the 
premise that economists know the ‘true’ model of the economy, he interprets the 
systematic forecast errors made by those market participants who do not formulate their 
expectations according to REH as a symptom of their irrationality. Accordingly, the 
presence of significant but nevertheless unexploited correlations between market 
participants´ forecast errors and the information available to them was now interpreted as 
pointing to unrealized profit opportunities in real-world markets. As Lucas (2001, p. 13) 
puts it, ‘if your theory reveals profit opportunities, you have the wrong theory’. This 
means that, in addition to the premise that the ‘true’ model of the economy is known or 
knowable, REH imposes two further requirements on economic models: ‘substantive’ 
rationality by all market participants and mutual consistency of market participants´ 
expectations.3 For the purpose of this essay, a key issue is that REH is viewed by one of 
its most qualified proponents as requiring a high degree of stability and regularity over 
time of the phenomenon under study:   
 
 ‘Evidently, this hypothesis [Muthian rationality] will not be of value in 
understanding psychotic behaviour. Neither will it be applicable in situations in which we 
cannot guess which, if any, observable frequencies are relevant: situations which Knight 
called “uncertainty”. It will most likely be useful in situations in which the probabilities 
of interest concern a fairly well defined recurrent event, situations of “risk” in Knight´s 
terminology… In cases of uncertainty, economic reasoning will be of no value… ’ (Lucas, 
1977, p. 15, term in brackets and emphasis added).  
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 Thus, REH presumes that phenomena exhibit sufficient stability and regularity 
over time to allow economic agents to infer their stylized facts and attach probabilities to 
an exhaustive list of potential outcomes. In this respect, Lucas’ position coincides with 
that of Savage (1954), the father of subjective expected utility (SEU) theory, who defines 
‘small worlds’ as situations of perfect knowledge where all alternatives, their 
consequences, and their probabilities are known for certain. Examples of ‘small worlds’ 
are hazard games such as lotteries and roulette. According to Savage (op. cit.), these are 
the only types of environments in which the application of Bayesian decision theory is 
legitimate. By contrast, he defines ‘large worlds’ as those environments where part of the 
needed information is missing or else where the future is ‘uncertain’ in the sense of 
Keynes (1920) and Knight (1971[1921]). Crucially, Savage (1954, p. 16) insists that 
applying Bayesian theory to decisions in ‘large worlds’ does not make any sense because 
there is simply no way to know all the alternatives, their consequences, and their 
probabilities. Therefore, the regularity and predictability of economic phenomena that 
Lucas (op. cit.) presents as the sine qua non condition for the emergence of (presumably 
neoclassical) economic reasoning requires that the environment is stochastically stable or 
`ergodic´ so that market participants can extrapolate into the future the empirical 
regularities inferred from the past. In particular, the latter exhibit the key property that 
averages calculated from past observations can persistently differ from the time average 
of future outcomes (Davidson, 1991, p. 132).4 As Davidson (op. cit.) explains, for the 
REH to provide a theory of expectations formation, not only must the subjective and 
objective probability distribution functions coincide `at any point in time for all market 
participants´ but they must also be derived from ergodic stochastic processes. Thus, Lucas 
(1977) apparently accepts that some economic phenomena are non-ergodic but he 
suggests that economics should be concerned only with ergodic worlds.  
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Next, Lucas´ allusion in the quotation above to ‘repeated instances of essentially 
similar events’ also suggests that, at least initially, he had in mind an inductive theory of 
knowledge acquisition or learning. However, an inductive learning theory is necessarily 
grounded on a ‘cumulative’ theory of knowledge. The latter implies that, as the amount 
of information collected increases over time, the probability that our hypothesis is true 
increases and converges asymptotically to unity. Yet, as Boland (2003) argues, both the 
‘cumulative’ theory of knowledge and the inductive theory of learning are incompatible 
with Popper’s philosophy. To be sure, according to Popper all knowledge is conjectural 
and, hence, no matter how much (finite) favourable empirical evidence we accumulate, 
the likelihood of a hypothesis being `true´ does not increase. In any case, Lucas (1986) 
apparently adopted a somewhat different theory of learning later on. Specifically, when 
seeking to justify the optimization assumption he characterizes the situations on which 
economic theory focuses as the end-result of an adaptive learning process:  
 
‘Economics has tended to focus on situations in which the agent can be expected 
to “know” or to have learned the consequences of different actions so that his observed 
choices reveal stable features of his underlying preferences… Technically, I think of 
economics as studying decision rules that are steady states of some adaptive process, 
decision rules that are found to work over a range of situations and hence are no longer 
revised appreciably as more experience accumulates…’ (Lucas, 1986, p. 218).  
 
 This quotation reveals some features of Lucas’s later methodological approach 
which are not present in Lucas (1977). First, he seems to adopt a ‘cumulative’ theory of 
knowledge as he refers to the accumulation of experience. Second, he suggests that the 
decision rules neoclassical economic theory deals with, namely, those decisions rules that 
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stem from the implementation of optimization methods can be interpreted as steady states 
of an adaptive learning process. Although he does not elaborate on it, the latter 
presumably consists of a trial and error-elimination process whereby economic agents 
make decisions which may turn out to be right or wrong so that by discarding wrong 
decision rules and retaining the right ones they eventually ‘learn’. Such learning process 
bears some resemblance to PTKL in the sense of apparently being adaptive. However, as 
we argue below, such resemblance is superficial. Third, Lucas (1977) assumes that the 
learning process eventually converges to an optimum. Specifically, he observes that those 
forecasting rules which are not based on REH will tend to generate systematic forecast 
errors thereby revealing the existence of unrealized profit opportunities, the implicit 
proposition being that if forecasting rules are based upon REH an optimum will be 
attained and unrealized profit opportunities will thus not emerge (Lucas, 2001). Yet, as 
we argue below, this represents an extreme position which requires that, at least, the two 
following conditions be fulfilled: (i) the object of knowledge (i.e., an economy) must 
exhibit stability overtime and (ii) the feedback mechanism that connects economic 
agents´ expectations and realized outcomes must be fast and accurate enough. Finally, 
and crucially, Lucas appears to suggest that economics should be concerned solely with 
those decision rules that economic agents have adopted after the ‘true’ model has been 
found, the implicit assumption being that decisions made prior to its discovery do not 
have any impact on the economy, i.e., they do not affect the equilibrium. However, this 
logically requires either that the ‘true’ economic model exists prior to decisions made by 
economic agents or else that the latter´s actions do not affect the economy. Again, this 
feature of the ‘learning’ process alluded to in Lucas (1986) is closely linked to the 
ergodicity assumption referred to above in that a pre-existing reality that is independent 
of agents´ beliefs and actions is only compatible with an ergodic environment.  
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3. The `Rational Expectations Hypothesis´ in the light of Popper 
 In this section we examine REH in the light of PTKL. Our purpose is to identify 
the key differences between them in order to substantiate the claim that PTKL provides 
more solid epistemological and ontological foundations upon which macroeconomists 
can build a more useful macro-theory. In particular, we argue below that REH diverges 
dramatically from PTKL in, at least, three respects: the learning process, the nature of 
knowledge, and the nature of the world and human action. 
 
3.1. Can we ever get to know the `true´ model?  
The main contradiction REH encounters when viewed in light of PTKL is that the 
former does not possess a mechanism that allow economic agents to get to know the ‘true’ 
model. As we saw in chapter 1, PTKL implies that we can never know whether a certain 
hypothesis is ‘true’ and, hence, the assumption that economic agents know the ‘true’ 
model is fallacious. First, if we follow Popper, no matter how many models are tested and 
subsequently replaced, there is no way we can know whether the model we use for 
predictive purposes is ‘true’. By the ‘true’ model we mean, of course, the model that 
produces unbiased estimates. This is not only because there is not an `inductive logic´ but 
also because, as Popper explains, any model is always an over-simplification and, hence, 
false (Popper, 1994, p. 166). Consequently, all we can obtain is a model that produces 
‘better’ estimates than other models in a particular historical and institutional context — 
and even this may be hard to achieve due to the practical problems posed by the Duhem-
Quine thesis — but this does not prove that our model is ‘true’.5 In other words, we can 
never prove that a model is ‘true’. Thus, REH is a misnomer. It is not a hypothesis; it is 
an assumption.    
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Second, let us assume for the sake of convenience that economic agents happen 
to know the ‘true’ model of the economy so that their forecasts are unbiased on average 
and their errors are random, i.e., they fall on a bell-shaped curve around the ‘true’ value. 
Now, if all errors are assumed to be random, then economic agents will not be able to 
‘learn’ from them in the sense that they will not be able to revise their knowledge in the 
aftermath of a change in the surrounding environment that brings about a corresponding 
change in the ‘true’ model. To be sure, PTKL implies that we ‘learn’ by eliminating our 
non-random errors. In other words, error-elimination requires that realized outcomes 
diverge significantly and systematically from expected ones. However, random errors 
must average out to zero in the long run and, hence, they cannot be used for ‘learning’ 
purposes.6 Another way of putting this is that, if an economic agent makes a random error 
in a period and then makes different ones in subsequent periods in the wake of new 
shocks, she will not be able to discern a systematic pattern in error-making and will thus 
be unable to revise expectations accordingly. Consequently, error-elimination cannot 
proceed if errors are random. Now, if the environment changes in a way that the ‘true’ 
model also changes economic agents will need to revise their model. Otherwise, their 
errors could not remain random. According to PTKL such ` revision´ can only be the result 
of a process of trial and error-elimination. But, as we argued above, if such a process is 
to come about errors must be systematic. Yet, the latter is precluded by REH. To 
conclude, REH lacks a truly learning mechanism grounded upon a trial and error-
elimination process as required by PTKL. The only mechanism advocates of REH can 
rely on to justify the assumption that economic agents know the ‘true’ model is a simple 
extrapolation into the future of data obtained from the past. Yet, if this is to take place the 
stochastic environment needs to be assumed to be stochastically stable or ergodic. This 
explains why Lucas (1977) rightly suggests that REH only applies to situations of ‘risk’. 
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Consequently, if REH is to be internally consistent its advocates need to assume that: (i) 
market participants do not need to learn the ‘true’ model, they simply know it, and (ii) the 
surrounding environment is ergodic so that the ‘true’ model does not change throughout. 
In an ergodic environment the only source of fallibility is economic agents´ inability to 
forecast future ‘exogenous’ random shocks.    
 
3.2. Can our knowledge become ‘optimal’? 
Models that adopt REH assume that economic agents´ knowledge is perfectly 
adapted to the surrounding environment so that, as we noted above, the only source of 
fallibility economic agents exhibit is their inability to fully anticipate the ‘exogenous’ 
random shocks that will hit the economy. By contrast, PTKL implies that the learning 
process market participants go through never results in an optimal adaptation to the 
surrounding environment (Popper, 1994, p. 4). In particular, Popper emphasizes that the 
process of adaptation to the latter is often successful and often unsuccessful owing to the 
fact that some errors will inevitably escape and this possibility is one of the reasons why 
we are fallible (Popper, 1990, p. 47). Therefore, and due to the `less than complete´ 
elimination of errors, the adaptation of our knowledge is always imperfect. It follows that 
observed states of adaptation of knowledge cannot be the result of convergence to an 
optimum. Should all errors be purged, the process of adaptation to the surrounding 
environment would be perfect. At that stage, our knowledge would be fallible only to the 
extent that changes in the surrounding environment cannot be fully anticipated. As we 
noted above, this is the scenario implied by REH. By contrast, PTKL has it that our errors 
may well be systematic.  
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3.3. What, if the future is objectively open? 
 Lucas (1977, p. 15) argues that Muthian rationality ‘will most likely be useful in 
situations in which the probabilities of interest concern a well defined recurrent event, 
situations of ‘risk’. The latter correspond to environments in which individuals can infer 
the empirical regularities observed in the past and extrapolate them into the future. We 
argued above that the ‘learning’ process Lucas (1986) apparently has in mind makes sense 
solely in situations where the environment is ergodic. The reason is that, as we explained 
above, REH is logically inconsistent in a non-ergodic environment insofar as it does not 
possess a learning mechanism. Now, the ergodicity assumption logically implies that the 
actions undertaken by economic agents during the ‘learning’ process both before and after 
expectations become ‘rational’ do not affect the RE equilibrium. But this, in turn, implies 
that the latter exists prior to the beginning of the ‘learning’ process, i.e., it is pre-
determined. In short, REH implies a deterministic world in which the future is a mere 
statistical reflection of the past. However, in a deterministic world human action is unduly 
constrained. Specifically, only actions that bring about routine change are allowed for. 
Thus, by stating that REH only applies to situations of ‘risk’ (or ‘small worlds’) Lucas 
(1977) restricts its validity to a deterministic and, hence, ergodic world. In such a world, 
there is very little room for fallibility. By contrast, Popper posits that the world is ‘non-
deterministic’; it is a world where the future is yet to be built as a result of our actions. It 
is only in a macro-theory in which it is assumed that the world is both non-deterministic 
and not pre-determined that economists can take due account of human fallibility.   
4. A tentative conceptual framework for macroeconomics 
We believe that PTKL provides macroeconomics with a conceptual framework 
which can potentially encompass a wide range of traditions in economics. Our starting 
point is the idea that agents´ decisions require the previous formation of expectations. Let 
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us think of the relation between expectations and ex-post realizations as a negative 
feedback mechanism whereby economic agents systematically revise their expectations 
in the wake of observed discrepancies between expectations and realized outcome. In 
principle, if the object of knowledge about which economic agents form expectations is 
stochastically stable or ergodic and the feedback mechanism is fast and accurate enough 
then the systematic operation of a trial and error-elimination mechanism should allow 
expectations to converge to equilibrium. As we suggested above, this appears to be the 
scenario contemplated in Lucas (1986).  
 Now, PTKL envisages an evolutionary process driven mainly by the interaction 
of two different feedback mechanisms. The first mechanism relates economic agents´ 
expectations and ex-post realizations. As advanced above, it is a negative feedback that 
allows agents to revise their expectations in the face of observed discrepancies between 
the former and the latter. An implication of PTKL is that this feedback mechanism is 
imperfect as some errors manage to escape so that, even if the surrounding environment 
is ergodic expectations do not eventually converge to an optimum. The second feedback 
mechanism stems from the impact on the object of knowledge (e.g., a market economy) 
of market participants´ beliefs, decisions, and actions. Popper posits it in his Poverty of 
Historicism (Popper, 1944, p. 89) and denotes it as the ‘Oedipus effect’ (hereafter OE) 
after Sophocles´ Oedipus the King tragedy. Unlike the previous feedback mechanism, its 
sign is a priori is ambiguous. If negative, then economic agents´ decisions will bring 
about changes in the surrounding environment that tend to narrow the gap between ex-
ante expectations and ex-post realizations. This case corresponds to the scenario known 
in the economics literature as self-fulfilling prophecies.7 There are many phenomena in 
economics which can be characterized by the presence of a negative OE such as: bank 
panics, speculative bubbles, sovereign debt crisis in countries belonging to a currency 
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union, etc. For instance, if deposit holders believe that their bank may go illiquid, they 
will try to draw their deposits as soon as possible irrespective of what the real liquidity 
situation of the bank is. In turn, by doing so, they will actually drive the bank illiquid. 
Through this mechanism, the gap between economic agents´ expectations and ex-post 
realizations tends to narrow and may eventually disappear. Situations characterized by 
the presence of a negative OE may lead to instability in the economy and, hence, some 
sort of institutional device may need to be set in place so as to short-circuit the former 
and prevent instability from actually taking place (e.g., deposit insurance system, debt 
monetization, etc.). By contrast, if OE is positive, economic agents´ beliefs, decisions, 
and actions will cause changes in the surrounding environment that tend to widen the gap 
between ex-ante expectations and ex-post realizations. Situations characterized by a 
positive OE are uncommon in macroeconomics.8     
Soros (2013) alludes to a feedback mechanism equivalent to OE he denotes as the 
‘principle of reflexivity’ and places it together with the ‘principle of fallibility’ at the 
centre of a new conceptual framework allegedly aimed at replacing current thinking in 
economics based on both REH and the Efficient Market Hypothesis. As Soros (2013) 
admits, the conceptual framework he proposes is inspired by Popper´s philosophy and, 
hence, it exhibits many similarities with the one being proposed here. However, and to 
the best of our knowledge, he does not associate his `principle of reflexivity´ with 
Popper´s OE. Nevertheless, we think there are some differences between the framework 
proposed by Soros and ours. More specifically, Soros (2013, p. 323) argues that REH 
represents a limiting case within his conceptual framework. According to him, REH can 
be characterized by the twin facts that (i) market participants´ revision of expectations 
can go forever, and (ii) the environment does not undergo significant changes. By 
contrast, we think that REH is incompatible with PTKL and the conceptual framework 
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that stems from it owing to the following facts: (i) REH presupposes that there is a pre-
determined reality (i.e., the world is ergodic), (ii) REH lacks a `learning´ mechanism that 
allows market participants to ever get to know the ‘true’ model (i.e., agents´ errors are 
assumed to be random), and (iii) REH presupposes that `true´ knowledge can be attained 
(i.e., there is an `inductive logic´). In the rest of this section we explore in more detail 
some features and implications of the conceptual framework sketched above.   
 
4.1. Ephemeral equilibrium 
Next, as we argued above, PTKL implies that market participants´ decisions and 
actions interact with the surrounding environment by virtue of two interrelated feedback 
mechanisms. In turn, the interaction of these two feedback mechanisms will, by itself, 
generate endogenous change and, in the process, it will tend to make equilibrium fragile 
and short-lived.9 This is because, as market participants revise their expectations in the 
aftermath of observed mistakes, the operation of the negative OE alluded to above may 
lead to changes in the previous equilibrium by bringing about irreversible changes in the 
economy. No wonder, the existence of OE highlights the limitations of the notion of 
equilibrium in macroeconomics and suggests that the study of processes of change may 
be more illuminating for policy purposes than the analysis of ephemeral equilibria. For 
instance, in the context of the NNS model, the level of aggregate demand is assumed to 
adjust passively to the (equilibrium) supply-side determined level of economic activity in 
the long run whereas in the framework we posit here the existence of a negative OE 
suggests that changes in the demand side of the economy will feed back into the supply-
side (e.g., if the unemployment rate exhibits hysteresis). The picture that emerges is thus 
one where the demand and supply side of the economy influence each other so the level 
of economic activity can be said to be neither supply-side nor demand-side determined. 
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This idea is formalized algebraically in Shaikh (2013) who constructs a system of three 
differential equations capturing the dynamics of the actual, expected, and fundamental 
value of a certain macro-variable. He shows that a reduced two-dimensional dynamical 
system capturing the dynamics of the actual and expected values of the variable in 
question is stable in the sense that both values fluctuate around the fundamental value 
although, crucially, the latter may drift away. In other words, the economic system does 
not possess an (fixed) equilibrium to which the actual, expected, and fundamental value 
converge but, rather, it constitutes a ‘moving centre of gravity’. The main prediction that 
stems from Shaikh´s model is that the economy will exhibit boom-bust cycles of varying 
amplitude and length.      
 
4.2. Endogenous versus exogenous instability    
 Let us start by saying that the adoption of REH in macroeconomics precludes the 
exploration of the hypothesis that important malfunctions of market economies are the 
outcome of systematic errors in the formation of economic agents´ expectations. If REH 
is adopted, phenomena such as financial crisis or aggregate output fluctuations can only 
be ascribed to the occurrence of ‘exogenous’ random shocks. Let us dwell on this point. 
When assuming that economic agents do not make systematic mistakes advocates of REH 
are also compelled to assume that the economy is hit by ‘exogenous’ shocks. If agents´ 
expectations are unbiased, shocks can only be random and ‘exogenous’ insofar as agents 
can fully anticipate any trouble lying ahead stemming from endogenous forces and act 
consequently. Further, REH implies that agents’ mistakes always occur after the shocks 
have hit the economy in the sense that they are ‘caused’ by them. Now, if we put these 
two elements together we have that REH implies that agents never make mistakes other 
than those ones induced by random and ‘exogenous’ shocks and, consequently, non-
206 
 
random mistakes cannot be a source of instability. For instance, aggregate output 
fluctuations can solely be ascribed to factors ‘external’ to the economy such as abrupt 
political changes, ‘natural’ disasters, or technological revolutions. In short, REH biases 
macroeconomics by ruling out by default the possibility that macroeconomic instability 
is endogenously generated and, by doing so, it restricts itself to a ‘small world’ in the 
sense of Savage (1954).10 
 
4.3. Evolutionary macroeconomics  
As we have noted above, the occurrence of random mistakes in the wake of 
‘exogenous’ random shocks is the only source of fallibility allowed for in models that 
adopt REH. However, this is a severely restricted approach to fallibility. To be sure, 
accounting fully for fallibility implies recognition that economic agents´ mistakes may be 
systematic owing to the fact that: (i) we can never ‘prove’ that a given hypothesis is ‘true’, 
(ii) learning and, hence, knowledge is always imperfect, and (iii) the surrounding 
environment undergoes unpredictable changes brought about (endogenously) by agents´ 
beliefs, decisions, and actions. As a result of it, agents´ will typically face situations of 
‘uncertainty’ in the sense of Knight (1971[1921]) and Keynes (1920) or, equivalently, 
they will find themselves in ‘large worlds’ (Savage, 1954). In such scenario, fallibility 
can be modelled by the operation of the two feedback mechanisms described above.     
 Now, the interaction of the two feedback mechanisms posited above may bring 
about endogenous change in a way that is strongly reminiscent of evolutionary systems. 
An example of the latter is Holland´s (1992) concept of ‘Complex Adaptive System’ or 
(CAS). If we think of a market economy as a particular type of CAS then its evolution 
can be modelled as driven by the interaction of credit assignment and rule discovery 
procedures. Both procedures constitute complex feedback systems which, on the one 
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hand, reinforce (discourage) the use of rules that have performed well (badly) in the past 
(‘credit assignment procedure’) and, on the other hand, produce new rules by combining 
the rules that have performed well in the past. The implementation of new rules will be 
aided by the formulation of ‘internal models’ that help anticipating the consequences of 
the adoption of certain rules. Importantly, and regardless of whether anticipations prove 
to be right or wrong, once such `internal models´ are undertaken, they will bring about 
irreversible changes in the surrounding environment thereby forcing CAS to re-evaluate 
its own ‘internal models’. Thus, the process of adaptation is never-ending and cannot be 
optimal. As noted in Beinhocker (2013), forecasting is extremely difficult in a CAS yet 
this does not prevent it from generating `predictions´, the latter being understood as the 
deductive logical consequences of a theory. An example of this is evolutionary biology. 
The example of CAS reveals that, by adopting REH, macroeconomics becomes 
incompatible with an evolutionary approach. First, as we argued above, REH is not a 
hypothesis but an assumption. By contrast, according to PTKL knowledge constitutes the 
product of an evolutionary process whereby false conjectures tend to be eliminated over 
time. Second, many of the changes that take place in the economy in the wake of decisions 
and actions adopted by market participants may be ‘irreversible’ in the sense that, once 
they are undertaken, it is extremely costly to undo them or they simply cannot be undone 
because the surrounding environment may have changed substantially as a result of the 
decisions made. However, if some changes are ‘irreversible’ the economy will exhibit 
path-dependency. To be sure, the latter implies non-ergodicity and this, in turn, precludes 
REH.   
We believe that if contemporary macroeconomics is to fully account for human 
fallibility it will need to adopt an evolutionary approach. Several traditions in economic 
analysis have adopted such an approach in the past, some well-known examples being the 
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(Old) Institutionalist School of Veblen, Mitchell and Commons, the Austrian School of 
Schumpeter, Menger, and Hayek, the Evolutionary school (Nelson & Winter, 2002), 
Complexity Economics (Arthur, 2013), Imperfect Knowledge Economics (Frydman & 
Goldberg, 2007), and those Post-Keynesians who have adopted Minsky’s interpretation 
of Keynes’s General Theory (Minsky, 1975). It is beyond the scope of this essay to 
evaluate whether and to what extent these approaches are fully compatible with PTKL. 
However, let us note that a common feature of all of them is that change is generated 
endogenously by a negative feedback mechanism connecting observed discrepancies 
between expected and realized outcomes, elimination of errors, and generation of new 
(tentative) conjectures.  
 
4.4. The partial autonomy of expectations and its implications   
 In the context of the NNS model it is assumed that in the presence of (full) price 
and wage flexibility a market economy will reach steady-state equilibrium. However, its 
advocates commonly argue that in the presence of nominal and real rigidities aggregate 
output may deviate temporarily from steady-state equilibrium. In particular, this will be 
the case if the economy is hit by ‘exogenous’ shocks. Policy analysis in the NSS model 
thus consists of determining the optimal values of policy instruments given a fully pre-
specified macroeconomic model where economic agents know both the ‘true’ model of 
the economy and the stochastic properties of ‘exogenous’ shocks. Now, the NNS model 
implies that market participants´ expectations do not play an autonomous role in the 
determination of the values of the variables of the model. This is captured in Frydman 
and Goldberg (2013, p. 143) who note that ‘REH, by design, imposes exact consistency 
between the sharp prediction — a single probability distribution of outcomes — implied 
by an economist´s aggregate model and the probability distribution representing 
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participants´ forecasting strategies’. In order words, REH implies that economic agents´ 
expectations adapt passively to the forecasts generated by the model itself. This way, 
macroeconomists may assume (rather than prove) the existence of a stable equilibrium 
where: (i) expectations are always and fully realized, and (ii) there are no endogenous 
forces pushing the economy away from it. By contrast, the possibility that market 
participants´ decisions change the surrounding environment implies that expectations do 
play, at least partly, an autonomous role in the sense that they do not adapt passively to a 
pre-determined equilibrium. No wonder, the recognition of the partial autonomy of 
expectations takes us back to Keynes´s General Theory where he makes it clear that:  
 
‘The considerations upon which expectations of prospective yields are based are 
partly existing facts which we can assume to be known more or less for certain, and partly 
future events which can only be forecasted with more or less confidence... We may sum 
up the state of psychological expectation which covers the latter as being the state of long-
term expectation’ (Keynes, 1936, pp. 147-148).    
 
Keynes (1936, ch. 12) argues that the ‘state of long-term expectations’ depends 
partly on the ‘state of confidence’ with which we make the most probable forecast we can 
make. In turn, the former affects the marginal efficiency of capital and liquidity 
preference and, through the multiplier effect on consumption demand, it determines the 
level of economic activity. The partial autonomy of expectations hinders a theoreticians´ 
attempt to obtain an overarching account of the economy and, arguably, constitutes a key 
difference between the natural and the social sciences. As argued in Hayek (1943), it is 
only in the social sciences that our interpretation of a situation no matter whether it is 
right or wrong becomes an integral part of the situation thereby affecting subsequent 
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developments. Further, and to the extent that we understand the surrounding world via 
the ‘internal models’ we create for that purpose, our (partial) understanding of the world 
will affect our decisions and, in this way, it may affect the world itself. Acceptingly, the 
partial autonomy of economic agents´ expectations with respect to the current structure 
of the economy poses a formidable methodological challenge to macroeconomists. The 
challenge is to develop a conceptual framework that takes account of the simultaneous 
evolution of the economy´s structure and economic agents´ understanding of the latter.  
 
4.5. Rationality 
The notion of rationality embedded in REH is contingent on the crucial premise 
that the ‘true’ model of the economy is either known or knowable. This is implicit in 
Muth´s (1961) description of REH as a purely descriptive hypothesis and in Lucas´ 
reinterpretation of REH as an assumption about how every market participant forecasts. 
As Frydman and Goldberg (2013) note, Lucas took for granted that market participants 
can construct a fully predetermined model that provides an account of how the economy 
evolves over time and, consequently, he argued that it would be ‘irrational’ for them to 
make systematic forecast errors since this would reveal the presence of unexploited profit 
opportunities (Lucas, 2001, p.13). Therefore, even if we disregard the conceptual 
difficulties that arise if an attempt is made to show REH as the end-result of an eductive 
process the question emerges what the appropriate benchmark for individual rationality 
is when the ‘true’ model of the economy is unknown and unknowable.11 We believe the 
answer is in PTKL. According to it, ‘rational’ behaviour consists of making conjectures 
and the corresponding decisions and, if necessary, revising them in the face of observed 
discrepancies between expected and realized outcomes. This notion of rationality does 
not imply that rational behaviour is always or often effective. Rather, all that is required 
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from economic agents is that they revise their decisions in the light of their observed 
mistakes. In particular, a decision which initially appears to be correct a priori given the 
information available to decision-makers may turn out to be wrong ex-post for reasons 
unrelated to the reasonableness of the decision previously made such as, for instance, the 
occurrence of unforeseen changes in the surrounding environment. 
Next, Popper´s notion of individual rationality (PR) bears some resemblance to 
Simon´s (1976) notion of ‘bounded’ rationality (BR) in that, unlike the accompanying 
notion of ‘substantive’ rationality (SR), rational behaviour is not assumed to be optimal. 
Nevertheless, as we show below, it exhibits several differences with it.12 Table 1 below 
illustrates the key differences and similarities between PR and the notion of SR and BR 
coined by Simon (1976, 1979). First, SR presumes that the ‘true’ model of the economy 
is known or knowable by economic agents whereas BR presumes that the former is not 
known for practical purposes but could be potentially known if the costs of searching for 
information were low enough and the computational difficulties faced by economic 
agents were not insurmountable. This is apparent, for instance, in Simon (1979, p. 502) 
when he makes it clear that BR is ‘a residual category ― rationality is bounded when it 
falls short of omniscience’. As Simon (op. cit.) explains, there are three different types of 
failures of omniscience: (i) failures of knowing all the alternatives, (ii) uncertainty about 
exogenous events, and (iii) inability (due to computational capacity constraints) to 
calculate the full consequences of every possible choice. Further, he argues that if the 
alternatives for choice are not given initially market participants will need to search for 
them and, hence, a theory of BR must incorporate a ‘theory of search’. However, the 
implicit premise is that if search costs were low enough and computational constraints 
were negligible market participants could know all the possible alternatives for choice. In 
other words, Simon apparently takes for granted that there exists an ‘inductive logic’ so 
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that what prevents economic agents from knowing the ‘true’ model of the economy is the 
presence of both high information search costs and computational constraints.13 In 
contrast to this, PR presupposes that the ‘true’ model of the economy is neither known 
nor knowable, the main reason being the conjectural nature of knowledge.       
                                      
Approaches  Domain   Dichotomy  
Conventional 
approaches to 
rationality: The ‘true’ 
model is either known 
or knowable 
‘Substantive’ 
rationality: it 
applies only to 
situations of ‘risk’ 
Rational 
behaviour 
Optimal 
(attainable) 
Irrational 
behaviour Sub-optimal 
‘Bounded’ rationality: 
it applies both to 
situations of ‘risk’ & 
‘Knightian’ uncertainty 
Behaviour is 
generally 
`rational´  
(e.g. 
heuristics) 
Optimal  
(Unattainable) 
Behaviour is  
generally sub-
optimal  
Popper´s approach to 
rationality 
(The ‘true’ model is 
neither known nor 
knowable) 
It applies both to 
situations of ‘risk’ & 
‘Knightian’ uncertainty 
Behaviour is 
generally 
`rational´(i.e., 
corrigible) 
No dichotomy 
Table 3: Popper´s notion of rationality and alternative approaches to rationality in 
economics 
 
Now, as Lucas (1977) insists, ‘in cases of [Knightian] uncertainty, economic 
reasoning will be of no value’ which entails that SR and REH only apply to situations of 
‘risk’ or ‘small worlds‘. By contrast, BR and PR apply both to situations of ‘risk’ and 
‘Knightian’ uncertainty. In situations of ‘risk’ BR basically consists of using rules (e.g. 
algorithms) to estimate the probabilities of an exhaustive list of potential outcomes by 
extrapolating information obtained from the past. Similarly, in situations of ‘risk’ PR 
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amounts to re-estimating periodically the numerical probabilities of a list of potential 
outcomes in the light of observed discrepancies between estimated probabilities and 
realized relative frequencies. However, as Lucas (1977) argues, SR does not apply in 
situations characterized by ‘Knightian’ uncertainty due to the impossibility of applying 
(neoclassical) economic theory. By contrast, both BR and PR apply in this case thereby 
leaving some room for ‘economic reasoning’ even when the surrounding environment is 
such as to preclude the assignment of numerical probabilities to each possible outcome. 
There is, by now, a large literature on rational behaviour under ‘Knightian’ uncertainty 
where the former consists of the use of different heuristics (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 
2011) and the adoption of social rules (Hodgson, 1997). We believe these approaches to 
rational behaviour are compatible with PKTL.        
Next, both SR and BR imply an undesirable dichotomy between optimality and 
sub-optimality. The dichotomy is explicit in SR where `rational´ behaviour is associated 
to optimality whereas `irrational´ behaviour is synonymous with sub-optimal behaviour 
(Becker, 1962). By contrast, we believe the dichotomy is implicit in BR where optimal 
behaviour is presented as being generally unattainable but `potentially attainable´ under 
favourable (albeit very unusual) circumstances. In particular, BR implies that results will 
generally be sub-optimal due to the shortcomings of market participants´ cognitive 
abilities which prevent them from processing, storing, and analysing a large quantity of 
information. Yet, this implies that optimal behaviour constitutes a benchmark against 
which the actual degree of sub-optimality of economic agents´ behaviour can be a priori 
determined. By contrast, such dichotomy does not exist in the case of PR where there is 
no such thing as an ‘optimal’ benchmark. Rather, PR implies that market participants´ 
choices will never be optimal (except by sheer chance) even if their cognitive abilities 
and computational power are unbounded insofar as knowledge ― including knowledge 
214 
 
about the ‘true’ model of the economy ― is always conjectural. In other words, the notion 
of optimal choice that pervades contemporary macroeconomics makes sense only if the 
‘true’ model of the economy is either known or knowable by market participants.  By 
contrast, PTKL does not presuppose that `true´ knowledge is attainable; it implies that 
economic agents´ behaviour is normally rational insofar as Popper´s ‘principle of 
transference’ (Popper, 1972, p. 6) posits that `what is true in philosophy is also true in 
psychology´. In short, the notion of ‘rationality’ that stems from PTKL is inextricably 
linked to the fallibility of human knowledge.  
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
Macroeconomic theory has been dominated over the last decades by REH which 
implies that economic agents are assumed to know the ‘true’ model of the economy so 
that their expectations are unbiased. The assumption that economic agents do not make 
systematic mistakes implies, in turn, that economies are assumed to be inherently stable 
and that macroeconomic volatility is caused exclusively by ‘exogenous’ random shocks. 
REH is a core element of the NNS model which has played a dominant role in theory and 
policy over (at least) the last decade and which, according to some commentators, bears 
some responsibility for the generation of the last financial crisis. We ascribed the 
difficulties of REH and the NNS model to their flawed epistemological and ontological 
foundations. Specifically, we argued that the adoption of REH biases macroeconomics 
and reduces its practical relevance by restricting its applicability to situations of ‘risk’ 
(Knight, 1971[1921]) or ‘small worlds’ (Savage, 1954). In such contexts, the solely 
source of fallibility is the inability by economic agents to anticipate ‘exogenous’ random 
shocks. We argued that this is too constraining a conception of human fallibility as it 
ignores fundamental sources of the latter such as the logical impossibility of knowing the 
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‘true’ model of the economy owing to the lack of an ‘inductive logic’, the imperfect nature 
of learning, and the changing nature of the environment in which economic agents make 
economic decisions. We went on to claim that PTKL provides macro-theory with solid 
epistemological and ontological foundations in that it enables it to take full account of 
human fallibility.  
If macroeconomics is to reorient itself to take full account of human fallibility it 
needs to focus on the changes in the surrounding environment brought about by market 
participants´ beliefs, decisions, and actions. In particular, we argued that, in the context 
of a market economy, change and evolution can be viewed as generated endogenously by 
the interaction of the two feedback mechanisms: (i) a negative feedback mechanism 
whereby market participants revise their previous expectations in the light of observed 
systematic discrepancies between expected and realized outcomes, and (ii) a feedback 
mechanism of ambiguous sign whereby market participants´ decisions and actions may 
alter the surrounding environment in an unpredictable way. We then argued that the 
endogeneity of change and evolution in market economies generates two predictions: (i) 
macroeconomic equilibrium is fragile and, hence, short-lived thereby making it difficult 
for theorists and policy-makers to exploit it, and (ii) market economies exhibit boom-bust 
cycles of varying amplitude and duration so that there is never a repetition of the same 
cycle. The former suggests that the importance of the notion of equilibrium in the context 
of macroeconomics tends to be overemphasized and that more attention needs to be paid 
to the causes and features of processes of transformation over time instead of 
characterizing (stable) equilibrium. Finally, we argued that, unlike conventional notions 
of rationality in economics such as Simon´s twin notions of ‘substantive’ and ‘bounded’ 
rationality, the notion of rationality associated to PTKL does not generate a dichotomy 
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between `optimal´ and `sub-optimal´ behaviour since, unlike them, PTKL presupposes 
the inexistence of an `inductive logic´.  
Lastly, we noted that some of the concepts we associated to PTKL can be also 
identified in other approaches in economics that have developed outside mainstream 
economics which, according to us, suggests that the development of a new conceptual 
framework for macroeconomics would benefit substantially from a re-examination of 
these approaches. Further, we believe there are other branches of knowledge economists 
can also take advantage of and whose conceptual frameworks are a priori compatible 
with PTKL. Some examples of this are: evolutionary psychology, evolutionary biology, 
and ‘complex adaptive systems’ theory. In short, we believe the development of a new 
macro-theory along PTKL will require that economists adopt a more interdisciplinary and 
less pretentious approach than has been the case in the recent past. To paraphrase Popper 
‘the future is objectively open’. Thus, it is in our own hands to change it. Let us hope that 
economists take up the challenge.       
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Notes 
 
1 For instance, Frydman & Phelps (2013, p. 6) argue that ‘in a leap of faith that transformed 
macroeconomics and finance for generations, Lucas presumed that the right theory of capitalist economies, 
which arguably thrive on nonroutine change, is a fully predetermined model that assumes that such change 
is unimportant’.  
 
2 However, Muth (1961, p. 317) notes that, for the purpose of analysis, he focuses on a ‘specialized’ or 
restrictive form of REH where it is assumed that: (i) the random disturbances that hit the economy are 
normally distributed, (ii) certainty equivalence holds for all the variables that are to be forecast, and (iii) 
the equations of the system are linear.  
 
3 Simon (1976, p. 130) identifies human behaviour as being substantively rational ‘when it is appropriate 
to the achievement of given goals within the limits imposed by given conditions and constraints’.  
 
4 Specifically, if the stochastic process is ergodic, then for an infinite realization of it the time statistics will 
coincide with the space statistics. If the realization of the stochastic process is finite, time and space statistics 
will coincide except for the presence of random errors albeit they will tend to converge as the number of 
observations increases. Thus, if the surrounding environment is assumed to be ergodic, then statistics 
calculated from past time series or cross-sectional data will be reliable estimates of the space statistics that 
will occur at any future date (Davidson, 1996, p. 480).   
 
5 To be sure, refutation does not prove a theory false in the sense that negative empirical results are never 
definitive. In other words, no conclusive disproof of a hypothesis can ever be produced for it is always 
possible to say that the experimental results are not reliable. In particular, the empirical testing of any 
hypothesis is necessarily accompanied by a certain number of `auxiliary´ empirical hypotheses so that, in 
the wake of a negative result, the theoretician may be tempted to blame any of the `auxiliary´ hypotheses 
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rather than the `central´ hypothesis for the occurrence of the negative result. This problem is known in the 
literature as the `Duhem-Quine´ thesis. A discussion of the latter in the context of macroeconomics is in 
Cross (1982).  
 
6 Under REH forecast errors stem only from the occurrence of ‘exogenous’ random shocks since the model 
that generates forecasts is assumed to coincide with the ‘true’ model. In turn, random errors are assumed to 
be generated by a probability distribution of zero mean.  
 
7 According to Merton (1948, p. 195) a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ is an initially false definition, conception 
or interpretation of the situation that evokes a new behaviour which makes the originally false definition 
come true.  
 
8 Let us provide an example related to social psychology. Let us assume that there is a widespread belief in 
the media and the sports community that a certain team is to win a championship. Now, on the one hand, 
the members of the team may well relax since everybody takes for granted that they will win. On the other 
hand, rival teams are likely to work and train harder since they are aware that they will only have a chance 
to win if they improve their performance substantially. The joint effect of the initial belief on both the 
winner-to-be team and its weaker rivals may end up ― through the operation of a positive OE ― making 
one of the rival teams eventually win the championship contrary to the initial expectations. In other words, 
the operation of a positive OE in this case leads to a widening of the gap between agents´ expectations and 
realized outcomes.  
 
9 In this respect, Rosenberg (2013) draws a useful distinction between `biological´ and `cultural´ domains. 
According to him, the difference in the nature of equilibrium in these two domains is only one of degree. 
As he explains, in the biological domain the interaction of different feedback mechanisms produces stable 
cycles that exhibit a high degree of persistence owing to the fact that the former are ‘held in check by 
environments that change with geological slowness’ (2013, p. 435). By contrast, he argues that the typical 
environment in cultural domains is subject to very rapid change. In particular, their lifetimes are inversely 
related to the rate of change of the cultural environment itself. Consequently, equilibrium in such domains 
is short-lived.    
  
10 The dichotomy between exogenous and endogenously-created instability is also captured in De Grauwe 
(2009) who distinguishes between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ systems. The former are systems where one 
or more agents fully understand the system as in the models adopting REH. By contrast, the latter are 
systems in which no individual understands the whole picture so that rationality consists of a trial-and-error 
selection process. De Grauwe (2009) recognises that the latter constitutes an example of rational behaviour 
which may result in a business cycle with a large endogenous component. A similar remark is in Arthur 
(2013, p. 3). However, neither De Grauwe (2009) nor Arthur (2013) mention that the notion of a trial and 
error-elimination process as the characterization of rationality has its philosophical foundation in PTKL. 
 
11 As Guesnerie (2013, p. 52) points out, the RE equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. Yet, the possibility of 
attaining an equilibrium through an `eductive´ process — a process that takes place in people´s minds 
whereby equilibrium is achieved through systematic reasoning of the decision-makers involved — faces 
insurmountable conceptual difficulties as illustrated in Knudsen (1993). 
 
12 According to Simon (1979), economic agents´ knowledge is subject to three types of constraints: (i) a 
limited ability to process, analyse, and store information, (ii) uncertainty, and (iii) the presence of social 
institutions. His notion of ‘bounded’ rationality stems from the fact that the existence of these constraints 
prevents economic agents from ‘optimizing’.  
 
13 Or as Boland (2003, p. 40) puts it, Simon (1979) does not really deny Inductivism, only the feasibility of 
inductive knowledge.   
 
 
